Antitrust Considerations in the Organization and Operation of American Business Abroad by Donovan, Peter A
Boston College Law Review
Volume 9
Issue 2 Number 2 Article 1
1-1-1968
Antitrust Considerations in the Organization and
Operation of American Business Abroad
Peter A. Donovan
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the International Trade Law
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter A. Donovan, Antitrust Considerations in the Organization and Operation of American Business
Abroad, 9 B.C.L. Rev. 239 (1968), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol9/iss2/1
BOSTON COLLEGE
INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME IX
	
WINTER 1968
	 NUMBER 2
ANTITRUST CONSIDERATIONS IN THE
ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF
AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
PETER A. DONOVAN *
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION 
	  240
II. GENERAL PROBLEMS 
	  242
A. Jurisdiction 	  242
B. The Legality of Foreign Investment 
	  250
III. INVESTMENT INTERESTS WITHOUT BUSINESS PARTICIPATION—
THE SECTION 7 INVESTMENT DEFENSE 
	  255
IV. INVESTMENT INTERESTS WITH BUSINESS PARTICIPATION 	  263
A. Establishment Problems 	  263
1. Monopolization and Attempts to Monopolize 	  265
2. Acquisitions and Mergers 	  271
a. Under the Sherman Act 	  272
b. Under the Clayton Act 	  277
3. The Joint Venture 	  282
a. In General 	  282
b. The Purpose of the Joint Venture and the Restricted Area of Per
Se Illegality 	  284
c. The Joint Venture and the Rule of Reason 	  292
d. The Impact of the Clayton Act on the Joint Venture 	  298
B. Problems of Operation 	  302
1. Conspiracy 	  302
a. In General 	  302
b. Intracorporate Conspiracy 	  304
c. Intraenterprise Conspiracy 	  312
d. Ancillary Restraints and Postestablishment Conspiracy Problems of
the Joint Venture 	  322
2. Antitrust Responsibility for the Acts of Affiliates 	  330
V. RECAPITULATION 	  346
A. The Legality of the Establishment 	  347
B. Internal Conspiracies 	  349
1. Unincorporated Establishments 	  349
2. Wholly Owned Subsidiaries 	  349
3. Partially Owned Subsidiaries 	  350
4. Joint Ventures 	  350
C. Vicarious Liability 	  351
D. Conclusion 	  352
* A.B., Boston College, 1957; LLB , Boston College, 1960; LL.M., Georgetown Uni-
versity, 1962; Associate Professor, Boston College Law School.
239
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the geographic dimensions of the world have be-
come much less pronounced and global trade has flourished. The
Second World War has affected not only the political climate in the
United States, changing it from an essentially isolationist nation into a
major political power, but also the character of American business. The
most immediate and startling effect has been the restructuring of Amer-
ican industry brought about by a large and increasing number of ac-
quisitions and mergers. This trend, starting in the forties, has continued
to the present day and has often been characterized as the third great
merger wave in the history of the United States. While most of these
mergers have involved domestic corporations, many of the newly
formed corporate alliances have brought together American and foreign
firms. The United States businessman has ceased thinking of himself as
a national shopkeeper and has adapted his war-acquired sophistication
and knowledge to expanding his business beyond the territorial confines
of this country. During the sixties, this extraterritorial expansion of
American trade has produced many foreign joint business enterprises
organized by American and foreign corporations. American trade with
other countries has blossomed and an ever-increasing number of com-
panies are becoming involved in foreign commerce. 1
This internationalization of American trade has produced a con-
comitant extraterritorial expansion of the United States antitrust
laws. Several postwar cases declare that the firm which establishes a
foreign base of operations must comply with these laws, and have made
it painfully clear to many American businessmen that their foreign
activity can lead to antitrust violations whenever competition in United
States commerce is substantially and directly affected. This article will
1 The post-World War II merger activity is statistically presented in V. Mund,
Government and Business 41, 51 (4th ed. 1965), which reports that the number of
acquisitions and mergers in manufacturing and mining industries has increased from
219 in 1950, to 1018 in 1963. Statistics released by the Federal Trade Commission show
this sharp increase in merger activity continuing. The FTC News Summary, March 2,
1966, reports that both the number and assets of large manufacturing and mining firms
acquired in 1965 reached the highest levels on record. The report also indicates that some
2400 large firms control over 80% of all manufacturing and mining assets in the United
States. The latest available statistics for the years 1966 and 1967 show the trend in
merger activity continuing, with 1746 firms being acquired in 1966, and 2384 firms in
1967. 5 CCH Trade Reg. Rep. 11 50,195 (March 25, 1968).
According to FTC statistics, recording joint venture activity for the first time for
the year 1965, American companies participated in 171 new ventures with 125 of the
total involving the collaboration of United States and foreign companies for foreign
operations. FTC News Summary, Feb. 27, 1967. In 1966 and 1967, American com-
panies were involved in 218 and 171, respectively, joint ventures, of which 146 and
113, respectively, represented cooperation with foreign companies. Interview with
Tranquilino B. Aquino, Supervisory Statistician, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade
Commission, March 27, 1968.
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explore the antitrust considerations bearing upon the initial problem
facing the American investor, that of determining the particular ar-
rangements by which to conduct his foreign business.
Several methods and organizational structures are available. The
American entrepreneur can conduct his business abroad either directly,
through a "foreign" company which he owns in whole or in part, or in-
directly, through some contractual arrangement. The "foreign" com-
pany may be established under American law or under the law of
another nation. The contractual arrangements can take the form of a
license of patent or trademark rights, an agency or distributorship
agreement, a requirements contract or some other form of contract
creating a relatively permanent or continuing relationship between the
two companies.
Precisely which avenue to take depends upon a number of political
as well as economic factors and is not by any means susceptible of easy
analysis. Of ten the choice involves competing and contradictory con-
siderations. For example, flexibility of internal control may suggest
branch operations or a partnership connection. This choice would tend
to assure the willingness of the United States Government to espouse
the claims of its nationals before an international tribunal. The advan-
tages and protection of limited liability, on the other hand, may suggest
incorporation. Even when it is concluded that incorporation is more
desirable, there is still the question whether this should be accomplished
under United States law or the law of some foreign country. Alternative
choices are not always freely available. Association with an existing or
newly formed foreign business entity may be dictated by the need for
local acceptance, both political and commercial. Buying into a foreign
firm or establishing close connections with one by licensing of patent or
trademark rights might present itself as the best way of entering the
foreign market and achieving acceptance. Exchange controls, import
restrictions or tax laws designed to favor local nationality may also
dictate this choice. Not infrequently, local foreign incorporation is an
absolute requirement of the foreign sovereign, sometimes coupled with
the added requirement that a stated percentage of the share capital be
owned by local nationals. It is perhaps unnecessary to note that all of
these factors become more complicated when the market to be served
falls within the territory of two or more sovereigns.
Since this article is concerned with the legality of, and antitrust
implications resulting from, foreign establishment, the ensuing analysis
is limited to problems which must be considered by one who seeks to
expand his operations into foreign markets through the ownership of all
or part of an extractive, manufacturing or service operation abroad.
Other methods by which foreign business may be conducted will be dis-
cussed only insofar as they bear on the question of capital investment.
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The analysis is divided into three parts. The first is a general dis-
cussion of threshold jurisdictional issues involved in the extraterritorial
application of the antitrust laws and explores the problems resulting
from distinctions between the export of capital and the export of goods.
To simplify discussion, the remainder of the article divides foreign
investments into two main types: first, those which are merely invest-
ments,' and second, those which are actual expansions of an American
company into overseas operation. The former section deals with capital
investments which fall short of a control establishment, and the invest-
ment defense embodied in Section 7 of the Clayton Act; the latter with
substantive antitrust problems involved in the formation and operation
of business establishments. In this last section we will classify the types
of establishments as "branches," "subsidiaries," and "joint ventures."
A "branch" is simply what the name implies: an overseas extension of
an American company's operations without separate incorporation. A
"subsidiary" is a separately incorporated extension of an American
company into overseas markets. A "joint venture," while it may be a
loose ad hoc arrangement of a partnership nature, will be treated as a
separately incorporated entity established and controlled by more than
one parent'
II. GENERAL PROBLEMS
A. Jurisdiction
The power of Congress "to regulate commerce with foreign na-
tions" is contained in Article 1, Section 8 of the Constitution. Pursuant
to this authority, Congress has from time to time enacted several anti-
trust statutes proscribing activity which has a detrimental effect upon
the foreign commerce of the United States.' The most important of these
are the Sherman Act passed in 1890, the Wilson Act (Tariff) passed in
1894, and the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts passed in
1914, each of which is expressly made applicable to foreign commerce.
2 For discussion of "investment," see pp. 255-62 infra.
a For discussion of joint venture terminology, see pp. 282-84 infra.
4 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964) (expressly declared applicable
to "trade or commerce . . . with foreign nations") ; Wilson Act (Tariff), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 8-11 (1964) (declares the Sherman Act applicable to imports); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 12-27, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1964) (specifically applies to both interstate and foreign com-
merce); Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-14, 21 (1964)
(some sections limited to situations where the use, consumption or resale occurs in the
United States, some expressly applicable to exports) ; Federal Trade Commission Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 41-51 (1964). 15 U.S.C. § 45 is made particularly applicable to foreign com-
merce by 15 U.S.C. § 64 (1964). The Webb-Pomerene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1964),
exempts certain types of export associations from the coverage of the Sherman Act.
While the above statutes fall within the category of what is generally referred to
as antitrust statutes, reference should be had to 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964) for the con-
gressional definition of "antitrust laws," i.e., those whose violation gives rise to a private
right of action for treble damages under 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
Congress has passed other statutes under this same constitutional grant which also
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Despite the age and number of these statutes, the question of the extent
to which the courts will and should exercise jurisdiction under them
over foreign acts and foreign nationals is still a matter of controversy.
This jurisdictional problem is a large one, straddling the disciplines of
political science and law, and has led to exhaustive comment by anti-
trust lawyers, government officials, authorities on international law and
others' In each case the courts must decide three questions: (1)
whether Congress has exercised its constitutional power to regulate
commerce so as to reach the specific extraterritorial conduct sought to
be prohibited; (2) whether judicial exercise of jurisdiction over this
conduct is consistent with the limitations imposed by our traditional
due process concept of fair play and substantial justice;" and finally,
(3) whether principles of public international law permit the exercise
of this jurisdiction.' While the problem is too large for complete dis-
cussion here, it is also too large to be ignored altogether. A summary of
the salient legal principles will provide a sufficient background for
present purposes.
Despite some early confusion,' it now appears that under these
contain antitrust provisions applicable to foreign commerce. See, e.g., Panama Canal
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 31 (1964), prohibiting use of the Panama Canal by violators of the anti-
trust laws; Shipping Act, 1916, 46 U.S.C. §§ 814-15 (1964), specifically applying antitrust
policy to agreements in the shipping industry.
6 See Raymond, A New Look at the Jurisdiction in Alcoa, 61 Am. J. Int'l Law
558 (1967) ; Raymond, The Exercise of Concurrent International Jurisdiction: "Move
with Circumspection Appropriate," 8 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 673 (1967).
6 See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
7 Note, Extraterritorial Application of Federal Antitrust Laws: Delimiting the
Reach of Substantive Law Under the Sherman Act, 20 Vand. L. Rev. 1030, 1033 (1967).
8 The early confusion was caused by Mr. Justice Holmes' opinion in American
Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 353 (1909), in which he stated: "[T]he
acts causing the damage were done ... outside the jurisdiction of the United States and
within that of other states. It is surprising to hear it argued that they were governed
by the [Sherman] act ." Id. at 355.
The continuing validity of this decision has been called into question by the Su-
preme Court's recent decision in Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,
370 U.S. 690 (1962). That case involved a private treble damage action brought against
two American corporations, one of which was Union Carbide & Carbon Corporation
(Carbide), and four wholly owned subsidiaries of Carbide, charging them with violating
§§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act by conspiring to restrain, by monopolizing, and by at-
tempting to monopolize trade and commerce in ferrovanadium and vanadium oxide.
Among other things the complaint charged that one of Carbide's subsidiaries had been
appointed by the Canadian Government as its exclusive wartime agent to purchase
and allocate vanadium for Canadian industries. That company, it was alleged, acting
under the control of its parent, entirely eliminated the plaintiff (Continental) from the
Canadian market, and divided its business among the respondents. Both lower courts
had held that petitioner was not legally entitled to recover for the destruction of its
Canadian business. Even if the Carbide subsidiary had "acted for the purpose of en-
trenching the monopoly position of the respondents in the United States, it was acting
as an arm of the Canadian Government ..." In reversing, the Supreme Court rejected
respondents' reliance upon American Banana as misplaced "in the light of later cases
in this Court." The Court noted that petitioner did not question the validity of any
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laws the geographic location of the challenged activities and, at least
under some circumstances, the nationality of the actors, are both im-
material when United States commerce is affected .° Dicta in several of
the cases suggest that jurisdiction attaches whenever the proscribed
action taken by the Canadian Government or by its Metals Controller, nor did the
case raise any question of the liability of the Carbide subsidiary which had acted as
the agent of the Canadian Government since that company had not been served.
According to the Court:
What the petitioners here contend is that the respondents are liable for actions
which they themselves jointly took, as part of their unlawful conspiracy, to
influence or to direct the elimination of Continental from the Canadian market.
As in Sisal, [274 U.S. 268 (1927)] the conspiracy was laid in the United States,
was effectuated both here and abroad, and respondents are not insulated by the
fact that the conspiracy involved some acts by the agent of a foreign government.
Id. at 706. Nor was it any defense that Carbide's subsidiary, "in carrying out the bare
act of purchasing vanadium from respondents rather than Continental, was acting in a
manner permitted by Canadian law." Id. at 707.
Two years after the American Banana decision, the Court in United States v.
American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911), struck down under the Sherman Act an
agreement executed in England between an American corporation and its British com-
petitor because of its substantial impact upon competition in American commerce.
Since then, the antitrust laws, and particularly the Sherman Act, have been applied to
protect the foreign commerce of the United States in a number of cases, similar only
in their complexity. The most important of these foreign commerce antitrust cases are:
United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913), and Thom-
sen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917) (involving foreign participation in a conspiracy
formed in a foreign country to control shipping between the United States and foreign
ports) ; United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927) (conspiracy formed in
the United States but effectuated abroad by obtaining discriminatory foreign legisla-
tion); United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (ND. Ohio 1949),
aff'd, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (cartel arrangements between an American corporation and
its most important foreign competitor limiting competition inter sese in the United
States and world markets) ; United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963)
(conspiracy formed in the United States and Europe between American, Swiss and
Italian corporations) ; United States v. Holophane Co., 119 F. Supp. 114 (S.D. Ohio
1954), aff'd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (involving restriction of imports and division of
world markets); United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945),
aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947) (division of markets and patent-pooling arrangements between
American corporation and its principal foreign competitors) ; United States v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (involving domestic monopoly, foreign
cartel agreements, and common ownership of domestic and foreign subsidiaries) ; United
States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (involving
issues relating to conspiracy to restrain trade, international cartels, foreign joint ventures,
and patent and process agreements) ; United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp.
753 (D.N.J. 1949) (involving foreign cartel arrangements and illegal use of patent
monopoly) ; United States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948)
(involving, inter alia, conspiracies to control world trade); United States v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950) (involving the extension of a
Webb-Pomerene export association to a conspiracy to restrain trade); United States
v. United States Alkali Export Ass'n, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (illegal use
of Webb-Pomerene export association to maintain domestic prices, international cartel,
elimination of export competition, and conspiracy to restrain domestic trade); United
States v. Scophony Corp. of America, 333 U.S. 795 (1948) (involving charges of
conspiracy, monopolization and attempt to monopolize); Eastman Kodak Co. v. FTC,
7 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1925), aff'd, 274 U.S. 619 (1927) (involving unfair methods of
competition and agreement restricting imports).
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effects upon interstate or foreign commerce are present. It should be
noted, however, that in each case there were present other jurisdictional
elements, such as participation of American nationals, corporate pres-
ence of foreign nationals in the United States or the performance of
unlawful activities within this country. Thus, it is doubtful whether the
effects on United States commerce are alone a sufficient basis for eon-
ferring jurisdiction upon an American court. Nevertheless, it is true
that American courts have assumed jurisdiction under the antitrust
laws over acts committed and contracts executed abroad by American
corporations or their foreign subsidiaries when they have found that
such acts or contracts substantially and directly affected or interfered
with American commerce!' And, under such circumstances, foreign
nationals have been found to have violated American law." Indeed, the
lawfulness of the acts or contracts under local foreign law, and even the
participation of agents of a foreign government has failed to immunize
the conduct from antitrust condemnation!'
Almost any discussion of the jurisdictional reach of United States
antitrust laws must center around the opinion of Learned Hand in
12 For example, in Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66 (1917), the Supreme Court
upheld a treble damage verdict where the Sherman Act had been violated by a combi-
nation of steamship lines operating between the United States and South Africa. The
conference members adopted uniform rates, gave rebates to shippers using only conference
lines and employed "fighting ships" to meet lower rates of independent shippers. Jurisdic-
tion had been obtained over American agents of the foreign participants. To find
subject-matter jurisdiction, the Court focussed on the effects of the combination on the
foreign commerce of the United States and affirmed the verdict for plaintiff even though
the agreement had been made in a foreign country. The Court stated:
It is contended that the combination, if there was one, was formed in a foreign
country and that, therefore, it was not within the act of Congress; and that,
besides, the principals in the combination and not their agents were amenable
to the law. To this we do not assent. As was said by the Circuit Court of
Appeals, the combination affected the foreign commerce of this country and was
put into operation here. United States v. Pacific & Arctic Ry. & Nay. Co., 228
U.S. 87. It, therefore, is within the law, and its managers here were more than
simply agents—they were participants in the combination.
243 U.S. at 88. See also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945).
11 See, e.g., United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945); United States v.
Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. 70,600 (1962),
jurisdiction established, 133 F. Supp. 40 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); United States v. General
Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
12 Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962);
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). But see American Banana Co.
v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). The foreign government's agent would appear
to be entitled to immunity, but this may turn upon complex legal issues involved in
the act-of-state and sovereign-immunity doctrines. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1963). On the question of foreign governmental participation,
see generally Graziano, Foreign Governmental Compulsion as a Defense in United States
Antitrust Law, 7 Va. J. Int'l Law 100 (1967).
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United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,' a case which constitutes
the high water mark of extraterritorial antitrust enforcement. Although
the case centered on the charge that the Aluminum Company of Amer-
ica (Alcoa) had monopolized the domestic aluminum ingot market, it
also involved an important charge which made it necessary for the
court to decide when the acts of foreign nationals "affect" the foreign
commerce of the United States so as to fall within the purview of the
Sherman Act and give American courts jurisdiction. Specifically, the
Government alleged that Alcoa, through its Canadian affiliate, Alu-
minium Limited, had participated in an international cartel as a means
of protecting its domestic position. Limited was incorporated in Canada
"to take over [most of] those properties of 'Alcoa' which were outside
the United States."" Instead of having Limited's stock issued directly
to it, Alcoa had it issued to its common stockholders, thereby placing
majority ownership of both corporations in the same group.
Limited combined with two German corporations and concerns
from Switzerland, France and Great Britain to form a cartel, known as
the "Alliance," which involved the formation of a Swiss corporation,
also termed the "Alliance," to administer the agreement." By the mem-
bers' interpretation of the original agreement, imports into the United
States were not included in the quotas fixed for the members. In 1936,
however, the agreement was amended and the members contracted to
include such imports in their quotas. The question before the court was
whether either the original or amended agreement violated the Sherman
Act. Judge Hand considered the original agreement terminated but con-
cluded that the amended agreement was illegal under the Sherman Act.
His resolution of this issue has become most crucial to the broad issue
under discussion and deserves close analysis. He first indicated that "it
is settled law—as 'Limited' itself agrees—that any state may impose
liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct out-
side its borders that has consequences within its borders which the state
reprehends; and these liabilities other states will ordinarily recog-
nize."" Posing the double question whether Congress intended to
attach liability for violation of the Sherman Act to the conduct of for-
eigners outside the United States, and, if so, whether the Constitution
permitted it to do so, he refused to impute to Congress
an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct
which has no consequences within the United States. Two
situations are possible. . . . There may be agreements beyond
13 148 F.2d 416 (2d Or. 1945).
11 Id. at 439.
13 Limited was served at its New York offices, but it does not appear that the
other foreign corporations had been personally served.
148 F.2d at 443.
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our borders not intended to affect imports, which do affect
them, or which affect exports. Almost any limitation of the
supply of goods in Europe, for example, or in South America,
may have repercussions in the United States if there is trade
between the two 17
It was Judge Hand's opinion that the Sherman Act was not intended to
cover these agreements. However, in considering the question of agree-
ments which did not affect United States imports even though they
were intended to do so, he said:
That situation might be thought to fall within the doctrine
that intent may be a substitute for performance in the case of
a contract made within the United States; or it might be
thought to fall within the doctrine that a statute should not
be interpreted to cover acts abroad which have no conse-
quence here. We shall not choose between these alternatives;
but for argument we shall assume that the Act does not cover
agreements, even though intended to affect imports or ex-
ports, unless its [sic] performance is shown actually to have
had some effect upon them. Where both conditions are satis-
fied, the situation certainly falls within [the ban of the
Act]. . .."
The necessary intent was readily inferred from the record, but
there was little evidence of any restrictive effect on imports. This
failure of proof was not decisive, however, since Judge Hand ruled
that once the intent to affect imports was proved, the burden of proof
was shifted to Limited. Since the evidence was equally inconclusive
on this score, the cartel, and Limited's participation in it, were un-
lawful. It is this latter aspect of Judge Hand's dual standard of
legality, the, shifting to the defendant of the burden of disproving
effects once the element of intent is established by the Government,
which will probably be decisive of the outcome of most foreign com-
merce Sherman Act cases."
Despite its obvious appeal to antitrust enforcers and its possible
international validity,' Hand's formula of proved intent plus ter-
ritorial effects has obvious limitations. By itself, it does not supply
a sufficient basis for jurisdiction in all circumstances. Consider, for
17 Id.
18 Id. at 443-44.
19 Donovan, The Legality of Acquisitions and Mergers Involving American and
Foreign Corporations Under the United States Antitrust Laws—Part I, 39 S. Cal. L. Rev.
526, 533 (1966). •
20 See S.S. "Lotus," P.C.I.J. Ser. A, No. 10 (1927). See also Trautman, The Role
of Conflicts Thinking in Defining the International Reach of American Regulatory
Legislation, 22 Ohio St. L.J. 586 (1961).
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example, the case of a large group of European companies maliciously
and notoriously conspiring to keep competing American-made goods
out of European markets. Here both an intent to affect the foreign
commerce of the United States and an actual effect on such commerce
presumably is present. A similar evil purpose and effect will presum-
ably also exist should a large group of South American coffee com-
panies enter into an agreement to limit coffee production and raise
the price of coffee in world markets. Yet it is most unlikely that any
United States court would exercise jurisdiction over these foreign
companies, if they are entirely owned by foreigners and have per-
formed all their actions in foreign countries without conspiring with
any American nationals. Some additional territorial nexus connect-
ing the foreign actors with the United States seems necessary before
an American court will exercise jurisdiction over foreign nationals.
Nevertheless, it is entirely clear that United States courts will con-
tinue to assert jurisdiction over the foreign actions of American
nationals and their affiliates whenever they transgress the mores of
our antitrust laws.
In commenting upon the applicability of the United States anti-
trust laws in the field of foreign commerce, one commentator has quite
appropriately stated that "[t]he American businessman who returns
to the home of his European forefathers, much like Naomi of the Old
Testament, does not travel alone. Whither he goes, our antitrust laws
go; and where he lodges, these laws also lodge." These antitrust
escorts, he charges, "are more numerous than the solitary companion
of the Book of Ruth," and "seldom emulate Ruth in helping to glean
at the foreign harvest. At times, rather, they are responsible for sub-
stantial problems in his overseas operations." 21 Similar fears have been
expressed by others and the matter has received considerable atten-
tion.' Some commentators have charged that the application of • the
antitrust laws in some post-World War II foreign trade cases' has
21 Van Cise, The Application of the U.S. Antitrust Laws to The European Com-
munity, 6 Antitrust Bull. 145, 145-46 (1961).
22 See generally K. Brewster, Antitrust and American Business Abroad (1958)
[hereinafter referred to as Brewster]; W. Fugate, Foreign Commerce and the Antitrust
Laws (1958) [hereinafter referred to as Fugate]; Legal Problems of International Trade:
A Symposium, 1959 U. III. L.F. 105; Symposium on Extraterritorial Effect of the U.S.
Antitrust Laws, 11 A.B.A. Sec. of Antitrust Law 65 (1957); Carlston, Antitrust Policy
Abroad (Parts I & II), 49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 569, 589 (1954); Haight, International Law
and Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 Yale L.J. 639 (1954); Oppen-
heim, Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman Act—Points and Implications of the Tim-
ken Case, 42 Trade-Mark Rep. 3 (1952) ; Whitney, Sources of Conflict Between Inter-
national Law and the Antitrust Laws, 63 Yale L.J. 655 (1954).
23 The casefr which have caused particular concern are: Timken Roller Bearing Co.
v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) ; United States v. Holophane Co., 119 F. Supp.
114 (S.D. Ohio 1954), aff'd, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) ; United States v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
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had a definite deterrent effect upon American businessmen making
investments or doing business abroad; 24 while others viewing the
same evidence have come to quite the opposite conclusion.'
By establishing a foreign base of operations, the American
businessman voluntarily subjects himself to the laws of the jurisdic-
tion in which he locates himself. He is therefore subject to two different
and perhaps conflicting bodies of law, whether he establishes himself in
an underdeveloped country26 or in an industrialized society.' If com-
pliance with both legal systems proves impossible or even economically
impractical, American investment abroad will be discouraged. For
this reason, the criticism has been raised that American antitrust
policy conflicts with the political and economic policy of the United
States,' and the question has been asked whether it is wise for the
United States to enforce competition in foreign commerce."
There are almost as many points of view on the extent to which
the antitrust laws should be applied to foreign commerce as there are
commentators on the subject. In the absence of congressional action,
the matter has been largely left in the hands of enforcement agencies
and the judiciary," but such ad hoc solutions lack predictability and
and have been a source of concern to the practitioner who must advise
24 Linowitz, Antitrust Laws: A Damper on American Foreign Trade? 44 A.B.A.J.
853 (1958). See also Kahn-Freund, English Contracts and American Anti-Trust Laws:
The Nylon Patent Case, 18 Modern L. Rev. 65, 68-70 (1955); Whitney, Anti-Trust
Law and Foreign Commerce, 11 Record of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. 134
(1956).
25 Fugate, Damper or Bellows? Antitrust Laws and Foreign Trade, 45 A.B.A.J. 947
(1959). See Brewster, Extraterritorial Effects of the U.S. Antitrust Laws: "An Appraisal,"
11 A.B.A. Sec. of Antitrust Law 65 (1957).
26 It is argued that the economic plans of the underdeveloped countries conflict
with the American antitrust laws because such countries, at the present stage of their
development, are not concerned with competition. This is shown by the fact that many
governments require competitors to unite and form a single economic unit. See Joint
International Business Ventures 84, 86-94 (W. Friedmann & G. Kalmanoff ed. 1961).
27 In recent years there has been a trend on the part of foreign countries, par-
ticularly the European nations, to enact antitrust legislation of their own. Although
these laws are sometimes less strict than the American antitrust laws, they are not
always so, and there is indeed the possibility of conflict. It is expected that such foreign
statutes will create problems for American courts in applying our internal antitrust
principles in the field of international trade. The statutes are collected in 1-5 Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development, Guide to Legislation on Restrictive
Business Practices Europe and North America (1964).
28 It has been said that they may conflict with programs for national security and
foreign aid programs. See Statement of the Department of State, Attorney Gen.'s Nat'l
Comm. to Study the Antitrust Laws, Report 97 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Att'y Gen.
Rep.]; Statement of the Commission on Foreign Economic Policy, id. at 95. See also
American Chamber of Commerce in London, The American Antitrust Laws and Ameri-
can Business Abroad 17-21 (1955) ; • Nebolsine, Analysis of Chapter II, "Trade or
Commerce * * * With Foreign Nations," 7. A.B.A. Sec. of Antitrust Law 64, 67-68 (1955).
29 Van Cise, supra note 21.
30 Cooperation among the various executive departments may at least bring about
uniformity of enforcement. See Att'y Gen. Rep. 92-98.
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his client on the basis of many imponderables.m: However, at least one
commentator has concluded that
the reasoned application and elaboration of the considerations
involved are more safely entrusted to the Attorney General
in the first instance and ultimately to the courts in the event
of litigation than to the Congress. Legislative particulariza-
tion in the antitrust field has not proved significantly helpful
even when its difficulties were not, as here, compounded by
problems of comity and jurisdiction."
In approaching the problems of foreign establishment, it is im-
portant to remember that the antitrust laws are not concerned with
the protection of foreign consumers or foreign competitors, but only
with American consumers and American business opportunity. This
follows from the fact that otherwise the jurisdictional basis of an
effect on American commerce presumably is lacking." Any adverse
effects on the commerce of foreign nations or nationals, while they
might engender some political problems for the Department of State,
will not lead to antitrust responsibility.
B. The Legality of Foreign Investment
On the most elementary level of analysis, there are two basic
methods by which an American manufacturer may expand the market
for his commodities into foreign territories: He may increase the vol-
ume of goods he exports or he may invest capital in an existing or newly
formed business producing goods abroad. In either case, his immediate,
if not ultimate, goal is the same, namely, increased foreign trade. Yet,
in result, the two methods differ, for when he chooses to establish a
manufacturing operation in a foreign country, his action will probably
result in a decrease in the United States export trade in the commodity
involved." This fact has given rise to antitrust implications not yet
31 Dean, Extraterritorial Effects of the U.S. Antitrust Laws: "Advising the Client,"
11 A.B.A. Sec. of Antitrust Law 88 (1957).
32 Brewster, supra note 25, at 73. See also Trautman, supra note 20, at 627.
33 This was apparently recognized by Mr. Justice Minton, while on the court of
appeals, in Branch v. FTC, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944). The case involved an appeal
from an FTC order issued to an individual conducting a correspondence school,
directing him to cease and desist from disseminating false and misleading advertising in
Latin America. The order was upheld on the ground that the FTC's action was aimed
at compelling the defendant "to use fair methods in competing with his fellow country-
men," Mr. Justice Minton stating: "That the persons deceived were all in Latin America
is of no consequence. It is the location of petitioner's competitors which counts." Id.
at 34-35.
24 This, of course, assumes that the American company had formerly produced
goods in the United States and exported them. With the establishment of a foreign
plant, the American concern no longer will export goods to areas supplied by its foreign
plant. To this extent the export trade of the United States is reduced even though the
actual volume of exports might remain unchanged or even increase because of normal
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fully explored. However, certain language in Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States 35 and United States v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co." has given rise to the fear that the courts are favoring the
export of goods over the export of capital in their interpretations of
the Sherman Act. 37
In Timken, the defendant, Timken Roller Bearing Company
(American Timken), manufacturing 79 to 80 percent of United States
domestic production of tapered roller bearing, had acquired a minority
stock interest in its chief British competitor, which subsequently
became British Timken, Ltd. Together they formed Sociètê Anonyme
Francaise Timken (French Timken) to manufacture and market
tapered roller bearings in France. The three companies allocated their
territories, fixed prices at which the products of one might be sold
in the territory of another, cooperated to protect their markets and to
eliminate outside competition, and participated in cartels to restrict
American imports and exports. 38 The Court held the territorial restric-
tions were not reasonable steps taken to implement a valid trade-
mark-licensing system and were violative of the Sherman Act.
One defense raised was that the international situation and ex-
change controls made it infeasible for American Timken successfully
to sell its American made goods abroad and prevented it from engaging
cyclical movements. This same type of "restraint" on United States commerce is not
present where the American is in the business of investing capital rather than the
business of producing goods or services. His foreign investment may limit domestic
capital markets since it results in the movement of funds to foreign territories, but it
does not produce any commodity restraints and hence does not directly affect the export
of goods. To the extent that the investor finances an American manufacturer's establish-
ment of foreign manufacturing operations, exports may be affected, but this is due to
the use made of the funds by the borrower. Accordingly, the analysis in this section
is limited to the American manufacturing or producing firm.
25 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
26 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
27 Att'y Gen. Rep. 78; Nebolsine, supra note 28; A.B.A. Comm. on Antitrust Prob-
lems in Int'l Trade, Report of the Subcomm. on Subsidiaries in Foreign Trade, 7 A.B.A.
Sec. of Antitrust Law 242 (1955). See Carlston, supra note 22.
28 As early as 1909, American Timken and British Timken's predecessor corporation
had made comprehensive agreements providing for a territorial division of world markets
for antifriction hearings. These agreements were somewhat modified and extended several
times in succeeding years. When American Timken and one Dewar, an English business-
man, succeeded in acquiring all the stock of British Timken in 1927, the cartel agree-
ments were again substantially renewed. French Timken was brought into the cartel
at the time of its formation in 1928. At the time of trial, American Timken owned
30% of British Timken, Dewar owned 24% and the balance was publicly held. All of
French Timken's stock was equally owned by American Timken and Dewar. While the
appeal in the case was pending, Dewar died. Under existing contracts, American Timken
had the right to purchase Dewar's stock from his estate, but was prevented from doing
so by the divestiture provisions contained in the decree entered by the district court.
After a divided Supreme Court struck the divestiture provisions, American Timken
purchased Dewar's stock and became the sole stockholder in French Timken.
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in foreign commerce except through the operation of foreign plants.
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the Court, rejected this argument:
This position ignores the fact that the provisions in the Sher-
man Act against restraints of foreign trade are based on the
assumption, and reflect the policy, that export and import
trade in commodities is both possible and desirable. Those
provisions of the Act are wholly inconsistent with appellant's
argument that American business must be left free to partici-
pate in international cartels, that free foreign commerce in
goods must be sacrificed in order to foster export of American
dollars for investment in foreign factories which sell abroad."
The defense contention, Mr. Justice Black concluded, "would make
the Sherman Act a dead letter insofar as it prohibits contracts and
conspiracies in restraint of foreign trade. If such a drastic change is
to be made in the statute, Congress is the one to do it."'
In Minnesota Mining, four American competitors and their
associates, who collectively accounted for over 86 percent of United
States exports of coated abrasives, combined to form an export associ-
ation under the Webb-Pomerene Act"- and to establish jointly owned
factories in England, Canada and Germany. Generally speaking, the
products manufactured abroad by defendants' jointly owned foreign
subsidiaries replaced defendants' exports to the markets supplied by
those subsidiaries, but United States imports were not affected. The
court held that the defendants' joint ownership of foreign manufac-
turing subsidiaries coupled with their embargo on exports to the
countries where they owned plants constituted a conspiracy to restrain
the export trade of the United States and, hence, a violation of the
Sherman Act."
Here again, it was claimed that defendants discontinued their
export trade because political and economic barriers made it impos-
sible to maintain such trade profitably. In response to this argument,
Judge Wyzanski stated:
[I] f over a sufficiently long period American enterprises, as a
result of political or economic barriers, cannot export directly
or indirectly from the United States to a particular foreign
country at a profit, then any private action taken to secure
or interfere solely with business in that area, whatever else
it may do, does not restrain foreign commerce in that area in
violation of the Sherman Act. For, the very hypothesis is that
80 341 U.S. at 599.
40 Id.
41 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1964).
42 92 F. Supp. at 961.
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there is not and could not be any American foreign commerce
in that area which could be restrained or monopolized.'
According to Judge Wyzanski, the central question was whether the
"defendants could not have profitably exported from the United
States a substantial volume of coated abrasives to the area supplied
by their jointly owned factories located in England, Canada and Ger-
many." His review of the evidence led him to conclude that the
defendants could have done so without establishing foreign plants:
It is no excuse for the violations of the Sherman Act that
supplying foreign customers from foreign factories is more
profitable and in that sense is, as defendants argue, "in the
interest of American enterprise" . . . . Financial advantage
is a legitimate consideration for an individual non-monopolis-
tic enterprise. It is irrelevant where the action is taken by a
combination and the effect, while it may redound to the ad-
vantage of American finance, restricts American commerce.
For Congress in the Sherman Act has condemned whatever
unreasonably restrains American commerce regardless of how
it fattens profits of certain stockholders. Congress has pre-
ferred to protect American competitors, consumers and work-
men.45
The above quoted dicta from these opinions suggest that the
export of goods is preferable to the export of capital, but this inter-
pretation may not be an accurate reflection of judicial thought. Both
judges were simply addressing themselves to the traditionally futile
argument that an unreasonable restraint could be excused on the
ground that it was commercially more expedient to restrain than to
compete." The decisions seem simply to have been intended to make
it clear beyond doubt that the Sherman Act is applicable to any com-
bination between an American firm and its foreign competitor or be-
tween a group of American competitors, whenever the combination has
the proscribed effects on the foreign commerce of the United States.
Nevertheless, because of the possible implication that production
abroad in itself involves a restraint on actual or potential United States
exports, these decisions have met with sharp criticism.' While there is
43 Id. at 958
44 Id. at 959.
45 Id. at 962.
45 See Brewster, supra note 22, at 77. In this connection, it is well to remember
that the Government's complaint and argument in Minnesota Mining were aimed pri-
marily at the unlawful extension of the Webb-Pomerene prerogatives beyond export
trade and into the area of investment.
47 Att'y Gen. Rep. 79-S1; A.B.A. Comm. on Antitrust Problems in Int'l Trade, supra
note 37, at 244-47; Carlston, supra note 22, at 718; Graham, Antitrust Problems of
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some historical and sociological justification for this judicial sugges-
tion," it is difficult to perceive any legal basis on which the distinction
can rest. Moreover, it is clear that the long-run political and economic
welfare of the United States lies in the competitive allocation of
American resources to investment both at home and abroad." Unless
American firms are free to operate manufacturing plants throughout
the world, they can be effectively excluded from many markets. It
can hardly be thought that forbidding American firms from operating
foreign factories when they can export goods from the United States
is in the best economic or political interest of the United States.
Drawing upon the same authority, some commentators have sug-
gested that the antitrust laws may not apply to foreign investment
at all." Their thesis is largely premised on the declaration in Minne-
sota Mining that acts which interfere solely with business in an area
where no American export trade is possible cannot restrain American
foreign commerce for, by hypothesis, none was possible. Since Judge
Wyzanski was referring to commodity exports, it is argued that his
comment implies that only the flow of goods is commerce within the
meaning of the foreign commerce clause of the Sherman Act. This
thesis constitutes a departure form the position judicially adopted in
enforcing the Sherman Act in domestic commerce," and it also appears
to be based upon a misreading and an overextension of Judge Wyzan-
ski's comments. He was not distinguishing between commodity export
and capital export but was applying the rule of reason to determine
whether the combination of large American competitors to exploit
foreign markets was fraught with unreasonably anticompetitive dis-
advantages." Any attempt to read more than this into his comments
seems unfounded.
Corporate Parents, Subsidiaries, Affiliates and Joint Ventures in Foreign Commerce, 9
A.B.A. Sec. of Antitrust Law 32, 47 (1956).
48 In 1890, when the Sherman Act was enacted, the United States was concerned
only with the investment of American capital at home. It was not concerned with
American investment abroad. Foreign trade during that period was thought to consist
entirely of imports and exports. See H. Faulkner, American Economic History 556 (7th
ed. 1954); H. Thorelli, The Federal Antitrust Policy 54-163 (1955).
49 See Att'y Gen. Rep. 79; Graham, supra note 47, at 47.
99 See Brewster, supra note 22, at 76-79.
5' When applied to domestic commerce, the Sherman Act has been held to include
the movement of capital as well as trade in goods. See United States v. South-Eastern
Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). See also Comm. on Antitrust Problems in
Int'l Trade, supra note 37, at 242: "Must as the term 'commerce' in the domestic field
includes the flow of capital as well as goods, so should it include the flow of American
capital in foreign commerce." The Attorney General's Committee also concluded that
"the words 'trade and commerce * * * with foreign nations' should be construed broadly
to include not only the import and export flow of finished products, their component
parts and adjunct services, but also, as in domestic commerce, capital investment and
financing." Att'y Gen. Rep. 79-80.
52 This interpretation is buttressed by Judge Wyzanski's statement that joint foreign
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III. INVESTMENT INTERESTS WITHOUT BUSINESS PARTICIPATION
—THE SECTION 7 INVESTMENT DEFENSE
Stock investments in existing enterprises vary greatly in nature
and create differing relationships between the "acquired" and "ac-
quiring" firms. Depending largely upon the amount of stock pur-
chased and the existence and identity of other investors, stock
acquisitions can create either control establishments—wholly owned
subsidiaries, partially owned subsidiaries, and joint ventures—or non-
control establishments—stock interests without control. The purchase
of all of the stock of the "acquired" company will result either in the
creation of a wholly owned subsidiary or an unincorporated branch,
division or department.' Partial stock acquisitions can create any of
the other types of investments.
The distinction between the partially owned foreign subsidiary
and the foreign joint venture is one that can be made easily The
central concept in a joint venture is that of partnership, or a pooling
of interests and resources for the accomplishment of specific objec-
tives. The joint venture is an association of contributors which implies
collaboration in some business activity." It is this partnership con-
cept which distinguishes the joint venture from the partially owned
subsidiary. The term "partially owned subsidiary" will, therefore, be
used to refer to those situations in which control of the foreign cor-
poration is vested in a single American parent and the remainder of
its stock is widely scattered and not held by any large single interest. 55
The other shareholders exemplify what is meant by the phrase "stock
interest without control" or "pure investment." It is important not to
think of a "subsidiary" as a corporation a majority of whose stock is
owned by another corporation. There can be minority-owned subsidiar-
ies as well as majority-owned subsidiaries. There can also be majority-
and minority-owned joint ventures since there may be several collabo-
rating partners and they can divide the equity in any manner they
choose.
The minority-owned subsidiary or joint venture is distinguished
from the pure investment not by the amount of stock held, but by
ventures by dominant United States firms might be illegal per se because of their
inevitable tendency to dampen the rivalry of their partners in foreign markets, and also
by his statement that such joint foreign ventures might also be illegal per se because
of their similar inevitable tendency to reduce the zeal of the venturers for competition
inter use in the American market. 92 F. Supp. at 961-63.
53 If the acquisition of all of the stock or assets of the foreign company is followed
by its absorption into the American acquirer, the fourth type of control establishment—
the unincorporated branch, division or department—is created. When the investor does
not liquidate• or consolidate the acquired firm with his own but retains its separate
corporate personality, a wholly owned subsidiary results.
54 See pp. 282-83 infra.
55 Cf. Att'y Gen. Rep. 89-91.
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the existence of parental control or active participation in the manage-
ment of the enterprise. The requisite management ingredient can
result from the organization or acquisition of the foreign corporation
in a manner which legally places control in the American corporation.
It may also result from contractual provisions among the share-
holders which place management responsibility upon one of them.'
Where control springs from contractual provisions, they must be
ancillary to the transaction by which the American corporation becomes
involved in the foreign company. The transactions might include
licenses for the use of patents, trademarks, or secret process rights,
or, perhaps, the transfers of loan capital or technology. Absent some
lawful main purpose to which the transfer of control is ancillary,
the agreement is simply a naked contract in restraint of trade, illegal
under the Sherman Act if it substantially affects United States com-
merce. 57
In most instances, the pure investment does not offer an accep-
table means of participation in foreign markets to the American
businessman who seeks to expand his operations into overseas ter-
ritories. It is principally of interest only to those who are satisfied
with passive financial participation in an overseas business firm. The
device, however, is not completely without appeal to the businessman
seeking to expand his own operations abroad. It can be used to great
advantage as a temporary or preparatory device by one who is either
presently unwilling or unable to acquire absolute or working control.
Through the pure investment, the businessman is able to participate in
a foreign market, and better able to determine whether he will later
enter that market himself.
In any event, mere investment in a foreign corporation in no way
violates the antitrust laws even though the foreign corporation may
be one of the investor's competitors in the United States and world
markets. This is made abundantly clear by the provision in Section
7 of the Clayton Act that it "shall not apply to corporations purchas-
ing such stock solely for investment and not using the same by voting
or otherwise to bring about, or in attempting to bring about, the sub-
stantial lessening of competition." 58 But neither the statute nor its
legislative history aids in a definition of "investment." At what point
does a stock interest cease to be held "solely for investment" and be-
come used for other pusposes7 Certainly, one who acquires and exer-
cises control is doing more than investing, but there is no formula of a
56 Devine, Foreign Establishment and the Antitrust Law: A Study of the Antitrust
Consequences of the Principle [sic] Forms of Investment by American Corporations in
Foreign Markets, 57 Nw. U.L. Rev. 400, 436 (1962).
57 Id. See also pp. 322-30 infra. Another lawful main purpose might be the operation
of the company by a management corporation.
58 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
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certain percentage of ownership plus a certain amount of representa-
tion on the board of directors which necessarily equals control in
all instances. Nevertheless, it is clear that one who owns more
than half of the voting shares of a corporation has control and there-
fore will be subject to Clayton Act standards."
Beyond this there is little that can be said by way of generalization
except to note that there are several domestic commerce cases in
which minority stock acquisitions have been found violative of sec-
tion 7•60 The most important of these cases is United States v. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co.?' in which the Supreme Court held that the
acquisition by E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, Inc. of a 23 per-
cent stock interest in General Motors Corporation was unlawful because
it was used to enable du Pont to become the dominant supplier of
automotive fabrics and finishes to General Motors. Since the balance
of General Motors' stock was widely held by the public, du Pont was
obviously the controlling stockholder. This element, coupled with
the fact that du Pont did not achieve its "commanding position" as a
General Motors supplier until after the stock purchase° and with the
evidence showing that its postacquisitional conduct was geared toward
this end," led to an easy rejection of the investment defense.
The fact that sticks out in this voluminous record is that
the bulk of du Pont's production has always supplied the larg-
est part of the requirements of the one customer in the auto-
mobile industry connected to du Pont by a stock interest.
59 In United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (ND. Cal.),
aff'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966), the court found that Schlitz' control of Labatt
enabled it to control General Brewing simply because of Labatt's 63.5% stock interest in
General Brewing. Cf. Swift & Co. v. FTC, 8 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1925)Srev'd on other
grounds sub. nom. FTC v. Western Meat Co., 272 U.S. 554 (1926) (indicating that the
purchase of all of the stock of a corporation is inconsistent with the concept of invest-
ment); United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (RD. Pa. 1960),
aff'd per curiam, 365 U.S. $67 (1961).
On the theoretical level, majority stock ownership can be consistent with the
concept of "investment" where the stock is not voted and where the majority share-
holder allows another group to elect a majority of the board of directors and leaves
the actual management and direction of the corporation entirely to that group. As a
practical matter this situation is most unusual; it conceivably can arise only where there
is a valid voting trust placing the voting privileges in someone totally independent
of the "investor," but even then the efficacy of the arrangement is doubtful.
69 United States v. El. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957); United
States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (ND. Cal.), aff'd per curiam, 385
U.S. 37 (1966); Briggs Mfg. Co. v. Crane Co., 185 F. Supp. 177 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd,
280 F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1960); American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co.,
152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958); Hamilton Watch
Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir.
1953).
61 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
62 Id. at 598-99.
63 Id. at 600-03.
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The inference is overwhelming that du Pont's commanding
position was promoted by its stock interest and was not
gained solely on competitive merit."
The Court admitted that "considerations of price, quality and service
were not overlooked by either du Pont or General Motors," and that
"all concerned in high executive posts in both companies acted honor-
ably and fairly, each in the honest conviction that his actions were
in the best interests of his own company and without any design to
overreach anyone, including du Pont's competitors . . . ."" These
factors might have established the "wisdom of this business judgment"
and the absence of any intent to restrain or monopolize trade, but
they did not establish an "investment." Predatory intent was not an
ingredient of the offense and the record "plainly revealed" that du
Pont had "purposely employed its stock to pry open the General
Motors market to entrench itself as the primary supplier of General
Motors' requirements for automotive finishes and fabrics.""
Of greater interest to the present discussion, involving as it does
the combination of American and foreign companies, is United States
v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co. 67 There, Jos. Schlitz Brewing Company, the
second-largest brewer in the United States, acquired a 39.3 percent
stock interest in John Labatt, Limited, the third-largest Canadian
brewer. Labatt had a partially owned American subsidiary which was
a substantial competitor in the United States, particularly on the
west coast." The acquisition would have brought this company under
the control of Schlitz. After determining that the acquired interest
was sufficient for voting control and that Schlitz sought working con-
trol over Labatt throughout the negotiations," the court determined
there was credible evidence to support the investment defense."
Other cases in which minority stock interests have been success-
fully attacked under section 7 have involved percentages of ownership
ranging from 22 to 24 percent?' In each of these cases the stock
64 Id. at 605.
65 Id. at 606-07.°° Id. at 606.
67 253 F. Supp. 129 (ND. Cal.), aff'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966).
68 Labatt owned 63.5 % of the stock of General Brewing Corporation. At the time
of the acquisition, General Brewing was the largest beer producer in Hawaii and the
second largest in California and in an area composed of eight western states; it ranked
fourteenth nationally. Its position in these "sections of the country" made it a substan-
tial competitior of Schlitz.
08 253 F. Supp. at 136, 138.
76 Id. at 144.
74 E.g., Briggs Mfg. Co. v. Crane Co., 185 F. Supp. 177 (ED. Mich.), aff'd, 280
F.2d 747 (6th Cir. 1960) (22% stock interest); American Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-
American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir.
1958) (23% interest); Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 114 F. Supp. 307
(D. Conn.), aff'd, 206 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1953) (24% interest).
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acquired was less than a controlling interest and the majority stock-
holders were in full control of the corporation, determining its policies
as they saw fit. Nevertheless, the courts held the acquisitions were
not made "solely for investment" because their purpose was to obtain
control. Recently, the Government obtained a consent order of divesti-
ture where the percentage of ownership acquired was less than three
percent.' These cases serve to illustrate that minority stock acquisi-
tions, too small to carry with them control, can nevertheless fall within
the ban of section 7.
The investment defense will fail whenever the evidence establishes
a purpose to obtain control, in whole or in part, and the proscribed
effects are present. But this does not mean that control is an element
of the offense. The statute does not speak in terms of control; it con-
demns the use of the stock for the forbidden purposes. In every case
where the courts have found the antitrust misuse, the postacquisitional
conduct of the two firms has been stressed; so too has the intent of
the acquirer. The courts have consistently viewed each case in its
economic perspective, examining such factors as the absence of an
investment portfolio, the degree of liquidity commensurate with an
ordinary investment, the financial condition of the acquired firm,
the amount paid for the stock, the ratio of the amount of stock
acquired to that normally traded on the exchange and the thinness
of either firm's market. Evidence that the minority stockholder received
favored treatment following the purchase has become almost conclu-
sive in vertical acquisition cases. In horizontal cases," the courts have
even recognized that mere investment in a competitor may adversely
affect competition without offering any redeeming virtues. The district
court opinions in these cases attest to a growing judicial disposition
to accept the proposition that a stock purchase made with the intent
of obtaining representation on the board of a competitor is not made
"solely for investment," and is inconsistent with unrestrained com-
petition. 74
72 United States v. Newmont Mining Corp., 1966 Trade Cas. 71,709 (S.D.N.Y.).
73 For explanations of horizontal and vertical relationships, see pp. 273-74 & note
117 infra.
74 The cases cited, note 71 supra, all held that the stock acquisitions were not simply
investments because of their attendant purpose of acquiring control or at least of
achieving a "closer relationship" between the firms. But the opinions in each case go
much further. By way of dictum or alternative holding, each judge suggested that the
acquisition of a minority stock interest in a competing corporation which results, is
intended to result, or is reasonably likely to result, in minority representation on the
competitor's board of directors is inconsistent with unrestrained competition between
the two corporations, and that this factor alone is sufficient to negate the investment
defense. In American Crystal Sugar, District Judge Dawson pointed out that "[a]ly such
representation would give the nominee of defendant an opportunity to be thoroughly
acquainted with the business and plans of the [other] company and thereby to limit
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Where the American firm is satisfied with merely passive financial
participation in the foreign firm and does not insist upon the safety
of absolute or working control, antitrust risks are minimal. They are
not completely eliminated, however, because of the ever-present possi-
bility that future management might seek to convert the investment into
the forbidden use. 75 If future management does use the stock to ac-
quire control it does not necessarily follow that the acquisition, lawful
when made, becomes unlawful. The metamorphosis of a mere invest-
ment into the responsibility of control becomes significant only if the
proscribed anticompetitive effects upon the commerce of the United
States are present.
It has been suggested that participation in a control group might
be compatible with the concept of an investment. Herbert Brownell, a
former Attorney General of the United States, has stated that legality
in such circumstances should depend solely upon a finding of active
participation in the group." To illustrate his position he cites the
the effectiveness of the competition between them." 152 F. Supp. at 394. In Hamilton
Watch, Chief Judge Hincks stated:
I incline to the view that the acquisition if made only with intent to obtain
minority representation constituted a violation of Section 7: having in mind .. .
the practical considerations that confront the board of directors of any corpora-
tion in a competitive enterprise, I think it fairly inferable that minority
representation, because of the opportunity thereby afforded to persuade or to
compel a relaxation of the full vigor of Hamilton's competitive effort would
come within the ban of Section 7.
114 F. Supp. at 317.
In affirming the decisions in these two cases, the Second Circuit cautiously withheld
judgment on these suggestions. But the rather strong per curiam opinion of the Sixth
Circuit in the Briggs case, commending the lower court for "an excellent opinion,"
indicates the probable future acceptance of the theory:
The most serious ramification . . . is the "listening line" which Crane [the
acquiring firm] would have in Briggs [the acquired firm]. As Chief Judge Levin
stated "since the two companies are competitors, the Briggs Board would be
unable to perform its proper functions in connection with the management of
the company without divulging to a competitor confidential information with
respect to the development of processes and techniques; plans for improvement
of products and plans for sales and promotion campaigns." 185 F. Supp. 177,
181. Furthermore, with two sympathetic representatives on the Board, Crane
will have driven the wedge in its attempts to gain control of Briggs' assets.
280 F.2d at 750.
Each of these cases involved suits by the corporation whose stock was being
purchased against the corporation making the purchases and alleged a violation of § 7.
In each, the plaintiff contended, among other things, that board representation would
itself injure competition between the two companies and in the industry. This factor
may have significantly influenced the courts. One must, therefore, be cautious in con-
cluding that the intention to acquire minority representation will be accorded similar
significance in a government suit where these specific charges by industrial firms will
most probably be lacking.
76 The validity of acquisition is tested in light of market conditions as they exist
at the time of suit rather than at the time of acquisition. United States v. E.I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 596-98, 607 (1957).
76 Brownell, How to Conduct Foreign Business, 1962 N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Antitrust
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example of an American corporate shareholder having one director
on the five-man board of a foreign corporation. This director casts
the tie-breaking vote on a proposal to establish world prices and
divide world markets—an action clearly violative of the United States
antitrust laws—by voting for cartelization. Posing the question whether
the American corporation can be held liable solely because it placed
its representative in this position, he concludes, "The answer is proba-
bly yes, but some would argue that additional circumstances must be
present, such as knowledge of the proposed action on the part of the
U.S. corporation coupled either with specific assent thereto or failure
to object."
The implication that the proferred argument might be tenable
seems incorrect. Proof of specific assent or failure to object on the part of
the American corporation is unnecessary. Not only was the stock voted
to elect the director, but the director's action brought about the unlaw-
ful restraint. Certainly, this constitutes "using [the stock] . . . to bring
about . . . the substantial lessening of competition." But what if the
American corporation can demonstrate either a lack of knowledge or
express objection to the action of its representative? It might be argued
that liability should be avoided if the American stockholder did every-
thing reasonable within its power to undo the effect of its nominee's act.
This suggestion has merit only because the statutory requirement of
"use" seems to imply some kind of premeditated action, some kind of
conduct intended to accomplish the improper result. If this is so, the
defense may exist, but its effectiveness depends on where the burden
of proof is placed. As a general rule, it is easier to prove knowledge
of a fact than ignorance of it. However, the realities of the situation
demand that the burden be borne by defendant. To state the obvious,
it is inconceivable that an American corporate stockholder in a foreign
corporation will elect a director and then not care how he votes on
specific proposals. It is far more realistic to presume that it had
knowledge—at least post facto knowledge—of its representative's
action. Moreover, the business documents which the Government would
need to prove knowledge may well be hidden in the offices of the foreign
corporation and not subject to subpoena since, by hypothesis, the
American stockholder does not possess working control and cannot,
therefore, be compelled to produce them. For these reasons, any deci-
sion placing the burden of showing knowledge upon the Government
is unsound and might well emasculate the statutory proscriptions.
A modification in the facts of Brownell's hypothetical yields far
more significant implications. The American corporation became en-
Law Symposium 88, 93, citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945).
77 Id. at 93.
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meshed in antitrust trouble only because its representative on the
board of the foreign corporation voted to cartelize the world. If
instead, he had voted against cartelization, it is difficult to conceive
of any basis for holding the American corporate stockholder liable
for any antitrust violation. True, the stock was voted, but it was not
voted or otherwise used "to bring about, or in attempting to bring
about, the substantial lessening of competition." Despite the opinions
of the lower courts in the horizontal cases, the hypothetical situation
so modified serves to suggest that participation in a control group
may not lead to the negation of the investment defense.
As we have seen, the United States businessman may invest
capital in foreign corporations in varying degrees. He may purchase all
of the stock or a majority of the stock, or he may acquire some minority
interest in the overseas firm. The minority interest, in turn, may
be a controlling or noncontrolling interest. The potential anti-
trust consequences and the usefulness of the Clayton Act "invest-
ment" defense differ in each instance. It is clear that the purchase
of all or a majority of the stock of a corporation is not simply an
investment. The cases also make it clear that the acquisition of a
controlling, though minority, stock interest is not a purchase "solely
for investment." The status of other minority stock acquisitions is
less clear. Present authority strongly suggests that an attendant in-
tent to acquire control will remove these stock purchases from the
simple investment category. Furthermore, there are some judicial
suggestions to the effect that acquisitions made with the intent of
achieving even minority representation on the board of directors of
a competing corporation are not made "solely for investment." At
the same time, however, there exists some reason for believing that
an American corporation can lawfully acquire stock in a foreign cor-
poration, even a competitor, nominate and elect representatives to
its board, and thereby participate in its activities, without necessarily
incurring antitrust liability as a result of the foreign firm's transgres-
sions of the antitrust laws of the United States. There is as yet no
clear-cut judicial definition of investment which conclusively resolves
these borderline cases. On the positive side, it can be said that where
the United States corporation neither has nor seeks control or repre-
sentation, it will fit within the investment exemption of Section 7 of
the Clayton Act.
It is not, however, the mere investor who creates antitrust prob-
lems in overseas investment; it is the investor Who expands his opera-
tions overseas. He may do it by establishing an unincorporated enter-
prise or subsidiary, by buying a controlling interest in a foreign
corporation, or by combining with others to establish a foreign opera-
tion. This kind of investor is clearly outside the investment exception.
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His overseas activities are governed to a large extent by antitrust
considerations, and it is he who is the subject of the remainder of this
article.
IV. INVESTMENT INTERESTS WITH BUSINESS PARTICIPATION
A. Establishment Problems
As indicated above, control establishments can be segregated into
four types: (1) the unincorporated foreign branch, division or depart-
ment; (2) the wholly owned subsidiary; (3) the partially owned
subsidiary; and (4) the joint venture. Distinct business reasons explain
their existence and separate classification.
Overseas operation conducted through unincorporated branches,
divisions or departments is not very popular. It has been used by a
mere handful of American enterprises and then only sparingly. Its
primary use generally has been for purposes of sampling a market
or establishing a foothold. The principal explanation for this limited
use of the unincorporated overseas establishment is probably to be
found in the United States tax laws which influence most business-
men to discard the unincorporated structure after the initial period
of loss operation has ended. 78 Other important considerations influenc-
ing the decision to incorporate would appear to be the existence of
foreign import duties and restrictions, insulation of the parent from
suit and the achievement of the benefits of limited liability and identifi-
cation with a foreign country. For whatever reasons, a great many
American corporations conduct their foreign business through subsid-
iaries, sometimes incorporated in the United States but more often
incorporated abroad. 7° From the substantive antitrust viewpoint, it
is immaterial whether the subsidiary is incorporated in the United
States or in some foreign country. 8°
Frequently, the American businessman will find both the unin-
corporated foreign branch, division or department, and the wholly
78 In many instances, tax considerations will play the primary role in influencing
the decision as to which organizational structure will be used. The United States tax
laws favor incorporation. The income of an unincorporated foreign branch or division
of an American corporation is taxed directly by the United States at the time of
accrual. The earnings of a foreign subsidiary, however, are not taxed until they are
remitted to its American parent as dividends or their equivalent. Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§§ 901-06 (Supp. 1965-66). Until recently the establishment of a foreign-based company
in a tax haven resulted in additional advantages. But this loophole has been closed. Id.
§§ 951-64, 970-72, 1248-49 (1964).
For a detailed study of the problem, see E. Owens, The Foreign Tax Credit (1961);
Tax Institute, Taxation and Operations Abroad (1960); Baker & Meek, Tax Problems
of Doing Business Abroad: Some Practical Considerations, 1957 Wis. L. Rev. 75; Decider
& Wimmer, Taxation Advantages and Problems in Foreign Trade, 1959 U. Ill. L.F. 202;
Hughes, Taxation of the Corporate Family, 9 A.B.A. Sec. of Antitrust Law 85 (1956).
70 Devine, supra note 56, at 436.
80 Id .
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owned subsidiary forms of business organization unacceptable. This
may be due purely to personal motives or to local requirements. Some
foreign governments require local investment in foreign owned firms
engaged in certain sectors of their economy. Others have adopted
policies which make partial local ownership particularly desirable,
such as preferential tax treatment or "buy national products" cam-
paigns. Apart from these considerations regarding the dictates or
wishes of the foreign sovereign, the American businessman may him-
self favor local participation to obtain desired local capital or attract
qualified local personnel. Incentive programs and stock-option plans
may be vital to the successful establishment of a new foreign com-
pany. In any event, whether partial ownership is required or desired,
the result is the creation of a partially owned subsidiary or joint
venture relationship. As we have seen, the distinction between these
two forms of partially owned business structures depends upon the
identity and character of the other investors."
The antitrust legality of establishing any particular type of
overseas operation has never been squarely presented in a decided
case. Nevertheless, it is clear that the creation of a business enter-
prise does not of itself violate the law." The litigated cases have in-
evitably involved much more than the mere fact of establishment; they
have been colored by agreements between competitors to divide
markets," fix prices," and engage in other anticompetitive behavior."
Thus, while these cases have not resulted in any clear-cut judicial
decision on the legality of foreign establishments as such, they do make
it clear that both the circumstances surrounding their creation and the
use made of them may produce antitrust problems. 8° For example,
where the formation of a foreign plant is the fruit of an underlying
conspiracy or agreement to restrain trade or of an attempt to monopo-
lize, it is unlawful. Similarly, the establishment of a foreign operation
51 See text accompanying notes 53-57 supra.
82 United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 962-63 (D. Mass.
1950). See also Brewster, supra note 22, at 182; A.B.A. Comm. on Antitrust Problems
in Int'l Trade, supra note 37, at 243; Carlston, Antitrust Policy Abroad, 49 Nw. U.L.
Rev. 569, 589 (1954) ; Fugate, Damper or Bellows? Antitrust Laws and Foreign Trade,
45 A.B.A.J. 947, 949 (1959); Nebolsine, Analysis of Chapter II, "Trade or Commerce
* * * With Foreign Nations," 7 A.B.A. Sec. of Antitrust Law 64, 69-70 (1955) ; Oppen-
heim, Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman Act—Points and Implications of the
Timken Case, 42 Trade-Mark Rep. 3, 7 (1952) ; Timberg, Competition—A Philosophy for
Export, and for Defense Production, 21 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 677, 682-83 (1953).
83 See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) ;
United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
84 See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
85 See, e.g., United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D.
Mass. 1950).
86 See Carlston, supra note 82, at 587-91.
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is illegal if it results in an unlawful monopoly or constitutes an unfair
method of competition.
1. Monopolization and Attempts to Monopolize.—Where either the
foreign establishment or the corporate family as a whole is large or
powerful, monopoly problems must be considered. Section 2 of the
Sherman Act supplements section 1 in that it attempts to deal with
the end-product of unreasonable restraints of trade, namely, mono-
poly. It specifically outlaws three practices: monopolization, attempts
to monopolize and combinations or conspiracies to monopolize.87 While
" "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of
a misdemeanor . . . ." 15 TJ.S.C. § 2 (1964).
Monopolization under § 2 consists of monopoly in the economic sense—that is,
power to fix prices or to exclude competitors—plus a carefully limited ingredient of
purpose or intent to use or preserve such power. Economic monopoly becomes illegal
monopolization not only (1) if it was achieved or preserved by conduct violating § I,
but also (2) if it was, even by restrictions not prohibited by § 1, deliberately obtained
or maintained. This element of deliberateness distinguishes the offense of monopolization
from the economic concept of monopoly.
Section 2's prohibition of monopolization, therefore, does not permit condemnation
because of size alone, United States v. El. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377
(1956), United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 451 (1920), nor even
of dominance, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 346
(S.D.N.Y. 1950), although size and dominance are evidentiary facts to be taken into
consideration. The courts have recognized that size is "an earmark of monopoly power,"
United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107 n.10 (1948), and "carries with it an oppor-
tunity for abuse," United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 116 (1932), but they
have repeatedly stated that mere size is not outlawed by § 2. Cf. United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966), modifying 236 F. Supp. 244 (URI. 1964).
It is generally stated that what § 2 proscribes is the possession of power to control
market prices or to exclude competitors, provided such power was so obtained, main-
tained or used that an intent to exercise that power may be inferred. American Tobacco
Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946). The intent to monopolize need not be a
specific intent to achieve monopoly, United States v. Griffith, supra, but may he inferred
from either lawful, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d
Cir. 1945), United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
afPcl, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), or unlawful activity, Lorain Journal Co. v. United States,
342 U.S. 143 (1951). It may not be inferred from monopoly power "thrust upon" a
business organization by reason of superior skill, foresight or industry. United States v.
Aluminum Co. of America, supra; American Tobacco Co. v. United States, supra; Union
Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of N.E., Inc., 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied,
365 U.S. 833, rehearing denied, 365 U.S. 890 (1961). The object of the statute here is
to forbid market control achieved by erecting unnatural barriers which make it impossible
for others to engage in competition. See United States v. Ed. du Pont de Nemours &
Co., supra, at 390; American Tobacco Co. v. United States, supra, at 809; United States
v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra. See also Att'y Gen. Rep. 43-60 (1955); J. Van
Cise, Understanding the Antitrust Laws 11-12 (1963).
By its prohibition of attempts, § 2 seeks to reach action which tends toward
monopoly. Proof of actual possession of the power to raise prices or exclude competitors
is not required where an attempt, combination or conspiracy to monopolize is charged,
rather than monopolization itself. However, a specific intent by the person or persons
involved either to achieve the unlawful end or to conspire to do so must be shown.
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a plurality of persons is necessary for a violation of section 1, section
2 can be violated by an individual. A single trader can violate the
Act by either monopolizing or attempting to monopolize. Consequently
the form of organization utilized to effectuate a foreign establishment
is irrelevant under section 2 and monopoly problems may arise even
when a foreign expansion is beyond the reach of section 1.
The foreign commerce cases offer little precedent for assessing
the legality of a foreign investment under section 2. Indeed, even
domestic monopolization precedent is sparse. With the exception of
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Americas' almost no cases have
turned upon the legality of internal expansion as such. The Alcoa
decision does, however, shed some light on possible judicial thinking.
The case presented a charge that Alcoa, the sole United States pro-
ducer of virgin aluminum ingot, had monopolized the domestic alumi-
num ingot market. Its control over the market stemmed from patent
rights acquired around 1900. Alcoa maintained its monopoly position
beyond the expiration of the patents by several specific practices later
enjoined by consent order of the court entered in 1912." Despite the
injunction, Alcoa was able to perpetuate its monopoly by activities
which, while they involved no "moral derelictions," were nevertheless
"exclusionary." In commenting upon the "deliberateness" by which
Alcoa had maintained its monopolistic position, Judge Learned Hand
stated:
It was not inevitable that [Alcoa] should always anticipate
increases in the demand for ingot and be prepared to supply
them. Nothing compelled it to keep doubling and redoubling
its capacity before others entered the field. It insists that it
never excluded competitors; but we can think of no more
effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each new
opportunity as it opened, and to face every newcomer with
new capacity already geared into a great organization, having
Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); United States v.
Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 531-33, rehearing denied, 334 U.S. 862 (1948). Such
an intent may be spelled out either from clear-cut documentary proof or from circum-
stantial evidence. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., supra; Interstate Circuit, Inc.
v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939). Unfair competitive practices, such as those
forbidden by § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act and the objectionable practices
mentioned in the Clayton Act can serve as proof of the intent necessary to support a
charge of attempting to monopolize. Moreover, it is as unlawful to attempt to monopo-
lize by excluding small potential competitors from the market as it is to drive out of
business large, established concerns. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc.,
359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396
(1947); Forgett v. Scharf, 181 F.2d 754, 757 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 825 (1950).
Sec also Att'y Gen. Rep. 61-62; J. Van Cise, supra, 11-13 (1963).
88 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
89 Id. at 422-23.
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the advantage of experience, trade connections and the elite
of personnel."
It is true that Alcoa expressly condemns only preclusive activity
by one already enjoying a monopoly position, and does not purport
to consider the antitrust significance of normal internal expansion.
Nevertheless, it warns any dominant firm in domestic or foreign com-
merce that it runs the risk of monopolizing by "embracing each new
opportunity" and this includes foreign opportunities."
Thus, foreign expansion can lead to a charge of monopolizing
or attempting to monopolize either the United States import" or
export" trade in a commodity because it may give a dominant firm
99 Id. at 431. Judge Hand continued: "Only in case we interpret 'exclusion' as
limited to manoeuvers not honestly industrial, but actuated solely by a desire to prevent
competition, can such a course, indefatigably pursued, be deemed not 'exclusionary.' So
to limit it would in our judgment emasculate the Act; would permit just such consolida-
tions as it was designed to prevent!' Id.
91 Brewster, supra note 22, at 189.
92 There is no question but that United States imports are a "part of trade or
commerce . . . with foreign nations" subject to monopolization under § 2. The principal
case on the point is United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927). In Sisal, two
American corporations and a Mexican corporation were alleged to have gained control
over the supply of sisal in Mexico by means of discriminatory Mexican legislation. The
defendant Mexican corporation, which had been financed by three American banking
corporations, became the sole exporter of sisal. The complaint charged that defendants
had secured a monopoly in the supply of sisal abroad, and in the domestic stocks of
sisal produced abroad, as well as monopolizing its importation and sale with the conse-
quent power to fix and raise prices of sisal within the United States. The Supreme Court
upheld the complaint as stating a cause of action under §§ 1, 2 of the Sherman Act,
saying it was "plain enough that appellees are parties to a successful plan to destroy
competition and to control and monopolize the purchase, importation and sale of sisal."
Id. at 274. The monopolization here was of the supply abroad. It directly affected United
States imports and was an act done by American and foreign corporations. Cf. United
States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963) (conspiracy formed by American, Swiss
and Italian corporations in the United States and Europe involving the transfer of patent
rights for the purpose of excluding or restraining Japanese competition in the United
States and Europe). See also Sanib Corp. v. United Fruit Co., 135 F. Supp. 764, 766
(S.D.N.Y. 1955), in which the court, relying on Sisal, held that a conspiracy partly
effectuated in a foreign country was subject to the United States antitrust laws. See
also Wilson Act (Tariff), 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11 (1964).
93 It is clear that the United States export trade is subject to monopolization, and
that the same rules apply as to a monopolization in interstate commerce. There is no
need to show that the domestic trade therein has also been monopolized. Apparently, the
courts have accepted this without question, relying on the statutory language "to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce ... with foreign nations." Fugate,
supra note 22, at 160.
There is no clear-cut case on the point under discussion. In cases involving the
monopolization of United States exports, the Government has also charged a violation
of § 1. Invariably, the courts have disposed of the cases under the § 1 count and thus
found it unnecessary to decide the § 2 allegations. In United States v. National Lead Co.,
63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947), the Government had
charged that an agreement to divide territories among foreign producers, participated
in by one dominant American producer and aided and abetted by another dominant
producer, had resulted in complete exclusion of imports and an elimination of export
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the power to foreclose others from an appreciable foreign outlet or
source of supply." In assessing the import of section 2, however, the
central question hinges on the formulation of standards for delineat-
ing the geographic area in which the market power of the defendant
is to be measured. The judiciary has not yet spoken and the issue
remains unresolved but some notable authorities have offered their
suggestions and a significant discourse is developing.
Kingman Brewster, Jr. has suggested that monopoly in foreign
commerce should be measured not against individual foreign markets
but against foreign markets as a whole, that is, in terms of competi-
tors' alternatives generally.° 5 Under this theory, the fact that an Ameri-
can corporation has acquired monopoly power in a single foreign coun-
try or region does not necessarily mean it has violated the law. Professor
Brewster's theory, based as it is on the sum total of available distribu-
tive and resource opportunities, suggests that an even broader geo-
graphic market may be appropriate in section 2 cases involving foreign
commerce. For if the "area of effective competition" delineates the
boundaries of the relevant market," there is no reason to confine it
geographically to foreign territories. Theoretically, the market can just
as well include all or part of the domestic market in the commodity in-
volved. Should this test be adopted, alternative domestic and foreign
outlets or sources of supply must be taken into account and the impact
of even the largest expansion on United States commerce may well be
negligible. As the size of the market is thus expanded, it becomes
increasingly less likely that any firm could possess the requisite
trade except to countries of the Western Hemisphere. The court found this violative of
§ 1 and did not decide whether § 2 was also violated. The same approach was used
in United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
It is to be expected that foreign trade cases charging violations of both §§ 1, 2 of the
Sherman Act will be handled in the same way in the future.
I" In general, the Supreme Court has said that as to § 2 an "appreciable part" or
"appreciable segment" of trade or commerce is subject to monopolization. United States
v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 225 (1947); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221
U.S. I, 61 (1911). The applicability of these decisions to foreign commerce problems,
however, is unclear. Their significance will have to be carefully considered in light of
the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. EJ. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351
U.S. 377 (1956). There, although both the Government and the defendant agreed that
cellophane was a "part of commerce" within the meaning of § 2, the Court, in defining
the relevant market, stated that "commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers
for the same purposes make up that 'part of the trade or commerce,' monopolization
of which may be illegal." Id. at 395. As to what "part" of commerce is subject to
monopolization, what constitutes the control necessary to cause a substantial effect in
foreign trade, and the requisite intent, see generally Brewster, supra note 22, at 84-88;
Fugate, supra note 22, at 150-61; Hale & Hale, Monopoly Abroad: The Antitrust Laws
and Commerce in Foreign Areas, 31 Texas L. Rev. 493 (1953); Oseas, Antitrust Prose-
cutions of International Business, 30 Cornell L.Q. 42 (1944).
95 Brewster, supra note 22, at 188-89.
06 See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956)
(primarily concerned with the delineation of the product market).
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power to establish prices or exclude competitors. Unless a single ter-
ritory constitutes virtually the entire export market or source of sup-
ply for a particular commodity, alternative export markets will still
be available to United States competitors, and alternative sources of
supply will still be available to United States customers. In a market
of wide geographic dimensions, the impact on United States com-
merce with foreign nations must certainly be slight. Consequently,
adherents of the theory that monopoly in foreign commerce should
be measured against foreign markets as a whole conclude that the
occasion for obtaining or maintaining monopoly by overseas invest-
ment is probably limited to firms already in antitrust trouble at home.'
It is important to observe this total-foreign-market thesis in its
proper economic perspective. The total international market in a com-
modity may well be larger than the widest possible market. American
businessmen are not free to buy and sell all over the world. The United
States Government has repeatedly forbidden or restricted trade with
certain countries. For example, United States exporters are not per-
mitted to sell goods on the list of strategic products to Communist
countries. Similarly, the policies and actions of some foreign govern-
ments also operate to curtail United States trade. Often, United States
companies are excluded from foreign countries as a result of trade em-
bargoes or other official trade barriers, such as import quotas or dis-
criminatory tariffs. Finally, certain facts of economic life, such as con-
centration or vertical integration in foreign markets, effectively pre-
clude American trade in many areas. For these reasons, it cannot be
said that the largest possible American foreign trade market for any
given commodity is conterminous with the total foreign market for
that commodity."
Not everyone has enthusiastically endorsed Brewster's theory
of measuring monopoly in foreign commerce in terms of competitors'
alternatives generally. Other authorities have adopted a different ap-
proach and their analysis suggests that isolated foreign trade areas may
constitute the relevant market in foreign commerce monopolization and
merger cases.°° Support for this proposition is found in a long line
of interstate commerce cases which indicate that economic conse-
quences within limited isolated local or regional markets may provide
a sufficient basis for predicating antitrust violations.'" If this approach
is carried over into foreign commerce cases, it may be recognized that
each foreign country or region constitutes a separate trade area, with
97 Brewster, supra note 22, at 188-89.
98 See Donovan, The Legality of Acquisitions and Mergers Involving American and
Foreign Corporations Under the United States Antitrust Laws—Part I, 39 S. Cal. L. Rev.
526, 550-52 (1966).
99 See id. at 552-56.
100 See id. at 553-56.
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different governmental and economic barriers constituting it a sepa-
rate foreign market worthy of antitrust protection. Brewster argues
against this approach, claiming that domestic-commerce-regional-
market principles are inapposite to foreign trade. His contention
appears to be based upon the premise that local markets are singularly
appropriate to domestic commerce cases since "[t]he local or regional
consumers anywhere in the country deserve the benefits of competi-
tion even if there is ample competition in other markets.""' American
consumers, he suggests, are not similarly deprived of the benefits of
competition by anticompetitive combinations abroad which do not
affect United States domestic commerce. This may be true, but the
question remains whether consumer benefit is the only end sought
to be served by antitrust laws in general and the Sherman Act in
particular. While the consumer is the ultimate and chief beneficiary
of a free enterprise system, it cannot be said that he is its only in-
tended beneficiary. Congress has repeatedly proclaimed, and the
courts have repeatedly recognized, another important political or
social goal of antitrust legislation, namely, the desire to protect small
businessmen and the right of merchants freely to engage in business
within a relatively small local region of the United States—often an
area small as a single city or even a part of a city. 102 Quite obviously,
this latter policy is most clearly fostered by recognition of multiple
foreign markets and most clearly frustrated by acceptance of a total-
foreign-market concept. There is no reason why legitimate antitrust
goals should be less decisively protected in foreign—import or export—
commerce than in domestic commerce.
While market delineation problems are formidable, other signifi-
cant issues exist which may seriously curtail the impact of section
2 upon the expansive activity of United States firms, even those which
clearly dominate the relevant market. These firms do not run afoul of
the law unless they deliberately acquire or maintain monopoly power;
the accidental monopolist is not an outlaw. The dominant firm might
be able to avoid liability by showing its dominant position was, to use
Judge Hand's language in Alcoa, "thrust upon" it by the thinness of the
market, local compulsion, inherent economic advantages of location,
or superior skill, foresight, and industry."' "A market may, for exam-
1r1 Brewster, supra note 22, at 187.
102 See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959);
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
103 See Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of N.E., Inc., 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir.
1960) ; United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 429-31 (2d Cir. 1945);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 341, 344 (D. Mass. 1953).
Judge Wyzanski considers this very unlikely. See United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
236 F. Supp. 244 (D.R.I. 1964), modified, 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
flit is the highly exceptional case, a rara avis more often found in academic
groves than in the thickets of business, where monopoly power was thrust upon
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ple, be so limited that it is impossible to produce at all and meet the
the cost of production except by a plant large enough to supply the
whole demand."'" In such circumstances section 2 is not violated,'"
for "[t]hose who do not seek, but cannot avoid, the control of a mar-
ket" appear to possess a recognized defense to a section 2 complaint.'"
Finally, where a foreign government grants a monopoly"' to an
American firm, it would seem that there is no antitrust violation unless
there is an underlying conspiracy"' or unless the firm procures the ac-
tion of the foreign government with the intent of excluding American
competitors."' Such activity could constitute an attempt to monopolize
and, therefore, be a violation of section 2 even though it does not
result in monopoly power."°
2. Acquisitions and Mergers.—Where the overseas expansion is ac-
complished by acquisition of a going concern, the investor must con-
sider the possibility of liability under both the Sherman Act and the
an enterprise by the economic character of the industry and by what Judge
L. Hand in Aluminum called "superior skill, foresight and industry."
Id. at 248.
104 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
105 Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of N.E., Inc., 284 F.2d 582 (1st Cir. 1960).
106 United States v. Aluminum Co, of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430-31 (2d Cir. 1945).
107 A foreign government would obviously be free to grant patent, trademark or
other exclusive franchises, without subjecting the holder of the franchise to liability
under the United States antitrust laws. Moreover, some countries regularly insist upon
local monopolization. On the question of trademark rights under foreign law, see Steele
v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co.,
234 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1956); Ramirez Sr Feraud Chili Co. v. Las Palmas Food Co., 146
F. Supp. 594 (S.D. Cal. 1956), aff'd per curiam, 245 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 927 (1958). As to the treatment of foreign patent and trademark
rights utilized by members of a conspiracy to restrain trade, see Timken Roller Bearing
Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951); Hazeltine Research, Inc. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 239 F. Supp. 51 (ND. Ill. 1965); United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd.,
100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753
(D.N.J. 1949); United States v. General Elec. Co., 80 F. Supp. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1948);
United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S.
319 (1947).
108 Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962);
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
109 Brewster, supra note 22, at 95-96; Fugate, Antitrust Law and International
Trade, 1959 U. Ill. L.F. 387, 395-96; Devine, Foreign Establishment and the Antitrust
Law: A Study of the Antitrust Consequences of the Principle [sic] Forms of Investment
by American Corporations in Foreign Markets, 57 Nw. U.L. Rev. 400, 419 (1962).
1 1 0 It is entirely possible that economies of scale and operation, or risks of foreign
operations, might justify an explicitly exclusive franchise or concession. Such arrange-
ments could be upheld as having a normal business purpose rather than condemned as
a scheme to circumvent the law. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495
(1948). The finding of a "normal business purpose" would negate the element of
specific intent which Columbia Steel makes crucial to an attempt to monopolize.
Brewster, supra note 22, at 190-91.
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Clayton Ace' Foreign acquisitions have figured prominently in the
past in conspiracy and monopolization cases under Sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act,' but there has never been a case under that Act
based solely upon a "foreign" merger situation. Recently, however,
a small handful of acquisitions involving United States and foreign
corporations have been prosecuted under the Clayton Act. Since only
one of these cases has resulted in a decision on the merits,'" we must
rely for the present upon analogies drawn from interstate commerce
cases.
a. Under the Sherman Act. Experience with domestic merger
cases has accentuated the Sherman Act's limitations and demonstrated
its inadequacies in curbing corporate amalgamations. As the Supreme
Court's famous decision in United States v. Columbia Steel Co."'
illustrates, the standard of reasonableness applied under the Sherman
Act has been rather lenient. As a result of that case, courts were re-
quired to look at several factors, such as the strength of the remaining
competition, the probable development of the industry, changes in
consumer demand and the purpose or motive of the parties."' This
111 Section 7 of the Clayton Act does provide that it will not
prevent a corporation engaged in commerce from causing the formation of
subsidiary corporations for the actual carrying on of their immediate lawful
business, or the natural and legitimate branches or extensions thereof, or from
owning and holding all or a part of the stock of such subsidiary corporations,
when the effect of such formation is not to substantially lessen competition.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). The precise significance of this provision is uncertain. The legis-
lative history of § 7 affords no insight into the proper construction, and it has not
been the subject of either judicial or governmental inquiry.
112 E.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) ; United
States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) ; United States
v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
113 United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (ND. Cal.), aff'd per
curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966).
111 334 U.S. 495 (1948). The Court held that the acquisition of the largest inde-
pendent steel fabricator on the West Coast by the largest steel producer in the United
States did not violate either §§ 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act.
115 The standard formulated by the Court in Columbia Steel for determining the
legality of mergers under the Sherman Act is as follows:
If such acquisition results in or is aimed at unreasonable restraint, then the
purchase is forbidden by the Sherman Act. In determining what constitutes
unreasonable restraint, we do not think the dollar volume is in itself of
compelling significance; we look rather to the percentage of business controlled,
the strength of the remaining competition, whether the action springs from
business requirements or purpose to monopolize, the probable development of
the industry, consumer demands, and other characteristics of the market. We do
not undertake to prescribe any set of percentage figures by which to measure
the reasonableness of a corporation's enlargement of its activities by the purchase
of the assets of a competitor. The relative effect of percentage command of a
market varies with the setting in which that factor is placed. (Footnote omitted.)
Id. at 527-28. It has been pointed out by at least one observer that "(Olds is more a
denial of a standard than it is the formation of one." Brewster, supra note 22, at 199.
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multiple-factors test, since it is so broad and requires consideration of
so many unwieldy factors, has little deterrent effect.
The latest Sherman Act merger decision in United States V. First
Nat'l Bank' has formulated a somewhat harsher per se market-share
test of illegality for horizontal mergers."7 Such mergers now appar-
ently restrain trade unreasonably whenever the firms involved are such
116 376 U.S. 665 (1964). In this case, the Supreme Court held that the merger of
the largest and the fourth largest commercial banks in Fayette County, Kentucky,
violated § 1. The Court expressly rejected a defense based upon the Columbia Steel
decision stating that Columbia Steel should be confined to its unique facts and concluded:
"Where, as here, the merging companies are major competitive factors in a relevant
market, the elimination of significant competition between them constitutes a violation
of § 1 of the Sherman Act." Id. at 672-73. Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissent complained
that this sweeping rule in effect condemns mere bigness.
It is still too early to assess the effect of the decision on the continuing validity
of Columbia Steel. Thus far it has been interpreted as rejecting the more complex
Columbia Steel test in favor of an easier per se illegality rule based simply upon the
finding that significant competition inter sese has been or would be eliminated by the
merger. Comment, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 143, 266-69 (1964);
Note, 52 Ky. L.J. 863 (1964); Note, 1964 U. Ill. L.F. 667. In this connection it is
interesting to note that Justices Brennan and White concurred in United States v. First
Nat'l Bank, 376 U.S. 665 (1964), "solely on the conclusion that the factors relied on
in . . . [Columbia Steel] as applied to the facts of this case, clearly compel the
reversal." Id. at 673.
117 Throughout the remainder of this article, combinations will be referred to as
being either "horizontal," "vertical" or "conglomerate." These terms are not always
helpful; often they serve as a source of confusion. Nevertheless, because they have
become an accepted part of antitrust vocabulary, they will be used here.
A horizontal merger is generally defined as the merger of two competitors. But
there is some dispute as to the meaning of the term "competitor." It is generally agreed
that companies manufacturing the same products or products which are close substitutes
are competitors if they distribute them in the same market. When their products are
distributed in different territories, however, it is claimed by some that they are not
competitors and that, therefore, this market-extension merger is not horizontal, but
instead a mixed conglomerate combination. A similar controversy arises in connection
with mergers of companies producing different but related products because they can
be produced with much the same facilities, sold through the same distribution channels,
or made a part of the same research and development efforts. Often acquisitions of this
type are made by a company which seeks to fill its product-line offering of comple-
mentary, if not competitive, goods. It has been claimed that these product-extension
mergers are not truly horizontal, but are mixed conglomerate mergers.
A vertical merger is defined as the merger of two companies, one of which sells a
product which the other company buys. The term "forward vertical acquisition" refers
to the acquisition of a customer by a supplier, while the term "backward vertical
acquisition" refers to an acquisition of a supplier by a customer.
The term "conglomerate merger" is the catch-all category which is defined to
include all mergers neither horizontal nor vertical.
Apart from definitional problems involved in classifying fringe-arca mergers, these
classifications encounter further difficulties because they focus upon the character of
the relationship between the merging companies rather than on the nature of the com-
petitive effects likely to be produced. As a result, they often hinder, rather than aid,
analysis. For example, many horizontal acquisitions have both vertical and horizontal
effects because one or both of the merging companies is vertically integrated. Competi-
tion on the horizontal level is necessarily affected first because of the elimination of
previously existing inter sese competition and secondly because rivals are now faced
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"major competitive factors" in the relevant market that their com-
bination eliminates "significant competition between them." The newer
First Nat'l Bank test is limited to horizontal merger situations, and
thus, the courts presumably must still apply the Columbia Steel stan-
dards to determine the validity of vertical and conglomerate mer-
gers. 118 Moreover, it appears that the Columbia Steel test' will also be
applied to many horizontal mergers involving American firms and
their foreign competitors. Elimination of significant competition
between the combining firms might ipso facto have adverse effects
upon foreign consumers or foreign competitors, but a more penetrating
analysis is needed to establish the requisite injury to United States
consumers or United States business opportunity.
If the approach of the courts in interstate commerce cases controls
the disposition of "foreign" commerce acquisition cases under the
Sherman Act,' it can be safely said that size is an important factor
and that "foreign" mergers involving small or medium size companies
will generally be permitted.'" Difficulties arise only when the smaller
acquisitions are made in seriation. Accordingly, the analysis of the
economic consequences likely to flow from the more important generic
types of mergers presented herein presupposes participation of com-
panies which are, or have become, large enough to restrain trade in the
relevant market. At the same time, no attempt has been made to indi-
cate which companies have sufficient size or power to restrain competi-
with a single unit having the combined strength or market power of its two constit-
uents. This last mentioned factor can also produce significant vertical repercussions
since the purchasing or supply power previously enjoyed by two independent firms is
now concentrated in one decision maker. The vertical merger of a customer and a
supplier similarly produces competitive effects on both levels of competition. Former
suppliers of the acquired firm are foreclosed by a forward vertical acquisition and
former customers of a supplier are foreclosed by a backward vertical acquisition. In
either case, the acquiring company has bettered its competitive position vis-à-vis its
rivals since it has acquired either an assured outlet or source of supply. Recognition
of the existence of these possible effects on two distinct levels of the market structure
is far more helpful to an assessment of the competitive impact of particular mergers
than is the determination and proper labelling of the precise relationship the companies
have to each other.
118 While it is possible that a somewhat similar per se test based upon the volume
of commerce involved could be developed for assessing the validity of vertical and
conglomerate mergers under the Sherman Act, no such test has as yet been judicially
formulated,
118 There is no reason to believe that it will not. Indeed, if a different approach is
adopted, it will be the result of a judicial accommodation recognizing the dissimilarities
between the commercial factors present in interstate commerce and those involved in
international trade, and accordingly, international mergers would be treated more
leniently than domestic mergers.
128 The analysis assumes that the merger reflects a normal business purpose and
that it was not made with the express or implied intent or purpose of restraining trade
or acquiring a monopoly, since this fact alone would be sufficient to invalidate the
merger under Columbia Steel even though no serious anticompetitive effects are likely
to result. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 531-32 (1948).
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tion unreasonably since this obviously depends upon the particular
market and circumstances involved in each case.'"
Proceeding first to a consideration of horizontal mergers, the
clearest violation is the acquisition of a foreign firm which is a substan-
tial actual or potential competitor in the American market or a sizable
exporter of goods to the United States?" Corporate absorption of these
companies affect domestic commerce in the same way and to the same
extent as any comparable merger of two American firms. If imports
are substantially restrained or if too much business is consolidated in
the hands of the resulting firm, the merger can be prosecuted under
the First Nat'l Bank formula?" Condemnation may also result when
there are no restrictive effects upon imports. Indeed, a violation can
exist even though the volume of United States imports increases and
the foreign firm continues to ship to this country. There is no assurance
that the foreigner's export policy will remain unchanged over the years.
Its domestic partner, whether the acquiring or the acquired company,
will always be in a position to influence the volume of these imports
and it is axiomatic that the combined enterprise will not act to the
detriment of either of its members. This factor alone provides a suffi-
cient basis for disallowing the merger if the threatened injury is sub-
stantial. Moreover, the combination may also have vertical repercus-
sions since the American company might become the distributor of the
121 The two banks involved in United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 376 U.S. 665
(1964), were the first and fourth largest commercial banks in the relevant geographic
market. Their combination would have given the resulting firm more than fifty per-
cent of the market, thus making it larger than all of the other competing banks
combined and three times as large as the next largest competitor. Quite obviously,
mergers of this magnitude are not likely to occur in many industries today. How much
smaller the companies can become and still satisfy the First Nat'l Bank formula can
be determined only by future litigation which probably will never arise due to the fact
that § 7 has been made fully applicable to bank mergers. See United States v. First
City Nat'l Bank, 386 U.S. 361 (1967) (interpreting the Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12
U.S.C. § 1828(c) (Supp. II 1965-66)); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321 (1963) (interpreting the Bank Merger Act of 1960, 12 U.S.C. § 1828 (c) (1964)).
Under the Columbia Steel test, size is not a singularly important criterion but
market shares are still significant. See Donovan, supra note 98, at 535-64.
122 United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 376 U.S. 665 (1964), involved banks
which were substantial actual competitors at the time of the merger. While the appli-
cability of the theory of that case to potential competition remains unsettled, it is an
extension which in all probability will be made. See Donovan, supra note 98, at 543.
123 United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (ND. Cal.), aff'd
per curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966) (attack under § 7 of the Clayton Act of an acquisition
involving a Canadian corporation which, though it was not a substantial exporter to the
United States, did have an American subsidiary providing a significant source of compe-
tion in the western portion of the United States). The analysis in the text is supported by
recent governmental enforcement policies adopted with respect to international acqui-
sitions having restrictive effects within the United States. See, e.g., United States v.
Mobay Chem. Co., 1967 Trade Cas. II 72,001 (W.D. Pa. March 20, 1967); Donovan,
supra note 98. at 547; Donovan, The Legality of Acquisitions and Mergers Involving
Foreign Corporations Under the United States Antitrust Laws—Part II, 40 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 38, 78-82.
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foreign firm's product in the United States. Other American competi-
tors of the domestic partner, including former distributors of the for-
eign firm's product, might be foreclosed from a substantial source of
supply and could even be driven out of the business of importing the
commodity involved.' 24
 So too, former American suppliers of the
domestic partner might be prevented from continuing to supply its
needs. Where the merger produces these postulated vertical effects,
the acquisition may unduly restrain the opportunities of competitors
to obtain or market their products and may therefore be unlawful even
under the more lenient Columbia Steel multiple-factors test.
On the other side of the coin, both vertical and horizontal mer-
gers of American and foreign corporations can also lead to export
restraints. The combination may produce a company which enjoys a
monopoly or near-monopoly position in a particular foreign territory
or country. Falling short of such a commanding position, the enterprise
might nevertheless achieve a position of considerable influence over
consumers and competitors in the foreign trade area. The effect on
United States foreign commerce is obvious: rival American exporters
will be unable to compete in the foreign region. Indeed, they might
even be excluded entirely. As a practical matter, these extreme conse-
quences are highly probable because of the proclivity of many foreign
governments, particularly those in developing nations, to prefer mo-
nopoly to competition. In these extreme, but not abnormal, circum-
stances, the merger will most assuredly restrain American export
opportunity, but the question remains whether the restraint is substan-
tial. Even if we assume that a comparable domestic acquistion will
unquestionably violate the Sherman Act, it does not necessarily follow
that the international acquisition is unlawful. Here, as in the monop-
oly area, the pivotal inquiry centers on the relevant market in which
to measure the substantiality of export restraints. If each foreign
country is recognized as possessing different and unique economic and
governmental trade barriers constituting it a separate export market
worthy of antitrust protection, the merger can easily be proscribed.
But the appropriate market need not be so narrowly drawn. If the
124 Given the proper circumstances, this result is highly probable, for as the writer
has already explained:
Where the commodity involved was produced under foreign patents held by the
overseas firm, thus enabling it to control the distribution of the product pro-
duced by others, the merger could make it more difficult for rival importers
to obtain the necessary goods with which to compete in the domestic market.
This restriction might also occur where the foreign production of the com-
modity is limited or largely consumed in foreign markets so that only small
quantities are available for importation into the United States. Under such
circumstances the rivalry of competing American importers is seriously curtailed,
and, if the supply is scarce, they could even be forced out of business.
Donovan, supra note 98, at 548.
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hypothetical merger is tested against the total foreign market or some
portion of the domestic and foreign market in the commodity, it will
seem insubstantial. It will be illegal only if the single foreign country
involved represents virtually the entire export market for the particu-
lar commodity. As we have seen, resolution of this pivotal ,market-
definition problem awaits judicial action.'25
The merger most likely to restrain United States commerce un-
reasonably is the acquisition of a foreign raw material supplier by a
domestic fabricator. This vertical merger can have disastrous effects
within the United States for, in industries where domestic raw material
supply is short, rival fabricators are dependent largely upon foreign
production. The lawfulness of the acquisition, therefore, depends upon
the volume of this foreign production and its availability to rival
American fabricators. Often, while total output is high, little is avail-
able since much production is either tied up by vertical integration in
the industry or excluded by export restrictions.
To this point we have considered international acquisitions as
Sherman Act problems. Perhaps in this respect the analysis is mis-
leading, since any merger of American and foreign corporations which
substantially lessens competition or tends to monopoly in the United
States will, in almost every case, be attacked under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act.12° Sherman Act standards do, however, retain their vitality
due to the existence of considerable doubt as to the applicability of the
Clayton Act to export restraints.
b. Under the Clayton Act. Merger experience in domestic com-
merce under Section 7 of the Clayton Act presents a stark contrast to
the picture developed under the Sherman Act. Substantive tests of
legality embodied in section 7 are far more stringent than those judi-
cially employed under the Sherman Act. While the latter's prohibitions
are limited to corporate alliances which restrain trade—actual or poten-
tial—in a manner which is "unreasonable" in light of the surrounding
circumstances, section 7 cuts much deeper. It forbids acquisitions and
mergers which may substantially lessen competition or tend to create
a monopoly.' This standard has led to several Supreme Court deci-
125 The various arguments urged in support of each of these competing market-
definition theories are presented in Donovan, supra note 98, at 550-59.
126 For a discussion of the jurisdictional criteria of § 7, limiting its scope of
applicability to acquisitions and mergers, see Donovan (Part II), supra note 123, at 41-47.
121 Section 7 provides, in pertinent part, that:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corportaion engaged also in com-
merce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect
of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to
create a monopoly.
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sions within the past six years holding that mergers which only slightly
increase the market share of the acquiring firm sometimes produce the
prohibited result. 128
 In one case, the Court forbade a supplier's acquisi-
tion of a customer representing 1.2 to 1.6 percent of the market; 122 in
another,. it decided that a horizontal merger which added only 1.3 per-
cent to the acquirer's share of the market violated the statute.'" These
decisions have made it painfully clear to many businessmen that
mergers involving small companies which do not even raise threshold
problems under the Sherman Act can, nevertheless, violate the Clayton
Act. For this reason, external corporate expansion into overseas
markets must be made with Clayton Act prohibitions in mind.
The existence of unsettled and perplexing jurisdictional problems
obscures the potential impact of section 7 upon international mergers.
The recent district court decision in the only case involving a merger
of United States and foreign corporations which has resulted in a deci-
sion on the merits, is not particularly helpful. The court simply as-
sumed without discussion that section 7 applied.' Consequently, there
is no decisive judicial precedent. In this vacuum, emphasis must be
placed upon the language of the statute itself and its place in the legis-
lative scheme of preserving unrestrained competition.
The word "commerce" is defined in Section 1 of the Act to cover
"trade or commerce among the several states and with foreign na-
tions."' Since Congress did expressly impose territorial limitations on
sections 2' 33 and 3,13' it may be argued that its failure so to limit sec-
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). The acquisition of the stock or assets of one or more corporations
is also covered and dedared unlawful under such circumstances.
The legislative history of the 1950 amendments to the statute makes it dear that
the section is intended to strike down mergers beyond Sherman Act regulation. The
salient points in the congressional history are summarized and discussed in Donovan
(Part II), supra note 123, at 48-54, and in Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the
Merging of Law and Economics, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 226, 233-38 (1960).
128 FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); United States v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270
(1966) ; FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965) ; United States v. Penn-
Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377
U.S. 271 (1964); United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964); United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) ; Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
129 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
130 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
131 United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (ND. Cal.), aff'd
per curiam, 385 US. 37 (1966).
132 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1964).
133 Id. § 13 prohibits a seller from discriminating in price between or among
different purchasers, except under certain justifying circumstances, but only in situations
"where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale within the United
States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any insular possession
or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States . . .."
134 Id. § 14 is limited in the same way as § 13.
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tion 7 was intentional, and indicative of an intent to have that section
apply to "foreign" mergers. This interpretation is compatible with, and
bolstered by, the statute's pervasive prohibition of both partial and
complete stock or asset acquisitions having anticompetitive effects in
this country. The crucial consideration in section 7 cases is not the
location or nationality of the parties or even the type of commerce
which is injured, but the situs of the merger's effects. Because many
mergers of American and foreign firms will injuriously affect competi-
tion in the United States, it seems clear that their international aspect
affords no immunity.
Since the statute covers only some corporate alliances and appar-
ently requires that the acquired firm be "engaged also in commerce,"
not all acquisitions are subject to it. 135 Many foreign business enter-
prises may not qualify as "corporations" and many more may not be
"engaged" in United States commerce. While it would seem that the
acquisition of a foreign firm which had not theretofore been directly or
indirectly buying from or selling to United States firms falls outside the
purview of the statute, this is not entirely clear.' Difficult and unre-
solved questions will arise whenever it appears that the foreign company
would have entered the stream of United States commerce. Although
the word "engaged" denotes a present participation in American com-
merce, analogous interstate commerce cases provide a basis for con-
cluding that the "'engaged also in commerce" clause of section 7
requires that the acquired firm be only potentially engaged in com-
merce. 137
The most serious obstacle to the use of section 7 to regulate
mergers of American and foreign nationals is the statutory requirement
that the acquisition have the prohibited effects "in any section of the
135 The statute applies only to acquisitions by a corporation of the stock or assets
of another corporation. Thus, mergers involving other kinds of business enterprises are
not covered. Moreover, the scope of the act is further limited by the fact that not all
corporate acquisitions are covered. The particular status of both the acquiring and the
acquired corporations is important. In the first place, stock acquisitions may be made
by corporations which are not "engaged in commerce" and asset acquisitions may be
made by corporations which are not "subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade
Commission." In the second place, it is clear that asset acquisitions are free from prohi-
bitions unless the acquired corporation is "engaged also in commerce" and, while there
is some room for disagreement, it appears that the acquired corporation must qualify
in the same way in the case of stock acquisitions. See Donovan (Part II), supra note
123, at 43-44.
136 If the statute is interpreted as not regulating these mergers, the requirement
gives rise to an interesting situation. It is theoretically possible, though perhaps im-
probable, that the acquisition of a foreign firm not "engaged also in commerce" can
cause a substantial injury to United States commerce and therefore violate the Sherman
Act but not the Clayton Act.
137 See United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); Donovan (Part
II), supra note 123 at 43-47. See also the Government's complaint in United States v.
Gillette Co., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. Q 45,068 (D. Mass. Feb. 14, 1968).
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country." This provision undoubtedly makes section 7 territorially
introspective. Nevertheless, it is clear that international acquisitions
which substantially reduce the volume of imports produce "effects"
within the United States and are therefore subject to proscription. It is
also clear that mergers of American and foreign firms which eliminate
actual or potential competition in a domestic market affect the char-
acter and intensity of competition in a "section of the country.'" In
neither case does the effect upon American consumers differ from that
of a domestic merger simply because the competition eliminated is of
foreign rather than domestic origin and takes the form of imports.'"
Nor is a restrictive effect upon imports essential to the finding of anti-
competitive results within the United States. Similar adverse conse-
quences upon domestic competition will follow from a "foreign" acqui-
sition which greatly enhances the position of an already dominant
American firm vis-a-vis its domestic rivals. This accretion of power will
almost always result from a merger concentrating a significant volume
of commerce in the hands of the combining corporations,'" from one
which leads to collaborative production or marketing operations in the
United States,' or from an acquisition of an advantageous foreign
source of supply or technology not freely available to competing enter-
prises.'"
At this point, it should be clear that the very factors which lay the
jurisdictional base for the implementation of section 7 also serve to
establish the violation. Since the economic consequences likely to flow
from the various kinds of international acquisitions producing injuries
to United States internal commerce remain constant regardless of the
statute under which they are attacked, the analysis of their competitive
impact under the Sherman Act is equally pertinent here. The point of
differentiation lies in the dissimilarities between the legal standards and
the quanta of proof relevant under the two statutes.
Any similarity of Sherman and Clayton Act goals disappears in the
case of an acquisition whose restrictive effects are limited solely to the
export commerce of the United States. At first glance, it certainly seems
strange that a statute designed to protect competition within a section
of the United States, can be interpreted as protecting American ex-
porters from activities in foreign commerce. Yet the argument has been
138 United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (ND. Cal. 1966),
aff'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966). See also the Government's complaints in United
States v. Gillette Co., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. 11 45,068 (D. Mass. Feb. 14, 1968), and United
States v. Aluminium Ltd., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. IT 45,064, at 52,585 (D.N.J. 1964).
139 Brewster, supra note 22, at 192.
140 Cf. United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (ND. Cal.),
aff'd per curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966).
141 Cf. United States v. Mobay Chem. Co., 1967 Trade Cas. If 72,001 (W.D. Pa.
March 20, 1967).
142 Brewster, supra note 22, at 192.
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made and is not without foundation. Stripped to its essentials, it is
predicated upon the fact that American businessmen produce export
goods in the United States and therefore any acquisition which fore-
closes them from a substantial segment of their total foreign market
causes production adjustments and therefore produces effects within
a "section of the country." Professor Brewster has presented the issue
and offered his suggestions. He postulates the hypothetical case of a
dominant American supplier of semifinished materials who acquires an
interest in all the dominant European fabricators of his product, who,
in turn, represent virtually the entire export market. To Professor
Brewster the separate lines of argument are clear:
The government might contend that putting United States
competitors at a substantial export disadvantage lessens com-
petition among producers for export. These handicapped pro-
ducers operate their export business in the United States and
in a "section of the country" that could be considered suffi-
cient to comply with the requirement. The defendant would
argue, plausibly, that, under the [Clayton]Act, the commerce
monopolized or in which competition is lessened must itself be
in a section of the country. Since in our hypothetical case the
commerce restrained is export commerce, it does not fall
within the statutory bounds.'
"Given the legislative purpose to protect the little competitor as well as
the consumer," Professor Brewster concludes, "it would seem to us that
the government has the better of the argument."144
Subsequent judicial developments may prove Brewster's reaction
correct, but his thesis must first successfully entomb some pulsating
objections. His hypothetical premises logically lead to the conclusion
that fewer corporations are producing goods for export. But does this
mean that competition has been injured? The answer depends upon the
definition one accords to the term. Traditionally, competition involves
a tripartite arena in which two or more sellers vie for the favor of a
buyer, or two or more buyers battle for the favor of a seller."5 In
Brewster's hypothetical, the only such market is in Europe, a foreign
market not a section of the United States. To the extent that section 7
is interpreted to protect "competition" in "markets" where there is
143 Id. at 193.
144 id.
145 Webster defines "competition" as "the effort of two or more parties to secure
the custom of a third party by the offer of the most favorable terms . . ," and as "a
market condition in which a large number of independent buyers and sellers compete for
identical commodities, deal freely with each other, and retain the right of entry and
exit from the market . . . ." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 464 (1963).
"Competitor" is defined as "one that is engaged in selling or buying goods or services
in the same market as another." Id.
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commercial intercourse among sellers and buyers, its introspective
nature requires that this market be located in the United States.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court will be required to decide policy
questions and determine the meaning of the term "competition" and
how to protect it. If the Court favors the use of section 7 to preserve ex-
port opportunity for American businessmen, Brewster's "production-
competition" theory provides a base. Under it, the statute's reach will
extend around the world and competition in foreign markets will be
regulated by American jurists as a means of regulating the production
of goods in this country.
3. The Joint Venture
a. In General. "The central concept in the joint international
business venture is that of a partnership" or a "pooling of interests and
resources for the accomplishment of a specific objective."'" It has been
said that "partnership has two sides—technical and emotional. On the
technical side, it is a joining of contributors; on the emotional side it is
a feeling of united cooperative effort. 114 ' The joint venture therefore
combines the management and direction of two previously independent
parties. It differs from a merger in that the participants retain their
original identity, personality, and interests apart from their joint
activity.'" Chairman Paul Rand Dixon of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion has, noted that: "In simplest terms, a joint venture is formed
whenever two or more people pool their financial resources and skills
and engage in some business activity."' An American corporation,
therefore, participates in a joint venture whenever it joins with another
party to engage in some business activity.
The antitrust implications are complicated by the fact that there
are several types of joint ventures in foreign trade. They may be of a
temporary or a permanent nature. They encompass at one extreme a
loose ad hoc association limited to a particular undertaking and cover-
ing a relatively short period of time, and at the other, joint, partial
stock ownership over an extended period."' Joint international business
enterprises of any type may take the form of a contractual arrange-
ment, but more frequently a joint company is incorporated as the
vehicle because the participants customarily seek to limit their liability
146 Joint International Business Ventures 5, 6 (W. Friedmann & G. Kalmanoff ed.
1961).
147 Id.
148 Devine, supra note 109, at 439.
146 Address by Hon. Paul Rand Dixon, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, be-
fore The Economic Club of Detroit, Detroit, Mich., March 12, 1962, as reprinted in 195
Com. & Fin. Citron. 2216 (1962).
IN Whipple, Problems of Combination—Integration, Intracorporate Conspiracy
and Joint Ventures, 1958 N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Antitrust Law Symposium 34, 50.
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and confer upon their enterprise a legal personality independent from
that of its parents."' The American venturer may have a majority
interest, a minority interest, a half interest or some equal partial
interest. In his operations, he may combine with other American com-
panies, with foreign companies or with both. The other participants
may or may not be actual or potential competitors of the American
venturer or of each other. The joint venture may be newly formed or
may be the result of partial acquisitions in existing enterprises. The
joint operations may be commercial, industrial or extractive, or a
combination of all three, integrated from raw material to consumer
sales.'" The market served by the joint operation may be in the United
States, a single foreign country, or any combination of countries.'" The
legality of joint international business operations is, of course, affected
by this multiplicity of relevant factors and "much may turn on who
joins, what is joined, and especially, what market is served by the
joint enterprise. "154
Because of the nature of the topic under discussion, this article is
primarily concerned with the more permanent rather than the tempo-
rary type of joint venture and, accordingly, the analysis will focus on it.
For present purposes, it is sufficient to state that the legality of both
types will be governed by the same rules and that the obvious differ-
ences between the two is one of degree and makes the temporary type
relatively secure from antitrust attack!"
At the outset it must be realized that there are restraints inherent
in every joint venture, just as there are restraints inherent in every
contract. 156 With specific reference to joint ventures in foreign com-
merce, Professor Brewster has pointed out:
Basically, there are two possible theoretical anticompetitive
tendencies of jointness. First, the possibility that the competi-
tive potential of the joint enterprise will be curbed in order to
protect the existing markets of the partners; second, the
possibility that the partners themselves will be less likely to
compete with each other because of their joint undertaking. 157
There is also the possibility that the new firm will adversely affect the
competitive situations of third parties. These dangers are similar to
those which necessarily exist in every instance of collaboration among
competitors. The mere fact that there are such dangers is not in itself
151 Fugate, supra note 22, at 255.
152 Brewster, supra note 22, at 200.
153 Id.
154 Id,
155 Whipple, supra note 150, at 51.
156 Id. at 52.
152 Brewster, supra note 22, at 202.
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sufficient reason for condemning contracts or other joint business ar-
rangements among competitors, as long as they are designed to accom-
plish a legitimate objective. 158 As a result, it has been said that "[t]he
legality of joint ventures will depend on the purpose and nature of the
enterprise, the situation of the partners, and their place in the market.
In short . . . illegality turns on unreasonableness and is well outside
the area of per se violations."'" In assessing the validity of joint
ventures these considerations must be kept in mind. It is also important
to realize that we are dealing with a field where the law is largely
unformulated.'
b. The Purpose of the Joint Venture and the Restricted Area of
Per Se Illegality. The litigated cases make it clear that any joint ven-
ture which is the product of an unlawful conspiracy to restrain trade is
illegal regardless of its actual effect upon competition. But the difficult
168 E.g., Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925) ; Board
of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) ; Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1 (1911); Denison Mattress Factory v. Spring-Air Co., 308 F.2d 403 (5th
Cir. 1962). See also Whipple, supra note 150, at 52. But see United States v. Sealy, Inc.,
388 U.S. 350 (1967).
1611 Brewster, supra note 22, at 206.
168 What few cases there are indicate that
a joint venture, or the ownership and operation of a joint company, even among
competitors in foreign commerce, is not unlawful per se, but becomes unlawful
if its purpose and effect is to restrain or monopolize interstate or foreign trade.
On the other hand, activities otherwise unlawful, such as price-fixing or division
of markets, are not justified merely because they are carried on through the
medium of a joint venture or joint company.
Fugate, supra note 22, at 257. See, e.g., United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319,
363 (1947) ; United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911); United States
v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504, 557 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). Cf. Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
In each of these cases, Timken possibly to the contrary notwithstanding, the joint
venture was declared illegal not because it was shown to have unreasonably restrained
trade, but because of an illegal purpose of the collaborators. The approach of the several
judges in first discerning the illegal purpose and then condemning the joint venture
indicates that foreign joint undertakings will be treated in the same manner as any
other instance of collaboration among competitors. The proper standard is whether, in
light of all the facts, the inherent restraints add up to an undue limitation on com-
petition, either because of some ferreted-out illegal scheme or because of the absence
of justification for the collaborative undertaking. This conclusion is supported by the
express refusal of the Timken Court to sustain the divestiture order entered by the
district court. Its unwillingness to do so, after having found the joint enterprise unlaw-
fully organized, indicates that it saw nothing inherently wrong in the formation of a
jointly owned foreign company to engage in manufacturing and distribution operations
overseas. The Court was willing to permit the continued existence of such joint opera-
tions abroad because it felt its injunctive powers were sufficient to undo the restraint
placed upon American commerce by the illegal cartel agreements. The Court was ap-
parently influenced by the fact that American Timken had both the contractual right
and the desire to buy out the British interests in French Timken, thus converting it
into an individual venture. See note 38 supra. The Court's reaction in this regard suggests
the importance of motive and business purpose, one of the touchstones in United States v.
Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948).
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question presented in every case is determination of the precise purpose
of the collaborators.'" It is inherent in the nature of the transaction
that the joint venture will not compete with its parents and its parents
will not compete with it. This is true whether the joint venture stands
in a conglomerate, vertical or horizontal relationship to its parents.'
161 Compare the majority opinions with the dissents in United States v. Sealy, Inc.,
388 U.S. 350 (1967), United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964), and
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
162 It is almost impossible satisfactorily to classify joint ventures as being either
"horizontal," "vertical" or "conglomerate" for all purposes. As pointed out in note 117,
supra, there is disagreement over the meaning of these terms which makes difficult the
classification of mergers under these categories. The problem is even more pronounced
with respect to joint ventures since it involves the inter use commercial relationship of
three, rather than two, parties. After determining the precise relationship between the
parents and the proper label to be ascribed to it, it becomes necessary to decide the
manner in which their joint creature is related to them, individually and collectively.
Often, it is imposible to classify them under any labels. Some classification is, however,
possible.
Certainly, one can safely label as "horizontal" the collaboration of two or more
actual competitors in the formation of a third company to manufacture and sell the
same product, or a product which is a close substitute for the product produced by them
in the same geographic market or markets in which they had previously competed. And
it has been suggested that the term "horizontal" could be used to describe this type
of collaboration where the market to be jointly exploited is one in which one or more,
but not all, of the parents had previously operated. See Comment, 37 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 712
(1962). Viewing the total arrangement in its proper economic context, this extended
classification seems eminently correct since the end result is substantially the same—
collaboration of competing concerns in the joint production and marketing of a com-
peting product in a market previously served by one or more of the organizers on an
individual basis. The same reasoning suggests that "horizontal" activities exist when the
joint enterprise is formed to produce or market a product produced by one or more
but not all of its parents. Accordingly, the term "horizontal joint venture" will be
used herein to describe these three types of collaboration.
While there is room for much disagreement, it would seem that the combination
of actual competitors jointly to manufacture and sell a competing product in a new
market (that is, a market not previously served by them) should also be considered
a "horizontal joint venture." Nevertheless, for purposes of clarity, collaborations of
this kind will be referred to as "horizontal market extension joint ventures." Similarly,
where two or more actual competitors combine to produce and market a product new
to their operations, the cumbersome term horizontal product extension joint venture"
will be used in order to focus clearly on the precise economic activity which is the sub-
ject of the competitors' collaboration. The word "horizontal" in both of these terms
denotes the relationship of the parents, namely, that they are actual competitors in
some products in some markets; the phrases "market extension" and "product exten-
sion" denote relation between them and their jointly owned enterprise.
It can be argued that these terms are too narrowly defined since they exclude situa-
tions in which the collaboration is between companies which are potential competitors
only. It may be true that their collaboration is just as "horizontal" as that of actual
competitors, and the "trustbuster" would certainly so conclude. But it is important
to ask what is meant by the term "potential competitors." If by this is meant com-
panies which produce "competing" products but do not market them in the same
geographic areas, they have been properly excluded since their combination produces
a substantially different competitive impact upon the market. It is more appropriate
to refer to these latter combinations as involving companies which are potential com-
petitors only. At the same time, it is important to note that several types of joint
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There cannot be any competition inter sese in the conglomerate and
vertical situations because the creature does not produce or sell prod-
ucts which are the same as, or close substitutes for, those produced and
sold by its parents. Competition cannot exist in the horizontal situation
because the parents will not allow it. The very existence of the col-
laborative undertaking implies at least an understanding that there will
be no competition between the parents and their joint subsidiary. It
follows that if the test of illegality were the existence of a noncompeti-
fion agreement, all joint ventures will be unlawful.'" The courts have
recognized this fact and have not gone so far as to seize upon this
restraint to find a violation. Yet, at the same time, they have also been
cognizant of the fact that a corporate joint venture can serve• as a
convenient cloak for illegal collaborative activity."' For example, two
companies which wish to divide a particular territory but know they
cannot lawfully do so by means of a naked agreement may accomplish
the desired result by pooling their resources, forming a jointly owned
company to exploit that market, and dividing the profits between them.
On the surface, it might be said that every horizontal joint venture
is of this type. In assessing their validity, however, the courts have
delved into the surrounding circumstances to ferret out the true pur-
poses of the collaborators. It is important to note that, in each of the
cases where joint ventures were held illegal, the court first found the
existence of an underlying illegal conspiracy."'
ventures threatening injury to potential competition only have been included within
each of the above-defined terms.
Note 117, supra, defined the "vertical" merger as involving the merger of two
companies, one of which supplies or consumes a product purchased or sold by the
other. This same type of relationship may exist between the joint venture and its
parents and thus there are "vertical joint ventures." Where this relationship exists, the
parents, quite obviously, are engaged in the same type of operation and stand in a
horizontal relationship to each other. Accordingly, the term ' horizontal-forward vertical
joint venture" refers to the situation where the creature purchases the product supplied
by its parents; the term "horizontal-backward vertical joint venture" refers to the
converse situation, where the parents purchase the product supplied by their creature.
The same terms absent the introductory word "horizontal" denote the situation that
exists when the joint venture stands in a vertical relationship with only one of its
parents. It is immaterial to the definition of these terms that the parents may not have
been engaged in actual competition with each other. Whenever it is necessary to draw
any distinctions respecting vertical joint ventures on this account, the text will clearly
so indicate.
The term "conglomerate joint venture" will here be used to denote the collabora-
tion of noncompeting, vertically unrelated companies to form a new company to produce
products dissimilar to any produced by any of the parents.
a03 Hale, Joint Ventures: Collaborative Subsidiaries and the Antitrust Laws, 42
Va. L. Rev. 927, 933 (1956).
164 See cases cited note 160 supra. See also United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S.
350 (1967); United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass.
1950).
165 See authorities discussed note 160 supra.
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This approach shows that mere establishment of a jointly owned
and managed foreign company is, of itself, evidence of nothing illegal.
Before a joint venture will be condemned as being conceived in sin, the
unlawful purpose must first be established by extrinsic evidence. Where
the parent companies have competed in a particular region and dis-
continue their operations when they later form a joint company to
operate in that same region, the inference of a purpose to divide the
market is virtually conclusive.'" The same conclusion might also be
drawn where the collaborators were pre-venture potential competitors
in the market served by their creature.
Almost any assessment of the purpose and nature of joint ventures
and of the evidentiary value of various circumstances in collaborative
undertakings must center on an evaluation of Judge Wyzanski's sin-
gularly important Minnesota Mining decision 167 There, it will be re-
called, four major American competitors and their associates combined
to form an export association under the Webb-Pomerene Ace" and to
establish jointly owned plants overseas. With few exceptions, the prod-
ucts manufactured abroad by defendants' jointly owned foreign sub-
sidiaries replaced their exports to the markets supplied by those plants.
The joint foreign subsidiaries were held unlawful:
Prima facie there could hardly be a more obvious viola-
tion of § 1 of the Sherman Act than for American manufac-
turers controlling four-fifths of the export trade of an industry
to agree not to ship to particular areas but to do their business
there through jointly owned foreign factories. It is, in statu-
tory language, a "combination * * * or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce * * * with foreign nations.'""
The collaborative undertakings had restrained the foreign commerce of
the joint venturers themselves and of their competitors. With regard to
the latter, it was said: "The restraint has consisted in the effect of
defendants' jointly owned foreign factories' precluding their American
competitors from receiving business they might otherwise have received
from the markets served by these jointly owned foreign factories."'"
After having decided the case on these grounds Judge Wyzanski
166 Cf. Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
167 United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947 (D. Mass. 1950).
168 15 U.S.C.
	
61-65 (1964).
166 92 F. Supp. at 961.
116 Id.
It may be that the American competitors would not have received all or most
of the business of these subsidiaries. . . . But such speculation is unnecessary.
When a dominant group of American manufacturers in a particular industry
combine to establish manufacturing plants in a foreign area to which the
evidence shows that it is legally, politically and economically possible for
some American enterprises to export products in reasonable volume, then it
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went afield to suggest that a combination of dominant American manu-
facturers to establish joint factories solely to serve the international
trade of a foreign country is a per se violation under the interstate com-
merce clause of the Sherman Actin The basis for this possible per se
illegality was explained:
The intimate associate of the principal American producers
in day-to-day manufacturing operations, their exchange of
patent licenses and industrial know-how, and their common
experience in marketing and fixing prices may inevitably
reduce their zeal for competition inter sese in the American
market. 172
After thus noting that a combination of producers to unite in manufac-
turing in foreign countries, unlike a combination of producers to unite
in export, does not have the protection of the Webb-Pomerene Act or
any other act of Congress, Judge Wyzanski continued:
It may, therefore, be subject to condemnation regardless of
the reasonableness of the manufacturers' conduct in the
foreign countries. In this aspect the reasonableness of the
foreign conduct would, like the reasonableness of domestic
price-fixing, be irrelevant. Joint foreign factories like joint
domestic price-fixing would be invalid per se because they
eliminate or restrain competition in the American domestic
market. That suppression of domestic competition is in each
case the fundamental evil, and the good or evil nature of the
immediate manifestations of the producers' joint action is a
superficial consideration. 173
 (Citations omitted.)
The logical extension of this line of reasoning is that " [ t] he
location of the commerce served by the joint enterprise, the degree
of restraint, and the business justifications would all be irrelevant.
Neither jurisdictional nor substantive defenses would avail."'" Due
to the absence of subsequent cases raising the same or similar issues,
the dictum has been neither adopted nor rejected. Consequently, it
remains to frighten off would-be venturers.
The American Bar Association's Subcommittee on Subsidiaries
is not necessary in an injunction suit brought by the Government to show that
particular American competitive enterprises could have exported profitably
to that area. The showing of the combination together with the showing of
the possibility of profitable American exports in reasonable volume proves
a violation of 1 of the Sherman Act.
Id. at 961-62.
171 Id. at 963.
172 Id.
178 Id.
174 Brewster, supra note 22, at 210.
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in Foreign Trade has suggested an alternative approach to the
problem:
In extreme cases, where dominant companies are involved,
the probabilty of subsequent illegal conduct may perhaps be
so strong as to justify ruling the joint subsidiary illegal at
birth. But before this is done, there should be a finding of at
least a substantial probability that the joint venture will
result in such types of anticompetitive conduct, and a finding
that the parties are of such relative size that the impact of
this conduct on U.S. foreign commerce will be substantial.
And in the case of foreign joint ventures remote possibilities
of future anticompetitive results may well be offset by the
special conditions of foreign commerce, such as the need for
sharing the heavier risks involved and the practical need for
"local" participation. When facts such as these can be
proven, they justify a considerably more liberal attitude
toward the formation and operation of joint ventures in for-
eign commerce than toward joint ventures at home.'
It has been previously indicated that possible anticompetitive
effects are inherent in every instance of collaboration among competi-
tors. Nevertheless, the mere fact that joint business arrangements
among competitors provide a potential forum for illegal restraints
has generally not been found sufficient, in and of itself, to warrant a
conclusion of illegality.'" The pivotal question has always been
whether the feared restraints have in fact resulted. The Minnesota
Mining dictum, of course, charts a different course and will probably
not withstand the test of time. In any event, it should be noted that
Minnesota Mining involved all the dominant members of the indus-
try, and that the jointness was complete as to technology, manufac-
turing, price and export policy. This collection of factors makes it
unlikely that the precise situation will ever rise again?'
Besides its per se illegality dictum, Minnesota Mining also causes
concern because of its holding that competition between the partici-
pants in foreign trade was eliminated through an implied agreement
among them not to export to foreign countries which were being sup-
plied by their jointly owned foreign factories.'" Judge Wyzanski
recognized that the American export trade could be equally ad-
versely affected if each of the partners separately invested in foreign
175 COMM. on Antitrust Problems in Int'l Trade, Report of the Subcom. on Sub-
sidiaries in Foreign Trade, 7 A.B.A. Sec. of Antitrust Law 242, 257 (1955).
176 See authorities cited note 158 supra and accompanying text.
177 Brewster, supra note 22, at 210.
178 See Fugate, supra note 22, at 263, to the effect that this was an implied rather
than an express agreement.
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factories. However, he distinguished the situation on the ground that
joint action forms the basis for a conspiracy while individual action
does not, saying, "[S]uch suppositious individual action would, it is
true, be a restraintt 1791
 upon American commerce with foreign nations.
But such a restraint would not be the result of a combination or
conspiracy."'"
Despite the rather clear implication contained in this language,
it is possible that the joint ownership of foreign factories did not
provide the raison d'être for Judge Wyzanski's finding of an implied
export embargo. His statement must not be taken out of context. It
must be remembered that prior to the formation of the jointly owned
foreign factories, the partners had each engaged individually in the
export of coated abrasives, and at the time they formed the joint
ventures they also formed and dominated a Webb-Pomerene associa-
tion through which they collaboratively funnelled all their exports.
Moreover, as jointly owned foreign factories were progressively ac-
quired, almost no exports were made by the export association to
the countries supplied by these factories. The situation might not
have been viewed in the same light if it had not been for this combina-
tion of factors. This seems a logical and proper inference from Judge
Wyzanski's earlier statement:
To achieve the restraint they have not merely established
jointly owned foreign factories. They have also by a concert
of action conformed to arrangements not to export from the
United States to those areas. These arrangements have in-
cluded the temporary or permanant decisions of the Export
Company not to ship to areas where Durex subsidiaries could
ship or sell more profitably; the formal agreement from May
1929 through October 1948 of each of the American manu-
facturing defendants not to export except through the Export
Company; and the practice of all of these manufacturing
defendants since that date to refrain from making individual
exports . . . . Such a concert constituted a conspiracy within
the intendment of § 1 of the Sherman Act."'
Furthermore, Judge Wyzanski's finding of a restraint on the foreign
commerce of the defendants' American competitors indicates that be
viewed defendants' actions as unreasonably exclusionary. Perhaps an
exclusionary effect upon nonmember competitors might not have
existed if there had been individual, rather than joint, investment in
179 This assumption that there would be a restraint upon American commerce
if there had been separate individual foreign investment has been questioned. See
Brewster, supra note 22, at 87-88.
180 92 F. Supp. at 962.
181 Id. at 961.
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foreign factories. Individual investment might not have led to a
united export policy since members could still independently have
competed abroad and, despite the existence of the export association,
might not have restrained nonmembers since the size of the foreign
establishments and their attendant market power might not have been
as great.
If this explanation of Minnesota Mining is correct, then that case
is not as inhibitive a precedent as it seems. In any event, the future
vitality of the decision appears to be limited to situations where the
participants in the joint venture are the dominant elements in the
entire industry. 182 The same anticompetitive effects on United States
commerce could hardly have occurred without this element of domi-
nance. If only two of the original nine parties had jointly organized
and managed a company in a single foreign country, then presumably
the exports of the others would not have been restrained by the agree-
ments to refrain from shipping to that country. 183 Likewise, if the part-
ners in a foreign joint venture had been two smaller firms, the effect
upon United States commerce in general, and particularly any exclu-
sionary effect on their American competitors, might be far less pro-
nounced than the effect of a single large firm's foreign investment.'" If
this is so,.then it would follow that joint foreign manufacturing and
marketing is not illegal simply because two or more firms are involved
and inevitably refuse to export in competition with their joint "subsi-
diary."1" Where there is no dominance, the restraint on exports is
not unreasonable simply because the joint enterprise will be protected
against its parents' exports?" Perhaps this might also be true when
the joint venture is used as a market for its parents' exports. In these
circumstances, it has been suggested that the test should be "whether,
but for the jointness, the exports would have been substantially dif-
ferent or greater."'"
It is important to realize that almost any conclusion in this area
is tenuous. All that can be deduced from the sparse case law is that
joint ventures in foreign commerce, particularly those intended to
engage in manufacturing and marketing abroad, are not per se illegal,
even though restraints are necessarily inherent in every joint venture.
They become illegal only when, in light of all the facts, the inherent
restraints add up to an unreasonable limitation on competition. Even
where significant restraints are present, the courts in applying the
182 The defendants in Minnesota Mining had, at one time, accounted for over 86%
of the American exports of coated abrasives. 92 F. Supp. at 951.
Hs Brewster, supra note 22, at 214.
184 Id .
162 Id,
186 Id. at 215.
187 Id. at 216.
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rule of reason may find them reasonable because of the ability of the
partners to show some justification for their combination. On the other
hand, the absence of any demonstrated justification may lead a court
to the conclusion that a particular restraint is unreasonable.
c. The Joint Venture and the Rule of Reason. The reasonable-
ness of joint venturing activities under the Sherman Act depends
largely upon who is collaborating with whom and for what end and,
most significantly, upon the necessity for their collaboration. Cer-
tainly, conglomerate joint ventures are far less susceptible to attack
and more easily justified than other types of joint ventures because
of their less pronounced potential danger to competition. On the other
hand, it is almost impossible to justify the combination of actual
competitors in the formation of a joint subsidiary to market their
competing products in an area they previously supplied.
We have already looked at the language of Minnesota Mining
suggesting that the combination of major present competitors in a
horizontal joint venture is justified only when it can be demonstrated
that it is impossible to conduct foreign business by any other means.
Another authority has offered a somewhat different and less harsh
approach: "Here it would be necessary to show at least that one of
the companies cannot practically go it alone, and that only a major
competitor is able and willing to participate in the joint project and
join in providing the capital, know-how or other assets necessary for
successful operation of the newly created concern."'
It has been suggested that a combination of American competitors
to open up a new "market" may enjoy kinder treatment. 18° This is
undoubtedly true since the collaboration may be permitted if either
of the venturers is able to show inability to go it alone. But it is
important in this regard to distinguish between geographic market
extensions and product market extensions. A particularly heavy bur-
den will be placed upon the proponents to justify their collaboration
where the joint venture produces and sells the same products as do
the parents. A somewhat less, but still substantial, burden of justifica-
tion will exist where the companies compete only in other products
since here either one of the venturers acting alone may lack not only
the financial assets but also the technological resources to sustain
independent entry. Nevertheless, internal restraints can still develop.
A close examination of the methods of production involved and a
comparison of the customers, territories and salesmen of the partici-
pants might indicate an overly restrictive operation. 19° Finally, even
188 COMM. on Antitrust Problems in Int'l Trade, supra note 175, at 256.
189 Carlston, Antitrust Policy Abroad, 49 Nw. U.L. Rev. 569, 588 (1964).
190 Freed, in Two Panel Discussions: New Frontiers in Section 7 Enforcement and
Joint Ventures and the Sherman Act, A.B.A. Sec. of Antitrust Law 33 (1953).
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where the two companies are not competitors at all, it is still necessary
to explore the potentiality of their rivalry and the evolution of the
joint idea. If the product is a close and logical extension of their exist-
ing product lines and fits within the capital resources, technical capa-
bilities and marketing operations of each partner, the possibility of
lone venture becomes highly probable and a serious need for justifi-
cation arises."'
In measuring the economic impact of these joint ventures, the
size of the collaborators is most important. In this connection it is
important to note the statement of Chairman Dixon of •the Federal
Trade Commission: "Obviously, neither the Department of Justice nor
the Federal Trade Commission is concerned about mergers or joint
ventures between or among companies whose share of the market is
too small to make any impact upon the competitive conditions within
the industry. . . . What may be socially desirable when sponsored by
small companies usually has markedly different economic consequences
when engaged in by industrial giants."192 Chairman Dixon's statement
furnishes a guideline, but it remains difficult to predict the standards
by which "small companies" will be distinguished from "industrial
giants."
While there never has been any judicial utterance to the effect, it
seems that the antitrust consequences of joint operations on the part
of American firms which are not competitors—actual or potential—are
not as severe. Still, the reasonableness of the collaboration may well
turn on the size and market power of the companies involved and their
ability or inability to develop the market individually."' United States
v. Pan American World Airways, Inc."' may be viewed as such a
case. There the court approved the combination of Pan American
World Airways, Inc. and W.R. Grace and Company to form Pan
American Grace Airways, Inc. (Panagra), to engage in air transporta-
tion in certain countries on the west coast of South America. Pan
American was a leading airline and Grace a leading shipper.
Though the two companies were each involved in freight and pas-
senger transportation, the court did not treat them as competitors.
Prior to the joint venture Pan American's activities in South America
were largely confined to the east coast, and Grace's to the west coast.
The district court recognized the limited market for air transport in
the area, the heavy capital investment required to construct the neces-
191 Id. at 34-35.
192 Address by Hon. Paul Rand Dixon, supra note 149, at 2217.
193 Devine, Foreign Establishment and the Antitrust Law: A Study of the Anti-
trust Consequences of the Principle [sic] Forms of Investment by American Corpora-
tions in Foreign Markets, 57 Nw. ILL. Rev. 400, 442 (1962).
194 193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), rev'd on grounds not here relevant, 371 U.S.
296 (1963).
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saw landing fields and other facilities, and the United States Govern-
ment policy of granting only one overseas air mail contract for each
individual route. These inhibiting factors made the operation of more
than one airline in the area infeasible. The court also noted that Pan
American and Grace were particularly well suited to join their efforts
because of the complementary nature of their own operations. Grace
had established facilities on the west coast that could be used to great
advantage for the new airline's operation. "Grace also had widespread
commercial contacts, a respected trade name and considerable influ-
ence in the countries along the proposed route."'" Pan American, on
the other hand, "was further advanced than any other American com-
pany in the carriage of foreign air mail, and had the technical aviation
skill which Grace lacked at that time."'" The court concluded that
"[t]he union of their physical and technical resources assured the
maximum possibilities of success in instituting and carrying on a
pioneering venture, useful to the community which did not thereto-
fore exist."'"
The district court did conclude, however, that Pan American's
subsequent limitations on Panagra's activitites constituted a violation
of the antitrust laws. A decree was entered directing Pan American
to show cause why it should not be ordered to divest itself of its stock
interest in Panagra. Grace, on the other hand, had exercised no such
pressure to limit Panagra's activities to the South American market.
In finding Grace had not engaged in any illegal conduct, the court
said, "Grace's stock ownership in Panagra cannot be said to have such
a 'pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue'
as to conclusively presume that ownership to be an unreasonable re-
straint on trade and commerce."'"
The Pan American decision was reversed on appeal by the Supreme
Court on the ground that primary jurisdiction lay in the Civil Aero-
nautics Board. Because of this basis for the decision the Supreme
Court's opinion is not helpful. The district court's opinion, however,
illustrates a judicial willingness to permit major noncompeting com-
panies to form jointly owned foreign ventures when there is need for
their collaboration.
The status of vertical joint ventures is unclear. There is as yet no
law on the subject, but the horizontal joint venture and related merger
cases provide analogous precedent on which the possible standards
of legality can be predicted. Where the parents combine in a horizontal-
vertical joint venture to form either a joint supply or marketing sub-
105 193 F. Supp. at 32.
106 Id.
107 Id. at 32-33.
108 Id. at 48.
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sidiary two distinct anticompetitive consequences may result: First,
their association may forestall independent expansion of the same
type and hence produce internal restraints; second, their joint under-
taking may greatly increase their market position vis-a-vis their
competitors and thereby produce external injuries to competition.
When resulting competitive effects in either situation are substantial,
an unreasonable restraint of trade may exist. The validity of the joint
enterprise will probably be determined by the application of the same
tests used in determining the legality of mergers under the Sherman
Act coupled with the added requirement of demonstrated need for col-
laboration.
The status of other vertical joint ventures is even more uncertain.
There is no indication of possible judicial thinking on the antitrust
consequences of the formation of a jointly owned foreign enterprise by
American firms having a customer-supplier relationship to each other.
The situation would normally arise when a marketing outfit seeks to
expand into overseas territories and obtains part of the necessary
capital from its domestic supplier. Here the joint venturers are not
competitors, and, therefore, their overseas collaboration cannot pos-
sibly have the repercussion of limiting domestic competition inter sese.
However, the foreign establishment may foreclose competitors of the
producer from a substantial market outlet, and may very well have
injurious effects in the United States by foreclosing competitors of
the marketing concern from a significant portion of the producing
firm's production. If this is the case, the joint foreign venture might
unreasonably restrain American commerce under the standards of
legality formulated in the merger cases. Absent this result, these ver-
tical ventures will be permitted.
Thus far, the analysis has centered exclusively on joint activities
involving only United States companies. To this extent, it overlooks
one of the features characteristic of postwar developments in United
States commerce. In recent years, the joint venturing activities of
American companies have generally involved participation of foreign
firms. These "international" joint ventures differ from their domestic
counterparts in that they do not pose the same threat to competition
in United States commerce. The internal restraint likely to result from
a domestic joint venture is reduction in the vigor of competition be-
tween its American parents; in the international joint venture, it is the
intensity of competition between American and foreign companies.
Because of this difference it might appear that the interest of the
United States is less pronounced in the latter instance and, accordingly,
that international collaborations should be judged less severely. There
is little in the cases supporting this theory and much suggesting its re-
jection. Timken is a prime illustration of the Court's position that the
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antitrust laws are designed to protect American competition from
unreasonable restraints, whether effectuated by combinations of Ameri-
can and foreign corporations or by American interests alone. Timken
and the other international joint venture cases, however, all turned on
the existence of an underlying per se unlawful conspiracy to restrain
trade. In none of these cases were the courts squarely presented with
the issue of the validity of international joint ventures in and of them-
selves. The district court's opinion in United States v. Imperial Chem.
Indus., Ltd.'" does, however, provide some assistance. There, the
court indicated that distinctions can be drawn between foreign joint
ventures formed to exploit a market in which either or both parents
were established or had a foothold and joint ventures formed to develop
virgin territories. After noting that joint ventures—in domestic or
foreign commerce—"become unlawful only if their purpose or their
effect is to restrain trade or to monopolize,' the court stated:
It is also clear that absent this wrongful purpose or harmful
effect there is nothing per se unlawful in the association or
combination of a single American enterprise with a single
local concern of a foreign country in a jointly owned manu-
facturing or commercial company to develop a foreign local
market. But the proof here shows an American concern, al-
ready established in a foreign local market, and a British con-
cern, which has a foothold in the same foreign local market,
combining to form a jointly owned company to the end that
the same foreign market may be developed for their mutual
benefit and profits divided on an agreed basis 201
In context, these statements clearly indicate that foreign and do-
mestic joint ventures are governed by the same rules. This undoubt-
edly is true since both must be lawful in conception and operation. But
the foreign joint venture may require an accommodation to be made
on the question of the reasonableness of its operation in order to ac-
count for the exigencies of foreign trade. On this point, the "interna-
tional" aspects of collaborative activity on the part of American and
foreign corporations could become particularly important. The ICI
opinion on remedies contains some language suggesting that it may. 202
Under the divestiture decree du Pont and ICI were permitted to con-
tinue their Chilean joint venture even though its purpose was unlaw-
ful.' The court pointed out that du Pont's American competitor was
199 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
299 Id. at 557.
201 Id .
292 United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd., 105 F. Supp. 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
293 This company was Compania Sud-Americana de Explosivos, referred to by the
court as CSAE. It was organized by du Pont and ICI in 1921 to manufacture and sell
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no longer a joint owner of the company, its interest having been pur-
chased by du Pont, and that the joint company functioned solely to
meet the requirements of a local market in a foreign country, pro-
ducing only a single product which could neither be imported into the
United States nor exported from the United States to Chile.'
Further support for the theory that collaborative foreign ventures
explosives in the northern part of Chile and in Bolivia. Du Pont's stated motive for
joining with ICI in the project was the desire to retain its existing position in the
area. The Chilean government wanted a military powder factory in Chile, was willing
"'to give facilities in the commercial business to any manufacturers willing to help them
with the military project' " and had increased import duties on explosives by 50%. Id.
at 243. The court stated: "Had CSAE been organized with the sole purpose of meeting
these existing conditions, there would have been no violation of our anti-trust laws."
Id. But it was also formed and used to block entry by competing concerns, including
two United States corporations. One of the American corporations, Atlas Powder Com-
pany, had already made significant inroads into the market and was brought into CSAE
as a 15% stockholder in recognition of this fact. The remaining stock was equally divided
between du Pont and ICI. 100 F. Supp. at 564-65. The three partners turned over their
Chilean and Bolivian import business in commercial explosives to CSAE which imme-
diately became enmeshed in the operation of the "South American Pooling Agreement"
by which du Pont and ICI agreed to share equally the net profits from their South
American sales of explosives and blasting supplies. Atlas continued as a shareholder of
CSAE for 20 years and then sold its interest to du Pont.
2" it is unclear how much weight should be accorded the fact that there was
only a single American investor. The court's observation must be placed in context. The
record failed to disclose whether du Pont made the purchase to obtain additional
foreign tax credits or because it believed the joint ownership by two United States
concerns in a company producing one of their major products was contrary to the
Sherman Act, Du Pont's precise motive in making the acquisition was "important," the
court said "in determining the extent of the relief required" since "a purpose to cease
violating the law" should receive some weight. 105 F. Supp. at 244. Du Pont was en-
titled to the benefit of the doubt and the court therefore felt compelled to find that
its purpose was to conform to the law. It then continued:
In either case, we take the facts as presented—Atlas is out of the com-
pany; ICI and du Pont are the sole owners; it operates but one plant in
Chile; it functions solely to meet the requirements of a local market in a
foreign country; it deals in one product; exportation by the company to the
United States is not feasible; the possibilities of presently encouraging exports
from the United States in this field to this market are doubtful and remote
save as to raw materials . . . .
Id. The court also reasoned that changing economic conditions brought about by World
War II made improbable the early revival of the cartel which had flourished prior to
the war. For these reasons, it felt injunctive measures designed to confine the Chilean
company's operations to its postwar product line and to prevent future allotment of
its raw material purchases would suffice. It may be that the court's emphasis on the
presence of a single American investor was not intended to indicate any difference in
result had there been two. It would seem that the Chilean market would be just as local
and limited and the possibility of United States foreign trade in the area just as remote
whether the joint venture was purely "international" or had added domestic partici-
pation. At the same time, the statement could have great significance. The court cer-
tainly took the facts as it found them. When its action is coupled with the statement
made in its earlier opinion, that there is nothing per se unlawful about the combination
of a single American firm with a single foreign firm to jointly develop a foreign local
market, this could be taken to mean that "international" joint ventures will be per-
mitted in situations where domestic foreign ventures will not be allowed.
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by American and foreign firms may be deemed less anticompetitive
than comparable domestic foreign ventures can be extracted from
the report of the American Bar Association's Subcommittee on Sub-
sidiaries in Foreign Trade. The study concludes that joint investment
by a nondominant United States corporation and a foreign company
can be justified by a showing of inordinately heavy risks which neither
of the venturers is individually prepared to take, or a showing of com-
plementary contributions which neither partner could provide alone,
such as the local experience, facilities and distributing organizations
of one partner and the capital and know-how of another."' Addition-
ally, it states:
Justification for joint investment by an American firm with
a local partner would be clear if the foreign country con-
cerned itself insists on the participation of local investors
or penalizes foreign ownership by tax or other regulatory
statutes, or if the participation of local companies is neces-
sary or highly advantageous in the assembling of a manage-
ment and labor force, in providing local capital and sales
outlets, and in dealing with the local government authorities
and the local financial and business communities.' 08 (Foot-
notes omitted.)
d. The Impact of the Clayton Act on the Joint Venture. Foreign
joint ventures must also consider the Clayton Act philosophy de-
signed to maintain structurally competitive markets. In United States
v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co.,' the Supreme Court held that domestic ven-
tures are subject to the proscriptions of section 7. Two United
States corporations, Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation and Penn-
salt Chemical Corporation, had combined to form a new company,
Penn-Olin Chemical Company, to engage in the production and distri-
bution of sodium chlorate in the southeastern portion of the United
States. Since Penn-Olin had no existence prior to its formation, the
defense argued that it was not "engaged also in commerce" at the
time of the "acquisition" as required for section 7 jurisdiction. Speak-
ing for the Court, Mr. Justice Clark employed some legal gymnastics
in order to hurdle this obstacle:
The test, they say, is whether the enterprise to be acquired is
engaged in commerce—not whether a corporation formed as
the instrumentality for the acquisition is itself engaged in
commerce at the moment of its formation. We believe that
this logic fails in the light of the wording of the section and
205 Comm. on Antitrust Problems in Int'l Trade, supra note 175, at 255-56.
200 Id .
207 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
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its legislative background. The test of the section is the effect
of the acquisition. Certainly the formation of a joint venture
and purchase by the organizers of its stock would substan-
tially lessen competition—indeed foreclose it—as between
them, both being engaged in commerce. . . . Moreover,
in this case the progeny was organized to further the business
of its parents, already in commerce, and the fact that it was
organized specifically to engage in commerce should bring it
within the coverage of § 7208
Justice Clark then pointed out that Penn-Olin had been engaged in
commerce long before the case had actually come to tria1. 20 ' This was
deemed significant because the economic effects, the "crucial question"
under section 7,210 are to be measured at the time of trial and not
merely at the time of acquisition.ni Whatever one may think of the
logical frivolity of Justice Clark's opinion, none of his colleagues ex-
pressly challenged his interpretation. 212 Thus, there is little doubt
that international joint ventures which adversely affect commerce
within a "section of the country" will violate section 7. Only close
analysis of Penn-Olin reveals the extent to which collaborative overseas
expansion will produce the adverse effects upon competition in the
United States and thereby violate the statute.
Olin and Pennsalt were both large chemical companies. Prior
to their collaboration, Pennsalt had commercially produced and mar-
keted sodium chlorate, principally in areas other than the southeast
portion of the United States. Olin, on the other hand, had never
manufactured the product, but did purchase large amounts of it for
internal consumption and had acted as Pennsalt's sales agent in the
Southeast under pre-venture contracts. Olin was quite familiar with
this product for another reason: It had developed a patented pulp-
bleaching process which required' the use of sodium chlorate, and this
process was used by the entire pulp and paper industry. Olin's process
created an expanding demand for sodium chlorate throughout the
United States and principally in the Southeast where the heaviest
concentration of purchasers was located. Both Pennsalt and Olin inde-
pendently considered the feasibility of constructing a sodium chlorate
plant in the area, but neither had made a final decision when they
formed Penn-Olin. At this time, the sodium chlorate industry was con-
208 Id. at 167-68.
209 Id. at 168,
210 See pp. 277-82 supra.
211 378 U.S. at 168.
212 Justice Douglas filed a dissenting opinion, joined in by Justice Black, in which
he expressly agreed with the Court on this point. Justices White and Harlan also dis-
sented; White wrote no opinion and Harlan merely indicated he would affirm the
lower court.
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centrated nationally in the hands of three companies, two of which
dominated the southeast markets; new firms had not , entered the
industry for at least a decade.
The Supreme Court agreed with the district court that the record
established no violation of the Sherman Act, but reversed its ruling
on the Clayton Act count. The lower court had allowed the collabora-
tion because it was unable to find that both Pennsalt and Olin proba-
bly would have entered the market as independent competitors. 213 In
the Supreme Court's view, this interpretation of the statute was too
narrow, for it failed to take into account the competitive realities of the
market:
Certainly the sole test would not be the probability that both
companies would have entered the market. Nor would the
consideration be limited to the probability that one entered
alone. There still remained for consideration the fact that
Penn-Olin eliminated the potential competition of the corpor-
ation that might have remained at the edge of the market,
continually threatening to enter.. . . The existence of an ag-
gressive, well equipped and well financed corporation engaged
in the same or related lines of commerce waiting anxiously to
enter an oligopolistic market would be a substantial incentive
to competition which cannot be underestimated 214
Addressing itself to this latter issue, the Court characterized
the industry as rapidly expanding and found this particularly true
of the southeast market, where approximately one-half of the total
national production of sodium chlorate was consumed. New plants
were needed in the area but few companies possessed the resources,
technical know-how or inclination to enter the market and challenge
the two oligopolists already firmly entrenched in the market. Its analy-
sis of the record led the Court to believe that either Olin or Pennsalt
could have entered at a reasonable profit. Each consumed large quan-
tities of sodium chlorate in the production of other chemicals and each
enjoyed a good reputation and business connections with the major
consumers of sodium chlorate in the area. Moreover, the Court found
that each "company had compelling reasons for entering" and that
"right up to the creation of Penn-Olin, each had evidenced a long-sus-
tained and strong interest in entering the relevant market area .... ;2215
The evidence thus suggested a strong likelihood of independent entry
by both companies. In the words of the Court, the "array of proba-
bility certainly reaches the prima facie stage," 216 yet the Justices were
213 378 U.S. at 172-73.
214 Id. at 173-74.
215 Id. at 175.
216 Id .
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not disposed to upset the district court's holding to the contrary. In-
stead, over the vigorous objections of Justices Douglas and Black, the
Court remanded for further findings as to the reasonable probability
of lone entry by one and the competitive influence which might be
exerted by the other's presence at the edge of the market. The two
dissenters felt, first, that the additional findings were unnecessary and,
second, that the Supreme Court was as competent as the trial court
to make them.217
In remanding, the Court stated that the same considerations
apply to joint ventures as to mergers and noted generally some factors
by which the trial court might assess the probability of a substantial
lessening of competition:
the number and power of the competitors in the relevant
market; the background of their growth; the power of the
joint venturers; the relationship of their lines of commerce;
the competition existing between them and the power of each
in dealing with the competitors of the other; the setting in
which the joint venture was created; the reasons and neces-
sities for its existence; the joint venture's line of commerce
and the relationship thereof to that of its parents; the adapt-
ability of its line of commerce to noncompetitive practices;
the potential power of the joint venture in the relevant mar-
ket; an appraisal of what the competition in the relevant
market would have been if one of the joint venturers had
entered it alone instead of through Penn-Olin; the effect, in
the event of this occurrence, of the other joint venturer's po-
tential competition; and such other factors as might indicate
potential risk to competition in the relevant market.218
As thus interpreted, section 7 will have its clearest impact on for-
eign joint ventures which threaten to lessen competition in United
States imports. Cases can easily be imagined where two or more
American competitors combine jointly to form and manage a foreign
extractive or manufacturing operation to supply them with the raw
materials or products they further process and sell. These joint foreign
establishments can affect competition within the United States in the
same way and to the same extent as comparable domestic joint ven-
tures. Similar internal effects upon United States commerce can result
from "international" joint ventures which foreclose actual or potential
foreign companies frorn this country.
217 The two Justices viewed the joint venture as a corporate guise to cloak a divi-
sion of markets, since it had been formed on the eve of competitive projects in the
southeastern market. Id. at 180-81.
218 Id. at 177.
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While it is clear that section 7 possesses the potential for signifi-
cant impact on joint ventures producing import restraints, its probable
role in regulating foreign joint ventures affecting United States export
trade is uncertain. Previously, it was pointed out in the discussion of
acquisitions 'and mergers that the jurisdictional criteria of section 7
may prevent the application of Clayton Act standards to export re-
straints.
Even if it is assumed that the statute is applicable to export
restraints, the Penn-Olin approach is not appropriate. Apart from
considerations as to the evolution of the joint venture idea and the
reasons and necessities for its existence, the several lines of inquiry
suggested by the Court all relate to the pre-venture and postventure
status of competition in the market served by the joint enterprise.
These criteria can easily be applied to joint ventures threatening import
competition, but it is difficult to apply them to export restraints for
they focus on the competitive effects of the arrangement in a foreign
market served by the joint enterprise rather than in a "section of the
country" where competition in the production of goods for export is
affected. Professor Brewster's production-competition theory imple-
menting the statutory language of section 7 requires examination of
the residual effects of joint foreign investment upon the structure of
domestic competition. In this respect, the element of foreclosure of
rival United States exporters from sizeable foreign markets suggests
itself as the most fertile avenue of exploration.
B. Problems of Operation
1. Conspiracy
a. In General. It is basic to the law of conspiracy that a person
cannot conspire with himself. This is but another way of saying that
there must be at least two persons or entities to constitute a conspiracy.
When this principle is transferred to the realm of corporate life and
antitrust activity, difficult and unresolved problems arise with respect
to the question whether components within the same business enter-
prise constitute separate entities capable of conspiring with one another.
The problem arises in two distinct contexts. Business may be con-
ducted either through a single corporate structure with unincorporated
branches, divisions or departments, or through a multicorporate family
where individual corporate members each conduct a portion of the
overall business of the economic enterprise. The constant factor pres-
ent in every case is that the corporate person cannot act at all except
by and through its human personnel—be they directors, officers, em-
ployees or agents—and acts done within the scope of their authority
constitute the action of the corporation. The corrolary to this principle
is that the separate identities of the corporation and its personnel are
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merged, with the concomitant result that action taken is performed by
by a "single trader." The situation involving the multicorporate struc-
ture simply adds the variable that one corporation, a subsidiary, may
act for another, its parent. Often action taken within the corporate
structure of either enterprise operates to regulate the freedom of action
and hence the trade of its component members as well as to impose
restraints on outside firms. The question presented is what antitrust
significance is to be ascribed to this activity.
The question is highly complex and the answer obscure. Much
depends upon the precise statute involved and the substantive offense
charged. For example, Section 2 of the Sherman Act not only forbids
combinations and conspiracies to monopolize, but also makes it a sub-
stantive offense to monopolize or attempt to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign
nations. In its latter aspects, it can be violated by a single trader and
it is clear that the corporate personnel who are responsible for the
monopolization may be held guilty of a conspiracy to monopolize, for:
"It has long been the law that where a corporation commits a sub-
stantive crime, the officers and directors who participated in the illicit
venture are guilty of criminal conspiracy." 21n The same reasoning leads
to the conclusion that a multicorporate family can be guilty of an
illegal conspiracy where the monopoly scheme is effectuated by a
parent corporation and its subsidiaries?'
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, on the other hand, is a substan-
tially different kind of statute. It does not declare restraint of trade
a substantive offense but condemns only contracts, combinations and
conspiracies to restrain unreasonably the interstate or foreign com-
merce of the United States. Accordingly, it does not follow as a matter
of logic that the concerted activity of corporate personnel on behalf of
their corporation or of subsidiaries on behalf of their parent con-
stitutes a violation of section 1. Indeed, it is generally conceded that
concerted action by the members of a single business enterprise is not
a contract, combination, or conspiracy within the meaning of the sta-
tute. But this conclusion is deceptively simple for considerable prob-
lems arise in defining "the business enterprise" and the courts have
held that members of the same economic enterprise may possess legal
capacity to conspire with each other in violation of section 1.
Conspiracies involving intrafamilial actors can arise in any of
three situations:
219 S. Oppenheim, Federal Antitrust Laws, Cases and Comments 284 (1959), citing
Egan v. United States, 137 F.2d 369 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 788 (1943), Mini-
sohn v. United States, 101 F.2d 477 (3d Cir. 1939), and Barron v. United States, 5 F.2d
799 (1st Cir. 1925).
220 Id.
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(a) conspiracy between a corporation and its branches,
divisions, departments, or employees or between the corpora-
tion's branches, divisions, departments or employees acting
on its behalf;
(b) conspiracy between a parent and its subsidiaries or
between two or more subsidiaries; and
(c) conspiracy between two or more corporations, the
stock of each of which is owned by the same natural person
or persons.221
These three are commonly lumped together and indiscriminately called
either "intracorporate" or "intraenterprise" conspiracies. This group-
ing has, however, caused some confusion, for it fails to recognize basic
distinctions between the first situation—involving only one corporate
entity—and the last two—involving more than one corporation. It
will therefore not be used here. A distinction shall be drawn between
the "intracorporate" conspiracy on the one hand and the "intraenter-
prise" conspiracy on the other. The first situation, since it involves
only one entity will be referred to as the "intracorporate" conspiracy;
since both the second and third involve the combination of two or more
corporations and raise essentially the same issues, they will be referred
to collectively as "intraenterprise" conspiracies.
b. Intracorporate Conspiracy. There is little federal authority dis-
cussing the intracorporate conspiracy problem 222 The Supreme Court
has yet to decide whether a corporation has the capacity to conspire
with its employees or component parts, or whether they have the
capacity to conspire among themselves, in violation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act.223 The question has, however, come before the lower
221 This categorization is based upon Att'y Gen. Rep. 30 (1955).
222 There are cases under state antitrust laws upholding the validity of a charge
that a corporation and two or more of its officers can conspire in restraint of trade. The
leading case is Standard Oil Co. v. State, 117 Tenn. 618, 100 S.W. 705 (1907). It in-
volved an appeal by Standard Oil Company and its officers from a conviction for
"making an unlawful contract . . . for the purpose and with a view to lessen full and
free competition in the sale of coal oil . . ." in violation of the Tennessee antitrust law.
Id. at 626, 100 S.W. at 706. The court held that a corporation and its officers "can both
be considered and counted in the two or more necessary to constitute an unlawful
conspiracy." Id. at 667, 100 S.W. at 717. Additional cases are collected in Kramer, Does
Concerted Action Solely Between a Corporation and its Officers Acting on its Behalf in
Unreasonable Restraint of Interstate Commerce Violate Section I of the Sherman Act?
11 Fed. B.J. 130, 135 n.10 (1951).
223 In Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948), the Su-
preme Court sustained the district court's finding that the defendants, a corporation,
its officers and subsidiaries, had conspired with each other and with outsiders, saying:
"The concerted action of the parent company, its subsidiaries, and the named officers
and directors in that endeavor was conspiracy which was not immunized by reason of
the fact that the members were closely affiliated rather than independent." Id. at 116.
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federal courts and appears to be fairly well resolved. While a few
early decisions found capacity did exist," the weight of more recent
authority is opposed to use of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine?'
In Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc.,'" the plaintiff dis-
tributor brought a treble damage action against his former supplier,
alleging that the latter's termination of plaintiff's franchise for his
refusal to agree not to deal in the products of a competitor violated
both Section 1 of the Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act.'
The complaint charged that the defendant corporation conspired with
its president, sales manager, officers, employees, representatives and
agents, who were actively engaged in the management, direction and
control of the affairs and business of the corporation. In affirming the
While this language could be interpreted as an implied recognition of the validity of
the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, such an interpretation is certainly tenuous. It
can just as well be argued that the Supreme Court was here approving the intraenter-
prise conspiracy, not the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, especially since the Court
cited United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 322 U.S. 218 (1947) and United States v. Crescent
Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173 (1944), both of which involved intraenterprise conspira-
cies. At best, the Schine language is ambiguous and cannot be read as either approving
or rejecting the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.
224 Patterson v. United States, 222 F. 599 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 238 U.S. 635
(1915), upheld the conviction and sentences of corporate personnel charged with con-
spiracy in restraint of trade and conspiracy to monopolize. The corporation was not
named as a defendant. The employees had engaged in predatory practices including busi-
ness libel and larceny. In the course of its opinion, the court said:
The section [§ 2 of the Sherman Act] includes conspiracies between competi-
tors, or between the officers and agents of a competitor on its behalf against
a competitor. But it is not limited to such conspiracies. It includes also con-
spiracies between any persons, whoever they may be, against any other person.
It is not essential that the execution of the conspiracy be of any benefit to
the conspirators. It is sufficient that it will be in restraint of another's inter-
state trade or commerce. . . . Clearly, then, a conspiracy between the officers
and agents of one competitor on its behalf in restraint of a single interstate
sale or shipment of another competitor is covered by it.
222 F. at 618-19.
In White Bear Theatre Corp. v. State Theatre Corp., 129 F.2d 600 (8th Cir. 1942),
plaintiff brought a treble damage action against a corporation and its officers, operating
the only theatre in town, for conspiring to monopolize and attempting to obtain a
monopoly of "first-run" pictures in the town. Without discussion of the point here in-
volved, the court reversed a judgment for the defendants and remanded the case for
a new trial.
225 Gordon v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 33 F.2d 103 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 909 (1964) ; Mackey v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 237 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1956) ; Nelson
Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 925 (1953); South End Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 237 F. Supp. 650 (N.D. 111. 1965);
Schoenberg Farms, Inc. v. Denver Milk Producers, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 266 (D. Colo.
1964); Herren Candy Co. v. Curtiss Candy Co., 153 F. Supp. 751, 755 (N.D. Ga. 1957);
Marion County Co-Op. Assin v. Carnation Co., 114 F. Supp. 58, 62-63 (WD. Ark.
1953), aff'd, 214 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1954); Brehm v. Goebel Brewing Co., 1953
Trade Cas. II 67,431 (W.D. Mich. 1953) ; Arthur v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 26 F.
Supp. 824 (D. Md. 1937).
226 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).
227 Id. at 912.
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district court's dismissal of the complaint, the court looked at the
"unique group of conspirators" and said:
It is basic in the law of conspiracy that you must have two
persons or entities to have a conspiracy. A corporation cannot
conspire with itself any more than a private individual can,
and it is the general rule that the acts of the agent are the
acts of the corporation."'
Noting the absence of an allegation that the officers, agents and em-
ployees were actuated by any motives personal to themselves, the
court concluded they were acting only for the defendant corporation.
It also recognized that the acts of the corporate officers may bring a
single corporation within Section 2 of the Sherman Act, but it ex-
plained that "this is not because there exists in such circumstances, a
conspiracy to which the corporation is a party" but because their acts
may constitute "an attempt to monopolize." Additionally, the court
admitted that a corporation may conspire with its subsidiaries but
stated this was so because the combination involved separate corporate
entities. Finding neither situation present, the court concluded:
[I]t appears plain to us that the conspiracy upon which
plaintiff relies consists simply in the absurd assertion that the
defendant, through its officers and agents, conspired with it-
self to restrain its trade in its own products. Surely discus-
sions among those engaged in the management, direction and
control of a corporation concerning the price at which the
corporation will sell its goods, the quantity it will produce, the
type of customers or market to be served, or the quality of
goods to be produced do not result in the corporation being
engaged in a conspiracy in unlawful restraint of trade under
the Sherman Act." 9
The Nelson decision was not, however, unanimous. Judge Rives
228 Id. at 914. The Clayton Act count was also dismissed because the plaintiff's
distributor-franchise agreement had already expired at the time the defendant corpora-
tion ceased doing business with plaintiff:
Section 3 of the Clayton Act, by its express terms, covers only leases, sales, or
contracts actually made on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the
lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods of a competitor of
the lessor or seller. There is nothing whatever in the Act to suggest that it cover a
situation where the manufacturer refuses to make a sale or enter into a contract,
and it has been stated time and again that a manufacturer has the unquestioned
right to refuse to deal with anyone for reasons sufficient to himself. [Citing
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), and other cases] . . .
The plaintiff has not been injured as a result of a contract, either express or
implied, which sought to prevent him from dealing in the goods of any compe-
titor of the defendant.
Id, at 915-16.
229 Id. at 914.
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regarded the action of the defendant corporation in coercing its deal-
ers into agreeing not to deal in the goods of a competitor as a restraint
of trade and a clear violation of the Clayton Act. Under such circum-
stances he felt it wrong to protect the defendant with "the cloak of
immunity of a single corporate entity." 2a0 The majority, he complained,
would have no trouble in sustaining the sufficiency of the complaint
if two corporate entities had been involved: for example, if one
corporation manufactured the equipment and a subsidiary or separate
corporation attended to its sales and distribution. This, he argued,
was paying too much attention to form and not enough to substance. 23 '
"At long last a method has been found to flout the purposes of the anti-
trust laws and to deny the victims any recourse to the courts." 232
The two opinions in Nelson amply depict the conflict on the intra-
corporate conspiracy issue. What is overly formalistic to one side is
clear black-letter law to the other. Consequently, the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine has been sharply criticized by some 233 and ap-
proved by others."' As indicated above, however, the present weight
of judicial authority seems to be opposed to the doctrine.
The Justice Department has generally refrained from bringing
charges of conspiracy against a single corporation" and has even
conceded in oral argument that the Sherman Act is not applicable.'
Recently, however, Chief Judge Pence of the United States District
Court for the District of Hawaii applied the doctrine to the unique
facts of Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
a Id. at 916.
231 Professor Handler has used the same reasoning to come to exactly the opposite
conclusion—to hold it possible for a parent to conspire with its subsidiary while recog-
nizing the impossibility of the intracorporate conspiracy "is to sacrifice substance for
mere form." Handler, Contract, Combination or Conspiracy, 3 A.B.A. Sec. of Antitrust
Law 38, 47 (1953).
232 200 F.2d at 916.
233 See, e.g., Adelman, Effective Competition and the Antitrust Laws, 61 Harv. L.
Rev. 1289, 1314-17 (1948); Rahl, Conspiracy and the Antitrust Laws, 44 III. L. Rev.
743, 763, 765 (1950).
284 See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 222; Note, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 920, 1000-05 (1959).
235 But see United States v. Times-Picayune Publishing Co., 105 F. Supp. 670
(ED. La. 1952), rev'd, 345 U.S. 594 (1953), and United States v. Lorain Journal Co., 92
F. Supp. 794 (ND. Ohio 1950), aff'd, 342 U.S. 143 (1951), in both of which the Depart-
ment of Justice charged conspiracies solely between a corporation and its officers. In Lorain
Journal, the district court found for the Government under an alternative § 2 charge
and refused to decide the § 1 question. In Times -Picayune, the Government dropped
the § 1 conspiracy charge before the final argument in the district court. See also Scbine
Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110 (1948).
236 In his dissenting opinion in Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341
U.S. 593, 606 (1951), Mr. Justice Jackson pointed out that the Government "admitted
that if Timken had, within its own corporate organization, set up separate departments
to operate plants in France and Great Britain, as well as in the United States, 'that
would not be a conspiracy.'" Id. For the exchange between Court and counsel regarding
this matter see 19 U.S.L.W. 3292-93 (1951).
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Inc.'" The case presented an issue of first impression since it dealt
with the validity of an alleged horizontal conspiracy among the unin-
corporated divisions of a single corporation to boycott the plaintiff.
The court distinguished the line of cases dismissing intracorporate
conspiracy complaints on the ground that they concerned themselves
solely with the vertical relationship between the parent and its divi-
sions. In this context it made sense to say that a corporation and its
unincorporated divisions are but one entity in a court of law. Histori-
cally and legally a corporation is deemed a person "and normally so
personified as if a man, a creature with but one brain, one medium of
thought and action . . . ." 238 But all corporations are not, in fact,
persons with one brain, one nerve center at which decisions are reached.
Some corporate structures consist of a parent and incorporated sub-
sidiaries, each one an entity capable of conspiring with others and with
each other:
The question, then, is what, if any, magic occurs when the
paper partition is removed. Is a business group which chooses
to organize as a single corporation with unincorporated divi-
sions automatically cast in the form of a normal person? Or
may we have a corporate "person" in the form of a multi-
headed Siva, or as portrayed by Dali or Artzybasheff? 23°
To Judge Pence, the answer was simple: "There is nothing sacrosanct
about the 'unincorporated' aspect of corporate divisions. To hold other-
wise would give businessmen the power to avoid the proscriptions of the
antitrust laws by the fortuitous employment of alert legal counsel." 24°
The critical question is factual and depends upon the ability of the
division to act independently in the relevant business activity:
Is each facet of the unincorporated division's operation in
fact, for all purposes, controlled and directed from above, or
is it endowed with separable, self-generated and moving
power to act in the pertinent area of economic activity? This
is the key question. If the division operates independently in
directing the relevant business activity, then it is a separate
business entity under the antitrust laws 241 (Footnote
omitted.)
To the extent that one is willing to accept the propriety of the
intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine which states that corporate enti-
ties within the same business enterprise can conspire among them-
237 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (1967 Trade Cas.) 	 72,186 (D. Hawaii July 24, 1967).
238 Id. at 84,261.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 84,262.
241 Id. at 84,261-62.
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selves, Hawaiian Oke must be accepted. Whenever unincorporated
branches, divisions or departments function in the same manner as
subsidiaries possessing and exercising distinct control over specific
business functions, it is foolish to seize upon the lack of incorporation
in one instance and its presence in another to deny and affirm con-
spiratorial capacity and action. The important point to note is that
Hawaiian Oke expressly disaffirms vertical conspiracies between the
parent and its divisions and thus poses no threat to normal centralized
planning activity.
Quite apart from Hawaiian Oke there is another instance in which
the elements of a conspiracy may be found within the internal opera-
tions of a corporation. In Nelson, the court expressly intimated that
a conspiracy may exist between a corporation and its officers or agents
who are actuated by motives personal to themselves and act in other
than their normal capacity while performing services for the corpora-
tion.242 Strictly speaking, conspiracies of this kind are not intra-
corporate conspiracies since they depend upon the corporation's
collaboration with independent persons. Nevertheless, they are closely
analogous to intracorporate conspiracies and are generally discussed
in connection with the doctrine since they involve the internal combina-
tion of actors within the corporate structure.
An unorthodox conspiracy case of this genre was presented to the
Supreme Court in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc.2" A
national broadcasting company cancelled its affiliation contract with
the plaintiff, the owner of a local television station, and purchased the
station of the plaintiff's competitor. The plaintiff sued the corporation,
its unincorporated division, and two divisional officers, alleging that
they had unlawfully conspired to put him out of business. The district
court granted the corporation's motion for summary judgment, ap-
parently on the ground that as there was but one corporate entity
there could be no finding of conspiracy.244 In the view of the Supreme
242 In Nelson, the court noted that it was not "alleged affirmatively, expressly,
or otherwise, that these officers, agents, and employees were actuated by any motives
personal to themselves" and concluded that "[Obviously, they were acting only for the
defendant corporation." It later stated, "In the absence of any allegation whatever to
indicate that the agents of the corporation were acting in other than their normal
capacities, plaintiff has failed to state a cause of action based on conspiracy under Sec-
tion 1 of the Act." 200 F.2d at 914. See also Gordon v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 330 F.2d
103, 107 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 909 (1964); Schoenberg Farms, Inc. v. Denver
Milk Producers, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 266, 269-70 (D. Cob. 1964); Marion County Co-Op.
Ass'n v. Carnation Co., 114 F. Supp. 58, 63 (W.D. Ark. 1953), aff'd, 214 F.2d 557 (8th
Cir. 1954).
243 368 U.S. 464 (1962). rev'g 284 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1960) and 174 F. Supp. 802
(D.D.C. 1959).
244 The basis of the court's opinion is unclear. It simply reasoned that under the
doctrine of United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), and the termination
clause of the plaintiff's affiliation contract, the defendant corporation was within its
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Court, however, the question was not whether a corporation could
conspire with itself, but whether there had been a conspiracy between
the corporation and certain independent parties." One of the persons
whom the Supreme Court suggested as a possible conspirator was a
management consultant who had been acting as a special agent of the
corporation.' The Court felt that the status of this person as an
independent actor or special agent or employee of the corporation
should have been submitted to the jury. Thus, under Poller, a corpora-
tion's capacity to conspire with its agents or employees depends on the
relationship of an individual to the corporation in a given situation—
a relationship to be determined as a matter of fact rather than of law.
The difficult problem in the language of the Nelson and Poller cases
lies in determining the extent of its applicability. It has been suggested
that a finding of separability of persons can be made where the acts
of the board of directors or the officers are ultra vires, for in such a
situation the directors or officers are certainly not acting within the
scope of their authority, and an even stronger case would exist where
the corporation is legally powerless to authorize or ratify such activ-
ity.' But this position is untenable. Consider, for example, the case
of the corporate officers who think they are acting on behalf of the
corporation but whose actions are ultra vires. It certainly cannot be
said that they intended to act on their own behalf or on behalf of any-
one other than the corporation. Though their actions may be outside
their authority and beyond, the corporation's power of ratification,
they are still actions done on behalf of the corporation. In these cir-
cumstances, it is difficult to see how there is, or could be, in fact or law,
any severability of persons.
The corporate official who intends to act on behalf of the corpora-
tion cannot be treated as an outsider for the simple reason that he
asserts no independent interest or position. A different situation is posed
rights in cancelling plaintiff's contract and in purchasing the facilities of plaintiff's com-
petitor, so long as it did not engage in any conspiracy to put plaintiff out of business.
The court must have held that there was no conspiracy but it never said so. It is
therefore impossible to know the precise reasons why the court felt there was no
conspiracy.
245 368 U.S. at 469. "It is argued that CBS cannot conspire with itself. However,
this begs the question for the allegation is that independent parties, i.e., Holt and Bartell,
conspired with CBS and its officers." Id. (footnote omitted).
246 Holt, who was considered by the Court to be a possible conspirator, had been
retained by CBS, the corporate defendant, to obtain an option to purchase the televi-
sion station of plaintiff's competitor. If the FCC amended its multiple ownership rules
so as to enable CBS to purchase additional television stations, Holt was to assign his
option to CBS if CBS so elected. If the FCC did not amend its rules, or if CBS did
not elect to take up Holt's option, then it was contemplated that Holt would operate
as an affiliate station in the CBS television network.
247 Devine, Foreign Establishment and the Antitrust Law: A Study of the Antitrust
Consequences of the Principle [sic] Forms of Investment by American Corporations in
Foreign Markets, 57 Nw. U.L. Rev. 400, 415 (1962).
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by the corporate official who acts both on behalf of the corporation and
in his own interest. But here too, his actions are still basically corpo-
rate acts, at least under the corporate opportunity and related doctrines
of corporate law requiring corporate personnel to place the corporate
good above their own. 248 Perhaps the only situation where there is a
true factual severability of persons exists when the corporate official
acts solely in his own behalf but somehow manages to induce corre-
sponding corporate action. It is doubtful whether these situations occur
with any regularity or, indeed, that they occur at all. If they do, they
most probably involve the collaboration of two or more corporate
officials who, it would seem, aremerely using the corporation to accom-
plish their personal ends. Under these circumstances there is no more
a meeting of the corporate mind with the minds of the individual actors
than there would be if two corporate officers murdered their company's
chief competitor. Without some meeting of the corporate and individual
minds there is no conspiracy involving the corporation. Even the im-
plied conspiracy cases based upon consciously parallel business prac-
tices do not claim that conscious parallelism alone is a legal substitute
for conspiracy.249 In the hypothetical posed here it is questionable
whether there exists any corporate consciousness at all, and, since
only one corporation is involved, it is also doubtful whether there is
any parallelism within the meaning of the conscious parallelism doc-
trine.
The problem with the intracorporate and related conspiracy doc-
trines has been quite properly placed in its proper economic per-
spective:
All concerted action by two natural persons could be a
"combination," but this reading would be socially incon-
venient and historically surprising. So long as the business
enterprise is regarded as an individual economic unit, it
must be permitted to act. To say that a single corporation
acting unilaterally cannot "combine" with itself is necessarily
to say that it cannot "combine" with its officers or employees
who are its only means for acting. 25°
While there is thus considerable difficulty in finding a basis on which
it can be claimed that a corporation has "combined" with its own
officers or employees, there is no such difficulty in finding a conspira-
torial relationship between the corporation and an outside agent. The
248 See H. Ballantine, Corporations §§ 66-71 (rev. ed. 1946).
249 Compare United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942), and Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939), with Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v.
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954), and Delaware Valley Marine
Supply Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 297 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1961).
250 P. Areeda, Antitrust Analysis 236 (1967).
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outside agent, unlike the usual officer or employee "may have distinct
and independent interests that permit him to 'combine' with his
On the basis of present authority it seems clear that no antitrust
liability results from the exercise of normal central management control
within the corporation. The single corporate enterprise is relatively
free from internal conspiracy problems. Indeed, at least one source has
concluded:
When a company conducts its business through branches,
divisions, or departments rather than separately incorporated
subsidiaries, business arrangements between those branches,
divisions, or departments ordinarily go unchallenged under
the antitrust laws. In effect, unincorporated components are
free to agree among themselves as to the price at which they
will sell, the territories in which they will sell, and the classes
of customers to whom they will se11. 252
Hawaiian Oke marks the sole departure from this principle. That
case, as we have seen, involved the abnormal situation where divisions
both possessed independent marketing discretion and acted on their
own without direction from above. Even if its validity is conceded, it
clearly poses no threat to foreign expansion and no barrier to the
exercise of normal management control within a single corporate
enterprise. 253
c. Intraenterprise Conspiracy. Where the overseas establishment
is accomplished by the acquisition or formation of a wholly or partially
owned subsidiary corporation a substantially different problem arises
because there are here two legally separate entities. The threshold
conspiracy problem arises when the American parent formulates
policy for the multicorporate family as a whole. Its centralized plan-
ning activities will be designed to maintain noncompetitive peace within
the family. Hence its directives will usually have the effect of dividing
territories, fixing prices, and regulating production among its con-
251 Id. at 237.
252 H. Blake & R. Pitofsky, Cases and Materials on Antitrust Law 435 (1967).
253 See Brewster, supra note 22, at 181 where it is stated:
If such foreign expansion is done by a branch or division of the American
corporation without separate incorporation, there is no basis for liability under
section 1, even though it is contemplated and in fact works out to divide
territories, fix prices, and regulate output internally so that the home office
and the foreign branch do not disturb each other's markets. There is only one
legal entity, and it takes at least two to make a conspiracy.
See also United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 92 F. Supp. 947, 962 (D. Mass.
1950), where the court stated its decree would expressly allow the American corporation
individually to establish and operate foreign factories.
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stituents in a manner that will assure they will not disturb each other's
markets. Although these arrangements unite components within a
single business enterprise, they differ from those previously discussed
simply because they exist between two or more legally separate
"persons." Under the admonition that the antitrust laws are concerned
with substance not form, the courts have sometimes held that a parent
can combine with its subsidiaries and the subsidiaries can conspire
among themselves. Because the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine has
apparently become an established part of antitrust law, there is the
possibility that foreign operations conducted through a wholly or par-
tially owned subsidiary will result in violations of the Sherman Act.
While there are no foreign commerce cases expressly applying
the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine, there is no reason to distinguish
between foreign and domestic corporations on this point. Moreover,
there is language in both the majority and minority opinions in
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States' which indicates that the
doctrine applies in foreign commerce cases. In Timken, American Tim-
ken owned one-third of British Timken, and they in turn each owned
50 percent of the stock of French Timken. Mr. Justice Black, speaking
for the Court, first found that the agreements between American
Timken, British Timken, and their jointly owned subsidiary, French
Timken, unreasonably restrained trade and then said: "The fact that
there is common ownership or control of the contracting corporations
does not liberate them from the impact of the antitrust laws."' In his
dissent, Mr. Justice Jackson interpreted the Court's opinion to apply
the well-established conspiracy doctrine that what it would
not be illegal for [American] Timken to do alone may be
illegal as a conspiracy when done by two legally separate
persons. The doctrine now applied to foreign commerce is that
foreign subsidiaries organized by an American corporation
are "separate persons," and any arrangement between them
and the parent corporation to do that which is legal for the
parent alone is an unlawful conspiracy."
Justice Jackson felt that this result placed too much weight on labels.
Mr. Justice Black's statement on behalf of the majority was not
essential to the decision of the case before the Court nor to any analysis
of its holding. Not only was American Timken's ownership of British
Timken during the period complained of less than a majority, but the
record showed, and the district court had held, that American Timken,
British Timken, and French Timken were not only "legally separate"
254 341 11.S. 593 (1951).
255 Id. at 598.
256 Id. at 606-07.
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entities, but were in fact separately controlled. 257 Moreover, the stock
acquisitions in the foreign companies were probably illegal in them-
selves.'" Nevertheless, Supreme Court dicta and dissenting opinions'
interpretations of majority opinions cannot be taken lightly. The
implications of the Timken language must be considered by all who
would conduct overseas operations through the means of foreign
subsidiaries or joint ventures. For this reason, an examination of the
domestic precedents giving rise to the intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine should be made.
The notion first appeared in United States v. General Motors
Corp.,' where the court disapproved of the tying of General Motors
Acceptance Corporation financing to General Motors automobiles.'"
There, the court stated that where subsidiaries operate as separate
legal entities—having different charter powers, different officers,
separate bank accounts and contracts with each other—they cannot
escape the Sherman Act by insisting that they are in effect a "single
trader."
Next came United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 26 ' where the
Supreme Court, in sustaining a divestiture order entered by the dis-
trict court, remarked that the affiliation of the defendants induced
joint action, and said that "[c]ommon control was one of the instru-
ments in bringing about unity of purpose and unity of action and in
making the conspiracy effective."'
The intraenterprise theory gained further impetus in United States
v. Yellow Cab Co.," where the Supreme Court said:
The test of illegality under the Act is the presence or ab-
sence of an unreasonable restraint on interstate commerce.
222 United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284, 311 (ND. Ohio
1949).
258 p. Areeda, supra note 250, at 239.
222 121 F.2d' 376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
260 A violation of Section 3 of the Clayton Act was not charged because financing
falls outside the purview of that section's prohibition of tying arrangements on "goods,
wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies or other commodities." 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1964).
261 323 U.S. 173 (1944). This was an action brought against nine affiliated com-
panies operating motion picture theaters in some 70 small towns in Alabama, Arkansas,
Kentucky and Tennessee, certain officers of these companies, and eight major distributors
of motion picture films, charging them with violations of §§ 1, 2 of the Sherman Act.
Crescent Amusement Company, the principal exhibitor, owned 50% of the stock of two
of the defendant exhibitors, and, prior to 1937, two-thirds of the stock of another,
which at the time of the suit was being run as a partnership by the majority stock-
holders of Crescent. One of the majority stockholders of Crescent was also the record
holder of all of the stock of another exhibitor, Rockwood Amusement Company, which,
in turn, owned 50% of the stock of two other defendant exhibitors. Rockwood itself
was actually being run as a "virtual branch" of Crescent. Another 1944 case which
raised intraenterprise conspiracy issues is United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,
321 U.S. 707, 723 (1944).
262 323 U.S. at 189.
283
	
U.S. 218 (1947).
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Such a restraint may result as readily from a conspiracy
among those who are affiliated or integrated under common
ownership as from a conspiracy among those who are other-
wise independent. Similarly, any affiliation or integration
flowing from an illegal conspiracy cannot insulate the con-
spirators from the sanctions which Congress has imposed.
The corporate interrelationships of the conspirators, in other
words, are not determinative of the applicability of the
Sherman Act.'"
The Court found the common ownership and control of the various
corporations irrelevant to any Sherman Act considerations.'"
Despite the obvious intendment of this language, Yellow Cab has
been construed by many notable authorities as not being an internal
conspiracy case. In Yellow Cab a single stockholder succeeded in
gaining control of a large cab manufacturing company and a series
of metropolitan cab operating companies.'" The manufacturing com-
pany and the operating companies agreed among themselves that the
operating companies would purchase cabs only from the manufacturing
company, thereby excluding competing cab makers and perhaps raising
the price of cabs and taxi service. Addressing itself to the Govern-
ment's charge that "the restraint of interstate trade was not only
effected by the combination of the appellees but was the primary
object of the combination," 267 the Court remarked that "[t]he theory
of the complaint . . . is that 'dominating power' over the cab operating
companies 'was not obtained by normal expansion to meet the demands
of a business growing as a result of superior and enterprising manage-
ment, but by deliberate, calculated purchase for control.' " 288 This
characterization of the Government's case has led some to believe that
the Court viewed predatory acquisition as the gravamen of the charge;
the mutually supporting policies after acquisition merely bore out its
original purpose?' This interpretation is supported by the decisions
after trial on remand. The district court found that the operating
companies had not been acquired with any deliberate or calculated
purpose to control their cab purchases and that no compulsion had been
exercised to control such purchases, and judgment for the defendants
was affirmed by the Supreme Court. 27° Thus, it has been argued that
264 Id. at 227.
265 Id,
266 The cab operating company did 86% of the business in the Chicago market,
100% in Pittsburgh, 58% in Minneapolis, and 15% in New York.
267 332 U.S. at 227.
268 Id. at 227-28.
269 Brewster, supra note 22, at 184.
276 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 80 F. Supp. 936 (ND. III. 1948), aff'd, 338
U.S. 338 (1949).
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the case is not an internal conspiracy case and that the Government
failed because of its inability to establish the predatory intent of the
original acquisitions. 2"
Both the Crescent Amusement and Yellow Cab cases were cited
and relied upon by the Supreme Court in Schine Chain Theatres, Inc.
v. United States,272 which held that a motion-picture-theater company
and five of its wholly owned subsidiaries had violated Sections 1 and
2 of the Sherman Act, notwithstanding the fact that they were affili-
ated.'" Later, financial bite was added by Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.
Joseph E Seagram & Sons, Inc.,274 in which a wholesale liquor dealer
in Indiana was permitted to recover treble damages from the nation's
largest distilling enterprise on a claim that its wholly owned sub-
sidiaries, House of Seagram, Inc. and Calvert Distillers Company, had
conspired to fix maximum resale prices for wholesalers in Indiana and
to sell only to concerns which agreed to these prices. Seagram and
Calvert were independently managed and were considered by the
court of appeals to be competitors, particularly because they pursued
independent policies except in this instance. In allowing recovery the
Supreme Court said:
Respondents next suggest that their status as "mere
instrumentalities of a single manufacturing-merchandizing
unit" makes it impossible for them to have conspired in a
manner forbidden by the Sherman Act. But this suggestion
runs counter to our past decisions that common ownership
and control does not liberate corporations from the impact
of the antitrust laws. [Citing Yellow Cab.] The rule is
especially applicable where, as here, respondents hold them-
selves out as competitors!'"
Kiefer-Stewart, like Yellow Cab on which it relied, involved con-
duct far beyond the normal centralized management of separate sub-
sidiaries.'" In the first place, it has been suggested that the restraint
271 Brewster, supra note 22, at 184.
272 334 U.S. 110 (1948).
273 The nature of the violation was that the theater chain, because of its unitary
bargaining power, had been enabled, in negotiating with distributors of motion pictures,
to obtain advantages over competing theaters in first-runs, clearance and minimum
admission charges.
274 340 U.S. 221 (1951), rev'g 182 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1950).
275 340 U.S. at 215. It is not entirely clear what the Court meant by its statement
that Seagram and Calvert held themselves out as competitors. Presumably, their dis-
tributors knew they were purchasing from a single corporate family. P. Areeda, supra
note 250, at 238 (1967). Nevertheless, "the notion of expanded antitrust liability where
affiliated companies adopt a competitive posture is consistent with an old line of cases
under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act . .." H. Blake & R. Pitofsky,
supra note 252, at 438.
276 Brewster, supra note 22, at 183. The argument presented in the text at this
point is based on Professor Brewster's analysis.
316
AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD
was in essence a partial "tying" of the two brands since one could
not be bought without acquiescing in the demands for the other.
Second, the record indicates that this "tie" was arrived at, not in the
normal course of management by the head of the corporate family,
but by the two subsidiaries acting on their own without direction from
their corporate parent. To this extent, the restraint was the result of
an exceptional special agreement entered into by independently man-
aged and apparently competing entities to act together in this particu-
lar instance. These factors have led some to the conclusion that Kiefer-
Stewart does not declare objectionable the normal centralized planning
of a multicorporate enterprise, but simply outlaws practices which
join the products of separate entities by tying, requirements or full-
line forcing arrangements.
It does not appear that this interpretation is sound. In the first
place, there was no tying agreement and the Court did not find one.'
Indeed, it does not appear that the Court was at all aware of any
"partial tying" problem. In the second place, the case was treated as
a price-fixing case in which the Court declared unlawful "an agree-
ment among competitors to fix maximum resale prices of their prod-
ucts" on the ground that "such agreements, no less than those to fix
minimum prices, cripple the freedom of traders and thereby restrain
their ability to sell in accordance with their own judgment."278 (Em-
phasis added.) Grammatically, it is clear from the use of the plural
pronoun that the arrangement was condemned not because it was the
unlawful act of a single trader, but because of the internal restraints
it placed upon the pricing initiative of the contracting parties. It might
be argued that the Court was here expressing, perhaps inarticulately,
its concern over the plight of the plaintiff wholesaler who was "col-
lectively" boycotted because it persisted in charging high prices
unsatisfactory to Seagram and Calvert. But this does not provide the
basis for the Court's opinion which expressly states: "Seagram and
Calvert acting individually perhaps might have refused to deal with
petitioner or with any or all of the Indiana wholesalers. But the
Sherman Act makes it an offense for respondents to agree among
themselves to stop selling to particular customers?"279 Quite clearly,
it was the internal restraint agreed to by Seagram and Calvert, rather
than the external restraint imposed upon the plaintiff, which condemned
277 Technically, it is not a tying arrangement since purchasers were not required
to buy one product in order to purchase another. A tying arrangement has been defined
by the Supreme Court as "an agreement by a party to sell one product but only on
the condition that the buyer also purchases a different (or tied) product, or at least
agrees that he will not purchase that product from any other supplier." Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. I, 5-6 (1958).
278 340 U.S. at 213.
279 Id. at 214.
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the conduct. Finally, there is another aspect of the case, one which
helps to explain the result and the Court's conclusion that Seagram
and Calvert should not be allowed to have it both ways: The Court
did intimate the view that if two or more commonly owned subsidiaries
hold themselves out as independent competitors they should not be
allowed to agree among themselves to control that competition.
Despite the limited factual application of the Yellow Cab and
Kief er-Stewart cases, they have given rise to a judicial slogan whose
implication has long since exceeded the bounds of the facts and the
theory of the initial cases. The Timken decision furnishes us with an
excellent example of this; it came shortly after Kief er-Stewart and re-
lied upon it for the proposition that common control of the conspirators
does not free them from the antitrust laws. Yet, as shown above, Tim-
ken did not present a real intraenterprise conspiracy problem, and the
Court's statements to that effect may be merely dicta. 2"
The several intraenterprise conspiracy cases are a source of great
confusion. Some observers find in the decisions one significant fact,
namely that the Court has always put the proposition in the nega-
tive: 2 ' The defendants cannot escape the consequences of a combina-
tion in restraint of trade by insisting that they are one person; 282
 the
fact that restraints occur in a vertically integrated enterprise does not
necessarily remove the bar of the Sherman Act; 283 any integration
flowing from an illegal conspiracy cannot insulate the conspirators
from the Act; 284 corporate interrelationships are not determinative of
the applicability of the Act; 285 concerted action was not immunized by
reason of the fact that members were closely affiliated rather than inde-
pendent; 2 " common ownership and control do not liberate corporations
from the impact of the Act.287
From this negative approach it is concluded that the converse
principle is not true. It does not follow, the argument runs, that agree-
ment among members of the same corporate family governing their
own prices and territories or otherwise limiting competition inter sere
necessarily violates the Act. The decisions, it is claimed, are all ex-
288 See notes 254-58 supra and accompanying text. Since Timken, the notion that
a parent can conspire with a subsidiary has been applied to defeat motions to dismiss
in Sanib Corp. v. United Fruit Co., 135 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Hershel Cal.
Fruit Prods. Co. v. Hunt Foods, Inc., 1955 Trade Cas. ff 68,046 (ND. Cal. 1955).
281 See Whipple, Problems of Combination—Integration, Intracorporate Conspiracy
and Joint Ventures, 1958 N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Antitrust Law Symposium 34, 45.
282 United States v. General Motors Corp., 121 F.2d 376, 404 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
283 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 277 (1947).
284 Id.
286 Id.
285 Schine Chain Theatres, Inc. v. United States, 334 U.S. 110, 116 (1948).
287 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951).
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plainable on other grounds, since each involves conduct far beyond
normal central management of subsidiaries or affiliates. Most can be
seen as instances of proved monopolistic intent under section 2, though
this did not form the basis of the Court's decisions. Further, all in-
volve combinations between members of the same corporate family
aimed at, or resulting in, unreasonable restraints on the trade of out-
siders.'" The clearest examples of such external restraints are said to
be found in the Yellow Cab, Kief er-Stewart, General Motors and
Crescent Amusement cases. Kiefer-Stewart, like Timken, also contains
elements of internal restraints. But this is construed to mean that
agreements regulating the conflicting interests of members of an enter-
prise entity may be condemned only where competition existed between
them prior to the agreement. The explanation for this conclusion is
found in language, used in both opinions, suggesting that the courts are
more disposed to upholding the notion of intraenterprise conspiracy
where the affiliates are largely independent or held out to be competi-
tors. Finally, it is argued, the courts insist upon finding an undue re-
straint on someone's competition—usually an external restraint on the
trade of outsiders and possibly an internal restraint on existing compe-
tition of the affiliates themselves. And this supposedly indicates that
while corporate affiliation is no shield against a Sherman Act charge,
it is also no sword for thrusting charges of antitrust violation on an
enterprise entity.
There are several difficulties with this analysis. First of all, the
Supreme Court did not base any of the decisions on a finding of attempt
to monopolize under section 2—a violation which can be perpetrated
by a single trader—but expressly found illegal conspiracies forbidden
by section 1. Also of doubtful validity is the suggestion that liability
can be avoided, regardless of the seriousness of the restraints effectu-
ated, simply by complete identification of the parent with its sub-
sidiaries. It is more the product of wishful thinking than judicial de-
cision, for no language used by the Supreme Court indicates that it has
ever, consciously or unconsciously, viewed the intraenterprise con-
288 The view adopted by the majority of the Attorney General's Committee is that
the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine should be limited to concerted action between
members of a corporate family, the purpose and effect of which is a coercive restraint
on the trade of strangers to the corporate family:
It seems indeed inconceivable to hold per se illegal the mere fixing by a
parent of a subsidiary's price or production, or the selection by the parent of
those persons with whom its subsidiary may or may not deal. Most members
of this Committee disapprove any application of this doctrine to joint action
between members of a corporate family not intended to or resulting in coercive
undue restraint on their customers or competitors. However, they believe, for
example, that when a parent and its subsidiary, though short of an attempt to
monopolize, nonetheless plan to drive out a competitor, Section 1 may be
transgressed.
Att'y Gen. Rep. 35.
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spiracy doctrine as applicable only to the loosely knit, mutiple-entity
enterprise. Finally, the attempted distinction between internal and
external restraints on competition does not distinguish the lawful from
the unlawful. Consider for example the horizontal situation of two
commonly owned corporations agreeing on price or marketing policies,
or even the vertical situation of a parent establishing its subsidiary's
policy in these respects. In each case there are external restraints on
the trade of buyers who must purchase at the dictated price and be
subject to the jointly agreed-upon marketing plans. But, in the hori-
zontal case, there exists an added restraint on the internal commerce
of the parties, since they are no longer free to compete against each
other in price. Does this mean that one agreement is lawful and the
other not? There is no reason why it should.
Determination of the scope of the intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine is, however, not greatly aided by finding fallacy in the previous
arguments. Judicial opinions have neither recognized limitations on
the doctrine, nor have they attempted to define its scope. Attempts to
inferentially limit the doctrine to particular types of conduct have no
judicial support or recognition and clash with the broad, sweeping state-
ments used by the courts in promulgating and applying the rule. Per-
haps the best counseling approach is to be guided by the Government's
enforcement policy and avoid practices which can be considered as
predatory or directly aimed at achieving dominance or eliminating
competitors. In the years since the doctrine was first announced, it has
'rarely been used by enforcement agencies and even when it has, lower
courts have generally adopted positions contrary to a broad interpreta-
tion of the doctrine.'" The reason for this judicial hesitancy to apply
the rule unyieldingly is obvious. "Thousands of companies in the
United States conduct their business through incorporated subsidiaries
and, under a broad interpretation of the intraenterprise conspiracy
doctrine, they would be in constant violation of the antitrust laws."'"
In assessing the impact of the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine
upon normal centralized planning activities of multicorporate entities
within a single business enterprise it is necessary to draw distinctions
based upon the percentage of stock ownership held. Quite obviously,
there is complete identity of interest between a parent and its wholly
owned subsidiaries just as there is between a corporation and its
branches, divisions or departments. From a business viewpoint, the
parent-subsidiary and corporate-division relationships are the same.
They are simply separate types of organizational structures used within
a single business enterprise, and, although they differ in form, they are
identical in substance. Since corporate subsidiaries usually are
289 H. Blake & R. Pitofsky, supra note 252, at 436.
290 Id .
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established for reasons completely divorced from market considera-
tions, no persuasive reason exists for treating them differently. The
Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws
has concluded that it is not unlawful for a parent corporation to
centrally determine and promulgate policies for its subsidiaries which
include price fixing and market division.2" It emphasized the bases
for its position in rather strong language:
The use of subsidiaries is generally induced by normal,
prudent business considerations. No social objective would
be attained were subsidiaries enjoined from agreeing not to
compete with each other or with their parent. To demand
internal competition within and between the members of a
single business unit is to invite chaos without promotion of
the public welfare.292
Similar conclusions have been derived by others. The American Bar
Association's Subcommittee on Subsidiaries in Foreign Trade has even
gone so far as to say: "With regard to foreign subsidiaries wholly
owned by a TJ. S. company, it is usually taken for granted that no anti-
trust violation arises merely from the creation of a new subsidiary
or from the normal operation of the parent and the subsidiary as a
single concern."293 And this, it indicates, is also true where several
corporations are present within the same enterprise entity. The position
forcefully adopted in these reports seems undeniably sound, for "anti-
trust policy should not convert normal business operations within a
multi-corporate enterprise, such as coordinating of pricing and other
sales policies, into a series of antitrust violations."'
The rationale which permits centralized planning where one corpo-
ration owns all of the stock of another may also permit it where there
is less than complete ownership, for a parent-subsidiary relationship
may still exist. But "[s]eparate incorporation is more than a formality
when the membership differs."°5 As the percentage of ownership de-
creases, the control of the parent is diluted and the identity of inte'rest
between the two corporations gradually disappears. If a majority of
the voting capital stock is owned by one party with one interest and
the remainder is held merely for investment purposes by noncompeti-
tors, the situation is clearly equivalent to a parent-subsidiary relation
and the two will be viewed as a single unit.' But when the minority
291 Att'y Gen. Rep. 30-36.
292 Id. at 34.
293 COMM. on Antitrust Problems in Intl Trade, Report of the Subcomm on Sub-
sidiaries in Foreign Trade, 7 A.B.A. Sec. of Antitrust Law 242, 243 (1955).
294 H. Blake & R. Pitofsky, supra note 252, at 437.
292 P. Areeda, supra note 250, at 239.
Awy Gen. Rep. 35. Cf. P. Areeda, supra note 250, at 239.
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interest is held by persons who are or could be competitors of the
majority, it becomes even less possible to find the necessary community
of interest between the majority shareholder and its "subsidiary" which
permits a court to treat the two as an enterprise entity. Nevertheless,
the majority shareholder's commanding position will enable it to direct
the subsidiary's affairs through normal voting channels without the
necessity for formal agreement. This latter technique will also permit
centralized planning without "combination" in the case where one
corporation owns a minority but controlling stock interest in another
and the remaining stock is widely diffused among the public. In these
latter two instances, there is no enterprise entity since a community
of interest between the "parent" and its "subsidiary" is lacking. Con-
sequently, the two corporations will be considered as distinct entities
for purposes of evaluating the legality of any joint action they take.
Any agreements which restrain their competitive posture towards one
another will be illegal. Obviously, the two firms are well advised to
treat each other as strangers.
In light of Kief er-Stewart and Timken, one caveat appears neces-
sary. A problem may be presented where we have joint action by two
or more commonly owned subsidiaries acting on their own without
direction from their corporate parent. Here there is no normal central-
ized planning for a multicorporate enterprise exercised through owner-
ship channels. Nevertheless, when there is an enterprise entity, the
same result should obtain even though the person charged with plan-
ning enterprise policy is not acting. From a practical viewpoint, how-
ever, it is wise to avoid contracts of this type and the problem is one
easily avoided by proper parental supervision.
d. Ancillary Restraints and Postestablishment Conspiracy Prob-
lems of the Joint Venture. Often in the formation of joint ventures the
collaborators will take steps to protect themselves against competition
from their jointly owned enterprise. They may impose restraints upon it
at the time of its formation or at some later time. Present authority
indicates that the antitrust implications of such restrictive agreements
may vary, depending upon how and when they are made and used.
' Restrictions placed upon a lawful joint venture by agreements
made at the time of its inception will probably be upheld under the
ancillary doctrine adopted from the common law by Judge Taft in
United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.' Under that doctrine,
297 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). The ancillary doctrine
was later adopted and applied by the Supreme Court in Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Bay,
200 U.S. 179 (1906). With regard to this doctrine, Professor Brewster has said:
The doctrine is a loose one, but there are some persistent limitations which
should be noted. First the restraint must be reasonably related to the interest
sought to be protected. Thus, the purchaser of a business may be restrained
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reasonable restraints which are deemed necessary in order to induce the
sale or purchase of a business or a trade secret, are upheld on the
ground that there is no net restriction on commerce because without it
the grantee would not have been put in business.'"
In Addyston Pipe, Judge Taft laid down the rule that no restraint
of trade could be permitted unless "ancillary to the main purpose of a
lawful contract, and necessary to protect the covenantee in the en-
joyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect him from
the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by the other party."Zoe
"This very statement of the rule," Judge Taft went on, "implies that
the contract must be one in which there is a main purpose, to which
the covenant in restraint of trade is merely ancillary."'" Continuing,
he said:
The covenant is inserted only to protect one of the parties
from the injury which, in the execution of the contract or en-
joyment of its fruits, he may suffer from the unrestrained
competition of the other. The main purpose of the contract
suggests the measure of protection needed, and furnishes a
sufficiently uniform standard by which the validity of such
restraints may be judicially determined. In such a case, if the
restraint exceeds the necessity presented by the main pur-
pose of the contract, it is void for two reasons: First, because
it oppresses the covenantor, without any corresponding bene-
fit to the covenantee; and, second, because it tends to a
monopoly. But where the sole object of both parties in making
the contract as expressed therein is merely to restrain com-
petition, and enhance or maintain prices, it would seem that
there was nothing to justify or excuse the restraint, that it
would necessarily have a tendency to monopoly, and there-
fore would be void."'
only in the use of the business he buys. The sale does not justify restricting
the purchaser in the use of properties he already owned or may acquire else-
where. So too, the seller of a business cannot be made to restrict himself
outside the area which has been served by the business he is parting with.
Second, the restraint, it used to be said must be partial. Therefore, covenants
even reasonably related to the interest transferred may be stricken down if they
result in the elimination of all competition in a significant market. Moreover,
the ancillary restraint will be illegal if its duration is considered excessive.
Finally, if it can be proved that the primary purpose of the whole arrangement
was the elimination of competition, it will he stricken down even if it is
attached to some underlying transaction. (Footnotes omitted.)
Brewste'r, supra note 22, at 86.
298 Brewster, supra note 22, at 219.
299 85 F. at 282.
800 Id.
801 Id. at 282-83.
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With reference to the last point, Judge Taft later said •
In them the actual intent to monopolize must appear. It
is not deemed enough that the mere tendency of the provi-
sions of the contract should be to restrain competition. In
such cases the restraint of competition ceases to be ancillary,
and becomes the main purpose of the contract, and the trans-
fer of property and good will, or the partnership agreement,
is merely ancillary and subordinate to that purpose,"
Though the potential importance of the ancillary doctrine to inter-
national trade is enormous, it has received little use by the judiciary
in handling foreign commerce antitrust cases. This is not because the
doctrine has been held inapplicable as a matter of law, but because
"the restraints were found to go far beyond the reasonable protection
of the interest transferred or retained, and because it was found, to use
Taft's words, that 'the restraint . . . ceases to be ancillary, and be-
comes the main purpose of the contract . . . "3" Timken furnishes
an excellent example. There, it will be recalled, the Supreme Court
rejected the defendant's ancillary-restraint argument because of the
district court's finding that the dominant purpose of the agreement
was to avoid all competition 3 04
 Later the Court said,
Nor do we find any support in reason or authority for the
proposition that agreements between legally separate persons
and companies to suppress competition among themselves and
others can be justified by labeling the project a "joint ven-
ture." Perhaps every agreement and combination to restrain
trade could be so labeled 305
Since the joint venture was ancillary to the underlying unlawful con-
spiracy, rather than the restraints being ancillary to the joint venture,
the doctrine was irrelevant. A careful reading of Timken also reveals
that the agreements unreasonably extended beyond the venture and
were intended to restrain the trade of outsiders. As a result, even the
requirement that the restraints must be "reasonably related to the
interest sought to be protected" 306 was not satisfied.
The doctrine has been used, however, by two lower courts as the
explicit basis for upholding restraints ancillary to international
licensing contracts."' More recently, the doctrine was used in Pan
302 Id. at 291.
303 Brewster, supra note 22, at 87.
304 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S 593, 597-99 (1951).
805 Id. at 598.
806 Brewster, supra note 22, at 86.
857 Thorns v. Sutherland, 52 F.2d 592 (3d Cir. 1931); Foundry Servs., Inc. v.
Beneflux Corp., 110 F. Supp. 857 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 206 F.2d 214
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American to uphold territorial restrictions placed upon a joint venture."'
The district court sustained a contract entered into by Pan American
and Grace in connection with the formation of Panagra. Under this
contract, it was apparently agreed that Panagra would not operate
on the east coast of South America and Pan American would not oper-
ate on the west coast. The Government attacked this agreement as an
illegal division of markets. Judge Murphy held that the agreement was
neither per se unreasonable nor unreasonable under the circumstances
because it was "perfectly consistent with the air transportation policy
of this country in those formative years."" He went on to say:
Pan American's restraints against Panagra and its continued
determination to suppress the extension of that airline to the
United States, in itself, and in combination with other conduct
on the part of Pan American constitutes a monopolization
of commerce that contravenes the provisions of the Sherman
Act, and would seem to require divestiture by that defendant
310. . .
Apparently, Judge Murphy was suggesting that restrictions placed
upon a joint venture may be lawful at the time of formation but be-
come unlawful when changed circumstances make it competitively
desirable to release the joint venture from those restrictions and permit
it to engage in competition with one or more of its parents. At first
blush, this seems unfair. However, it is to be remembered that, under
the common law ancillary doctrine, a lawful restraint had to be
"partial," and ancillary restraints were forbidden if their duration
was excessive.311 While Judge Murphy's decision might seem unreason-
ably harsh, unfair or even contradictory, it is not wholly unfounded.
Unless a court is willing to break away from its common law shackles,
such a result is to be expected. As the court noted, the case was a
"continuation of a bitter family quarrel rampant since 1941 arising
out of the unhappy and quondam unholy union of Pan American and
Grace, each of whom owns 50% of the stock of Panagra, that the
Civil Aeronautics Board (C.A.B.) could not resolve."' Moreover,
"[t] he C.A.B. in 1945 and again in 1953 requested the Attorney
General to initiate this suit." While these factors did not appear to
(2d Cir. 1953). One commentator thinks it doubtful that the Thorns case would be
precedent today in light of the National Lead and Timken cases. See Fugate, supra
note 22, at 139. But cf. Brewster, supra note 22, at 87.
308 United States v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 18 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), rev'd on grounds not here relevant, 371 US. 296 (1963).
320 193 F. Supp. at 34.
310 Id. at 22-23.
311 Brewster, supra note 22, at 86.
312 193 F. Supp. at 20.
313 Id. at 20 n.2.
325
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
influence the decision, they certainly were not the type of considerations
which would entice a court to break with precedent.
Further support for Judge Murphy's position can be found in the
approach of the Supreme Court in Columbia Steel, where, after finding
the merger lawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the Court
stated that "even though the restraint effected may be reasonable
under § 1, it may constitute an attempt to monopolize forbidden by
§ 2 if a specific intent to monopolize may be shown."R 14 There was
some evidence in Pan American which might indicate the presence of
an unlawful intent to monopolize. In the first place, the record re-
vealed several instances in which Pan American blocked expansion
of Panagra's South American lines which would have brought it into
competition with Pan American's subsidiaries."' Second, it may be
that Pan American was not simply enforcing the lawful territorial
agreement by which Panagra agreed not to operate on the east coast
of South America, but was attempting to extend its territorial protec-
tion and prevent extension of Panagra's lines to the United States."'
In this respect, it is important to note the precise language used by
Judge Murphy:
In our opinion, Pan American's successful blocking of
Panagra's extension to its own terminal in the United States
constitutes an unlawful exercise of the power it had to exclude
Panagra as a competitor in the United States-South American
market, and to thereby maintain its virtual monopoly position
over that market at least until the entry thereinto by Braniff
314 United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 531-32 (1948).
816 193 F. Supp. at 34-36. Pan American's actions in this regard may have been
perfectly consistent with its territorial agreement but some of the markets protected
did lie close to the west coast of South America.
826 There is some confusion as to the precise scope of the agreement. At one point,
the court said:
It is the government's claim that Pan American and Grace entered into an
agreement prior to the formation of Panagra whereunder the proposed jointly
owned company was to have the exclusive right to traffic along the west coast
of South America from the Canal Zone south free from Pan American competi-
tion, and Pan American was to be free from competition from the proposed
jointly owned company elsewhere throughout South America and between the
Canal Zone and the United States.
193 F. Supp. at 22. Later, however, the court stated: "We find that the agreement
between the defendants as to spheres of operations and its evolution was substantially
in the manner described by Grace." Id. at 35. According to the court, Grace had
contended that the agreement
was, in general terms, to the effect that Panagra was to operate on the west
coast and in all the countries of the west coast through which its international
mail line ran, as well as over the Andes to Buenos Aires and Montevideo, and
that there was no intention one way or the other contemplated mutually by
them with respect to possible extension of Panagra's line to the United States.
Id. at 34-35.
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in 1948. Thereafter and to date, it remains the dominant
carrier in that market and maintains its power to participate
in substantially all United States origin or destination traffic
carried by Panagra through its continued suppression of a
Panagra-United States extension.' 7
Assuming that Pan American had originally acquired its monopoly
position legally, Judge Murphy nevertheless concluded that, since
Panagra could not be legally identified with Pan American, its subse-
quent maintainance of that monopoly through its voice in Panagra
was illegal under section 2.
Pan American's justification for its blocking actions is
bottomed upon a fallacious predicate; Panagra is not part of
the Pan American system to the extent that it is reduced to
that status through the subjugating exercise of Pan Ameri-
can's negative control over its destiny. Panagra is not a sub-
sidiary of Pan American; its co-equal stockholder, Grace,
never so intended it to be (and never intended to be a mere
investor in Panagra), nor has Panagra's abstention from inde-
pendent entry into the United Stateg-South American market
been the result of concerted action between it and Pan Ameri-
can. If Pan American were the majority shareholder in
Panagra or if Panagra were a wholly owned subsidiary of Pan
American it might make a decisive difference in this case.3 's
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in United States v.
Sealy, Inc."' is another instance in which postestablishment use of a
lawfully formed joint enterprise has been declared illegal under the.
Sherman Act. The opinion suggests that joint venturers will encounter
strong objection where the jointly owned company seeks to regulate
the activities of its parents. In the early 1920's, a large group of
manufacturers jointly formed Sealy, Inc. to engage in the business of
licensing manufacturers to make and sell bedding products under the
Sealy name and trademarks. Its original formation was admittedly for
"genuine and lawful purposes" and the Government did not contend
that Sealy was a "facade" for a conspiracy to suppress competition. 32°
Conceding this, the Government nevertheless charged Sealy with
allocating exclusive territories and imposing territorial restrictions
upon its dealers as well as fixing resale prices in violation of Section 1
of the Sherman Act. At the time of trial, there were almost thirty
Sealy "licensees," and they owned substantially all of its stock. Pur-
317 Id. at 39.
318 Id. at 39-40.
319 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
320 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
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suant to by-law requirements, Sealy's board of directors and executive
committee were composed exclusively of licensee-stockholders or their
nominees. Through these groups, the licensee-stockholders exercised
control over the day-to-day business of Sealy, including the grant,
assignment, reassignment, and termination of exclusive territorial
licenses.
In assessing the validity of the licensing program, the Court indi-
cated, "it is first necessary to determine whether the territorial arrange-
ments here are to be treated as the creature of the licensor, Sealy, or
as the product of a horizontal arrangement among the licensees."m
Seeking "the central substance of the situation, not its periphery ... ,"
the Court felt "moved by the identity of the persons who act, rather
than the label of their hats.' The Court then concluded:
The arrangements for exclusive territories are necessarily
chargeable to the licensees of appellee whose interests such
arrangements were supposed to promote and who, through
select members, guaranteed or withheld, and had the power
to terminate, licenses for inadequate performance. . . It
would violate reality to treat them as equivalent to terri-
torial limitations imposed by a manufacturer upon indepen-
dent dealers as incident to the sale of a trademarked product.
Sealy, Inc., is an instrumentality of the licensees for purposes
of the horizontal territorial allocation. It is not the princi-
pal.323
The Court also stressed the fact that it was faced with an aggregation
of trade restraints since Sealy's trademark licenses specified minimum
retail prices as an integral part of the licensing program. This, the
Court said, "underlines the horizontal nature of the enterprise and
the use of Sealy, not as a corporate entity but as an instrumentality
of the individual manufacturers." 324
 Beyond this, it also negated the
claim that the territorial restraints were mere incidents of a lawful
program of trademark licensing."' Since the arrangements for terd-
321 Id. at 352.
322 Id. at 353.
323 Id. at 353-54.
354 Id. at 355-56. Quaere how price fixing can carry any implications as to whether
a particular relationship is horizontal.
325 Id. at 356. The Court cited Timken as another case where the argument that
territorial restrictions were reasonable steps incident to a valid trademark licensing
system was "summarily rejected." The Court approached the Sealy licensing program
the same way, despite obvious differences between the two cases. In Timken, the
restraints covered nonbranded merchandise as well as the Timken line. In Sealy, how-
ever, the restraints covered only Sealy products; as to their private-label products,
the licensees were free to sell outside of the given territory at prices determined by
them alone. Relying on the Timken statement that "[al trademark cannot be legally
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tonal limitation were part of an aggregation of trade restraints, in-
cluding unlawful price fixing and policing, they were held per se un-
lawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Comparison of the decisions in Pan American and Sealy raises
some interesting implications. Pan American suggests that once a joint
enterprise is incorporated and comes into existence, it acquires an
independent legal personality separate and distinct from that of its
parents. And, since the separate and individual partners are each
actively engaged in the direction and management of the joint ven-
ture, it does not possess a community of interest with any one of them
even where one parent owns a majority of its stock.'" Because of the
absence of this identity of interest between the joint enterprise and its
parents, the enterprise-entity rationale which would justify agreements
between parent and subsidiary corporations designed to maintain non-
competitive peace within the multicorporate family is inapplicable. Nor
does it appear that the ancillary doctrine can be utilized to justify
postestablishment restrictive agreements of this type between the joint
venture and its parents since their chronological position shows they
are not truly "ancillary" to the formation of the collaborative enter-
prise."'
Unless such restrictive provisions were part of the accomplish-
ment of some lawful purpose, such as the licensing of a valid patent,
trademark or secret process, or a contract providing for the transfer
of capital or technology, the ancillary doctrine cannot be used to
justify them.'" Even here, however, the doctrine may prove futile.
It must be remembered that in its broadest application, it protects only
reasonable restraints ancillary to a primary lawful purpose. While the
concept of reasonableness is broad and in some instances even un-
manageable, it has been said that "covenants even reasonably related
to the interest transferred may be stricken down if they result in the
elimination of all competition in a significant market."32° Consequently,
the defense may be unavailing to collaborators who are dominant
factors in either the domestic or foreign market even though their
combination might survive the initial test requiring justification for
their combination.'"
In the last analysis, enterprise planning of the activities of joint
companies can be achieved only through the assertion of control
used as a device for Sherman Act violation," the Court found the trademark to be no
defense to what would otherwise be a violation of the Sherman Act.
328 See notes 146-47 & 294-95 supra and accompanying text.
327 Devine, Foreign Establishment and the Antitrust Law: A Study of the Anti-
trust Consequences of the Principle [sic] Forms of Investment by American Corporations
in Foreign Markets, 57 Nw. U.L. Rev. 400, 447 (1962).
328 Id.
329 Brewster, supra note 22, at 86.
330 See id. at 222.
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through normal channels. Incomplete and insecure as they may be,
these control channels offer the only possible avenue for achieving
postestablishment noncompetitive peace between a joint venture and
its parents. Sometimes even this avenue may be frustrated. Sealy warns
that the separate existence of an incorporated joint venture will be
disregarded where the court is convinced that it was formed or is being
used as a horizontal combination to restrain the competition of its
parents in violation of the Sherman Act. If the Sealy facts are demon-
strative of the type of situation which will produce this judicial reac-
tion, the problem will probably be confined to those relatively few
instances where the creature expressly seeks to regulate the competitive
activities of its parents.
2. Antitrust Responsibility for the Acts of Affiliates.—In the preceed-
ing section the discussion was directed at antitrust questions arising
from the internal relationship between the American corporation and
its foreign establishment. There, concern was focused on the extent
to which the American entrepreneur can direct the affairs of its over-
seas operation without engaging in a "contract, combination, . . . or
conspiracy" within the meaning of the Sherman Act. Here, the con-
cern is with the other side of the question, and the purpose is to deter-
mine the extent to which the American investor will be liable for anti-
trust violations of its overseas establishment. Since the United States
parent is often the only concern personally amenable to the process
of United States courts, this problem greatly affects the question of
what form of business organization is most feasible for overseas ex-
pansion.
Conducting business abroad through the unincorporated form of
organizational structure—branch, division or department—makes the
United States firm responsible for all of its foreign operations. Since
the foreign establishment is merely an extension of the firm, acts of its
overseas personnel are readily attributed to the firm. Thus any course
of conduct engaged in by the branch, division or department aimed
at, or resulting in, unreasonable restraint of trade or monopoly or
amounting to an unfair method of competition or deceptive trade prac-
tice renders the corporation an antitrust violator.
When, however, the United States businessman establishes a
separate corporate entity abroad—be it a wholly or partially owned
subsidiary or even a joint venture—the vicarious responsibility of the
American parent for the acts of the foreigner is less obvious. Because
there are now two legally separate persons involved the question be-
comes one of "piercing the corporate veil" and it is to this question we
turn.
It is a basic premise of corporate law that companies separately
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incorporated are separate entities distinct not only from their incorpo-
rators and stockholders but also from other corporations as well. And
this rule obtains even though the corporation is owned by a single
investor or interest, for control is inherent in the nature of a corpora-
tion. To hold those controlling responsible for the acts of the corpo-
ration would frustrate the legislative purpose of creating an instrument
of limited liability. Thus the courts have repeatedly held that the
fact that one corporation owns all of the stock of another and that
the two have the same directors and officers is alone insufficient to
warrant piercing the veil of corporate existence.' Yet, it is also true
that the courts have looked through the corporate form to the actuali-
ties of the situation and sometimes disregarded the corporate fiction."'
As a general rule, the independence of a parent from its sub-
sidiaries is presumed. For no matter how great a fiction the corporate
entity concept may be, or how transparent it may appear, it is a fiction
created by sovereign act of the state and as such will be recognized
in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary. The courts, as
interpreters of legislative policy, thus find themselves faced with a most
difficult problem of maintaining the sanctity and usefulness of the
corporation, while at the same time guarding against its becoming a
convenient device for cloaking violations of the law. The result has
been the formulation of many meaningless principles which fail to aid
analysis because they are nothing more than the statement of results.
Thus, it is often stated that where the corporation has been used as a
device "to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or
defend crime,"333 the theoretical distinctions between the corporation
and its shareholders will be disregarded. Another frequently repeated
judicial statement is that "[t] he legal fiction of distinct corporate
existence will be disregarded, when necessary to circumvent fraud," 334
and "may also be disregarded in a case where a corporation is so organ-
ized and controlled, and its affairs are so conducted, as to make it
merely an instrumentality or adjunct of another corporation."a"s
Under the traditional rules for piercing the corporate veil, the test
is the form rather than the substance of control.'" These rules have
831 H. Ballantine, Corporations §§ 118-21, 135 (rev. ed. 1946); 1 W. Fletcher,
Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations §§ 41-47 (rev. ed. 1963); H. Henn,
Corporations §§ 77-78, 136, 143-45 (1961); N. Lattin, Corporations 60-61, 90-96 (1959).
332 See H. Ballantine, supra note 331, §§ 122, 130, 132, 136-39, 142; 1 W. Fletcher,
supra note 331, §§ 41-47; H. Henn, supra note 331, §§ 143, 151-52; N. Lattin, supra
note 331, at 66-78.
333 United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co., 142 F. 247, 255 (ED.
Wis. 1905).
334 In re Watertown Paper Co., 169 F. 252, 256 (2d Cir. 1909).
335 Id.
336 In Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Champlain Transp. Co., 31 Fad 265 (2d
Cir. 1929), Judge Hand explained:
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made it necessary for the courts to conduct a detailed examination of
the parent-subsidiary relationship to determine whether the parent
has in fact disregarded the separate and distinct existence of the sub-
sidiary. In doing so, they have looked to see whether the subsidiary
is held out to the public as a distinct enterprise with its own business,
has functioned as a separate corporation making commercial decisions
through the formal office of its own directors and officers, is adequately
financed as a separate unit, and maintains its own accounts, records
and the other paraphernalia of an independent company. When the court
has determined that these formalities have not been followed, it has
disregarded the fictitious personality of the subsidiary saying it was
nothing but the "alter ego," "instrumentality," "corporate dummy"
or "agent" of the parent. These theoretical rationalizations developed
by the courts are conducive neither to clarity of thought nor to pre-
dictability of results.' In this respect, the criticism and warning
uttered forty years ago by Mr. Justice Cardozo remains true today:
"The whole problem of the relation between parent and subsidiary
corporations is one that is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor.
Metaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices
to liberate thought, they end often by enslaving it."' There is little
doubt that this has in fact occurred. 33°
Control through the ownership of shares does not fuse the corporations,
even when the directors are common to each. One corporation may, however,
become an actor in a given transaction, or in part of a business, or in a whole
business, and, when it has, will be legally responsible. To become so it must
take immediate direction of the transaction through its officers, by whom alone
it can act at all. At times this is put as though the subsidiary then became an
agent of the parent. That may no doubt be true, but only in quite other
situations; that is, when both intend that relation to arise, for agency is
consensual. This seldom is true, and liability normally must depend on the
parent's direct intervention in the transactions, ignoring the subsidiary's
paraphernalia of incorporation, directors and officers. The test is therefore
rather in the form than in the substance of the control; in whether it is
exercised immediately, or by means of a board of directors and officers, left to
their own initiative and responsibility in respect of each transaction as it arises.
Some such line must obviously be drawn, if shareholding alone does not fuse
the corporations in every case. (Citations omitted.)
Id. at 267.
337 "Unfortunately, it has not been found possible to lay down any definite test
or formula as to when the usual immunity of the controlling shareholder will be lost,
but the courts have employed various illusory terms and theories to express the results
at which they arrive." H. Ballantine, supra note 331, § 136 at 311. See also Douglas &
Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 Yale L.J. 193
(1929).
338 Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., 244 N.Y. 84, 94, 155 N.E.2d 58, 61 (1926).
339 E.g., Mull v. Colt Co., 31 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Walkovszky v. Carlton,
24 App. Div. 2d 582, 262 N.Y.S.2d 334 (1965) ; Majestic Factors Corp. v. Latino, 15
Misc. 2d 329, 184 N.Y.S.2d 658 (Sup. Ct. 1959) ; Mangan v. Terminal Transp. Sys.,
Inc., 157 Misc. 627, 284 N.Y.S. 183 (Sup. Ct. 1935), aff'd, 247 App. Div. 853, 286
N.Y.S. 666 (1936).
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Since our major concern here is primarily with the operation of
foreign business enterprises, the ensuing discussion is limited to an
analysis of the recent foreign trade precedents bearing upon the sub-
ject. The cases are few in number and their rationes decidendi have not
always been clearly articulated. It is, accordingly, difficult to extract
clear, meaningful principles from them. Nevertheless, one thought is
clear. The traditional approach has not enslaved the courts in enforcing
the antitrust laws.
Among the fifty-one defendants in United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America,'" were the Aluminum Co. of America [Alcoa] and Alumi-
nium Limited, a Canadian corporation. Limited, it is recalled, was
formed by Alcoa to take over its foreign operations, and its stock was
distributed to Alcoa's shareholders. As a result, a parent-subsidiary
relation was not established, but the two companies were owned and
controlled by the same group. At the time of the suit, a majority of
the stock in the two companies was still commonly owned, but the
district court found that they had operated independently for some
time. Nevertheless, the Government sought to charge Alcoa with an
illegal restraint of trade because of Limited's membership in an inter-
national cartel designed, inter alio, to restrict United States imports
and thereby protect Alcoa's domestic monopoly. Judge Hand noted
the increasing disposition of the courts to disregard the fictitious nature
of a corporation when it was possible to "substitute the concept of a
group of persons acting in concert." In view of the district court's find-
ing, which was not clearly erroneous, the alleged identity of the two
corporations had to be based solely on common majority stock owner-
ship. This was too extreme a position for Judge Hand to accept for it
endangered the rights of minority shareholders:
Nevertheless, the group must not be committed legally ex-
cept in so far as they have assented as a body, and that assent
should be imputed to them only in harmony with the ordinary
notions of delegated power. The plaintiff did not prove that
. . . there was not a substantial minority in each company
made up of those who held no shares in the other; and the
existence of the same majority in the two corporations was
not enough by itself to identify the two. "Alcoa" would not
be bound, unless those who held the majority of its shares
had been authorized by the group as a whole to enter into the
"Alliance"; and considering the fact that, as we shall show,
it was an illegal agreement, such an authority ought con-
vincingly to appear. It does not appear at all."'
340 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
341 Id. at 441-42.
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It is important to note the precise facts of the Alcoa decision.
Limited had joined the cartel; Alcoa had not. And although the
cartel's quota restrictions on imports were helpful to Alcoa, there was
nothing to connect the two companies except common ownership. Be-
cause of the district court's finding that Limited had acted altogether
free from any connection with Alcoa, their separate corporate existence
had to be accepted. Alcoa decided only that two operationally unrelated
companies will not be treated as a single unit merely because of com-
mon majority stock ownership. As such, the decision falls well within
traditional principles and neither aids nor hinders antitrust enforce-
ment against multicorporate business enterprises.
If Alcoa states that something more than common ownership is
required to associate one corporation with the conspiratorial action of
another, United States v. National Lead Co., 342 shows that the courts
are sometimes willing to find the necessary connection in the parent-
subsidiary context. There the court held that three American corpora-
tions, National Lead Company, its wholly owned subsidiary, Titan
Company, Inc., and E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, Inc., had
conspired among themselves and with several foreign companies to
divide the world into exclusive territories with respect to trade in
titanium compounds. The commercial development of titanium com-
pounds began around the time of World War I as a result of the inde-
pendent work of three separate groups of chemists in the United
States, Norway and France. The American group acquired patents and
assigned them to the Titanium Pigment Company, Inc. (TP), a
domestic company formed for this purpose. The Norwegian patents
were assigned to Titan Co. A/S (TAS). In 1920 TP and TAS entered
into a cartel agreement described by the court as "the basic charter for
the worldwide regulation of production and commerce in titanium com-
pounds."'" This agreement set the stage for more than 60 other
agreements in the following 24 years which fundamentally altered the
free world market. It was made at a time when National Lead owned
no TAS stock and only 10 percent of TP's stock but had option rights
to increase its TP holdings to 50 percent. These two companies subse-
quently became subsidiaries of National Lead.'"
National Lead and du Pont were connected to the cartel largely
342 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), aff'd, 332 U.S. 319 (1947).
343 Id. at 517.
344 In 1927 National Lead acquired 87% of TAS's stock with the original Norwe-
gian interests retaining the remaining 13%. Later, in 1929, National Lead organized
Titan Company, Inc. which the court characterized as its "corporate pocket for the
deposit of its holdings in foreign titanium enterprises." 63 F. Supp. at 519. Titan at the
time of its formation acquired the rights and assumed the liabilities of TAS under the
1929 cartel agreement. By 1932 National Lead had acquired all of the stock of TP and
in 1936 it acquired all of its assets and assumed all of its liabilities. Id.
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through the participation of their subsidiaries. Yet the opinion is devoid
of the detailed examination of the parent-subsidiary relationship which
typically precedes an application of the "instrumentality," "agency,"
"corporate dummy" or "alter ego" rules. The reason for this is clear
with respect to National Lead. Upon acquiring its 10 percent stock
interest in TP, the court found it "thereupon negotiated [the cartel]
... agreement with TAS'"" and by another agreement simultaneously
executed by the three corporations bound itself to respect their basic
agreement."' The opinion thus suggests that National Lead was the
motivating force behind TP and that TP did not play an independent
role, yet there is no recitation of facts to show that TP did not func-
tion as a separate corporate entity. 347
The manner of tying du Pont to the conspirators is less clear. The
court identified it with Krebs Pigment & Color Corporation, which was
organized by du Pont and another United States company in 1931 with
70 percent of its stock held by du Pont. Krebs manufactured and sold
titanium compounds until 1935, when du Pont acquired all of its
assets. Thereafter du Pont engaged directly in the manufacture and
sale of titanium compounds. In 1933, before its absorption into du
Pont, Krebs and TP entered into contractual arrangements "cast"
in "the form of a settlement of patent disputes" by which they ex-
changed irrevocable, nonexclusive licenses of all patents then or there-
after owned by them or otherwise at their disposal.'"
Judge Rif kind had considerable difficulty in connecting du Pont
with the cartel because the factual evidence of its participation was
by no means as clear as that establishing National Lead's complicity.
Du Pont had not subscribed to the 1920 cartel and the 1933 agreement
between Krebs and TP "deviated sharply from the form and from the
principles" of the earlier arrangements.'" Moreover, du Pont had
withdrawn from any exchange of information with National Lead and
competed with it for the United States market. Finally, the du Pont
organization was never regarded by the cartel group as a "full fledged
345 Id.
346 Id. at 518.
347 On appeal, National Lead did not challenge the district court's finding that it
participated in the cartel, but simply contended that the decree "went too far in
forbidding normal and usual contractual arrangements." The Supreme Court disagreed.
National Lead Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. at 325-26.
848 63 F. Supp. at 520, 528.
849 The precise language of the opinion is that du Pont "did not subscribe to the
1920 agreement; the agreement it did sign, in 1933, deviated sharply from the form and
from the principles of the 1920 agreement." Id. at 527. Despite the implication of this
language that du Pont signed the 1933 agreement, it is dear that the agreement was
between Krebs and TP and that du Pont itself did not sign it. Clearly, the court was
here referring to the du Pont family not to du Pont individually. The use by the court
of the phrase "the agreement it did sign" is explained by the fact that Krebs later
became and was an integral part of du Pont at the time suit was instituted.
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member of their family" and "its anomalous position" under the 1933
patent exchange agreement was the subject of frequent discussion and
apprehension which led to constant efforts to convert it into a fully
conforming member. 35° Indeed, Judge Rifkind was forced to admit
that "much of the evidence supports its denial" of complicity. 351 But
he had an explanation for this:
In sharp contrast with NL [National Lead], DP
[du Pont] exhibited from the very beginning of its interest
in titanium, an alert consciousness of the antitrust laws and
moved cautiously and under the guidance of trained antitrust
lawyers. The question is whether it succeeded in avoiding not
only the form but also the substance of the transgression. I
have concluded that it has not . . . . 352
This conclusion was founded entirely upon the circumstances
surrounding the 1933 agreement. A most important fact was the
manifest eagerness of du Pont to obtain access to National Lead's
patents and skill in the titanium field and the latter's equally strong
desire to grant access. Difficulties arose because the cartel agreement
forbade National Lead to grant du Pont a patent license unless it
agreed to adhere to the cartel arrangement. This du Pont repeatedly
refused to do for a number of reasons, the most conspicuous of which
was antitrust prohibition. In this "troubled atmosphere," highly pro-
fessional lawyers well-skilled in antitrust drew the 1933 agreement
between Krebs and TP in terms so vague that counsel disputed its
meaning during the trial. Contemporaneous documents indicated its
uncertainty was intentional. In a letter from a National Lead official
to an English associate, it was explained that the "obscurity" was
"deliberate and the product of fear of the antitrust laws." 353
 While
this letter served to show National Lead's frame of mind in its negoti-
ations with du Pont, it did not establish the illegality of the 1933
agreement, nor did it support any inference adverse to du Pont. Hav-
ing thus determined that the contract was itself insufficient to establish
conspiracy, the court found du Pont had indirectly joined the cartel by
making promises to abide by its terms. Its finding was predicated
upon communications between officials of Krebs and National Lead
which culminated in a telltale letter from the executive vice president
of National to one of the principal cartel members. The letter was
exhibited to Krebs' president before mailing and since it encountered
no objection, was deemed an admission of du Pont's participation in
the cartel.
350 Id. at 527.
351 Id.
352 Id.
353 Id. at 528.
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While Krebs' role in the conspiracy is thus established, du Pont's
involvement is not. There is nothing in the opinion to indicate that
du Pont ever disregarded the separate corporate status of Krebs.
Yet the court considered the two as one. Nowhere is it expained why
du Pont was responsible for the action and knowledge of its subsi-
diary. At one point, where the court "sketched" the "outlines" of the
"story," it said the 1933 agreement was preceded by a "protracted
period of negotiation" between National Lead and du Pont.' How-
ever, no du Pont official was named as a negotiator and the only
person identified as being connected with the neogtiations was the
president of Krebs. According to the court, he acted on behalf of
du Pont, but no factual basis substantiating this conclusion was men-
tioned. The court did, however, explain that the absence of any
evidence showing that du Pont's executive committee knew of his com-
mitments was immaterial for there was "abundant evidence" to establish
that his authority "was broad enough to justify charging the corpora-
tion with his acts in its behalf."3" It is thus implied that Krebs' presi-
dent was authorized by du Pont to act on its behalf. But how was he
authorized? Was he acting as a special agent of du Pont while still a
general agent, indeed an officer, of Krebs, or was Krebs itself con-
sidered nothing more than du Pont's agent? The general tenor of the
opinion quite clearly indicates the latter, for the court continually
identified the two companies, treating them as a single unit, and often
said "du Pont" when it meant "Krebs."'
In any event, it is clear that liability was not imposed upon
du Pont for Krebs' action simply because it later absorbed Krebs
into its own corporate structure, for then there would have been no
need to discuss the authority of Krebs' president to act on du Pont's
behalf. It is also clear that du Pont was found to have joined the
conspiracy between National Lead and its foreign associates through
the acts of Krebs and that the opinion does not proceed along the
avenue normally taken by the judiciary in piercing the corporate
veil. Indeed, the questions which would be made relevant by this
approach are those which the court either ignored or left unanswered.
The court came very close to treating the multicorporate du Pont
family as an enterprise entity."'
The court's handling of the parent-subsidiary problem in United
States v. Imperial Chem. Indus., Ltd.358 differs from that in National
Lead and sheds considerable light on the treatment of this doctrine
354 Id. at 520.
355 Id. at 530-31.
356 See, e.g., note 349 supra.
357 For an explanation of the enterprise-entity theory. see Berle, The Theory of
Enterprise Entity, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 343 (1947).
358 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.DN.Y. 1951).
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under the antitrust laws. The case presents the interesting and con-
trasting picture of a subsidiary being held responsible for the acts of
its parents. It is thus important on the question of enterprise planning
for it shows that too much centralized planning and control of a multi-
corporate business enterprise can cause the coalescence of parent and
subsidiary and lead the courts to regard the entire combination as a
single business unit.
In ICI, it was held that the four corporate defendants—du Pont,
its subsidiary, Remington Arms Company, Inc., Imperial Chemical
Industries, Ltd. (ICI) and its subsidiary Imperial Chemical Industries
(New York), Inc.—together with a number of foreign coconspirators,
entered into various patent and process agreements as part of a con-
spiracy to divide world markets for the manufacture and sale of chem-
ical products, sporting arms, and ammunition.
Du Pont owned more than 50 percent of Remington's stock. The
Government alleged that Remington joined in the conspiracy between
du Pont and ICI in 1933 when du Pont acquired its majority stock
interest in Remington. Specifically it was claimed that, following
this acquisition, du Pont and ICI agreed to extend the conspiracy
so as to include Remington.'" It was also charged that Remington
cooperated with du Pont and ICI to eliminate competition beween
them in furtherance of their agreement. Remington denied participa-
tion in the conspiracy and defended on the ground that "at no time
ha[d] duPont controlled its management, policies or activities,
other than as a right incidental to stock ownership, but that Reming-
ton ha[d] continued to act independently . . . ." 3" Thus, the issue
was drawn as to whether du Pont exercised such control over Reming-
ton as to associate Remington with the conspiracy between it and
ICI.
Here again, the court did not address itself to the arguments
traditionally advanced to support a disregard of the corporate entity,
but simply stated: "The record is clear that duPont and Remington
were managed as one and the same enterprise; Remington was used
to serve and accomplish duPont's objectives."' The court pointed
to the fact that, from the time du Pont secured its majority interest
in Remington, it consistently nominated a majority of the Remington
board of directors with the concomitant result of continuous joint
management and interlocking directorates between the two."' When
du Pont acquired its interest in Remington, however, the Remington
certificate of incorporation was amended to provide for cumulative
359 Id. at 579.
869 Id. at 510.
361 Id. at 581.
862 Id .
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voting for directors which enabled the minority shareholders to elect
members to the board. The court pointed out:
These minority stockholders continued to be active in the
affairs of the corporation. No protest is recorded from them,
however, as to the division of world markets with ICI, only
that "they felt that in equity ICI ought to accept as a general
proposition for discussion, that the Remington Company were
[sic] entitled to expect a continuation of the status quo ante
in foreign markets" . . . 5"
In reaching its decision that "duPont and Remington were managed
as one and the same enterprise . . . . ," the court relied heavily on
the fact that " [d]uPont invariably represented Remington in negotia-
tions with third parties . . . ." 5" The Remington-ICI agreement was
taken as proof of du Pont's domination of Remington. It was negotiated
for Remington by a Remington director who was also a du Pont em-
ployee and it was approved by du Pont's Legal Development and
Foreign Relations departments. Finally, it was acted upon by the
Remington board "subject to approval of the Executive and Finance
Committees of the duPont Company" which was subsequently re-
ceived. 905 There was also du Pont correspondence referring to Reming-
tion as a du Pont-controlled subsidiary. And although the du Pont
majority did in one instance yield to the interest of the minority
shareholders and directors, the court refused to find that du Pont did
not control the acts of Remington. There was, in addition, the similar-
ity between the Remington-ICI patents and process agreements and
the du Pont-ICI agreements to associate Remington with the compre-
hensive conspiracy alleged. Moreover, the court found that the purpose
of Compania Brasileira de Cartuchos (CBC), a Brazilian company
jointly owned by Remington and ICI, was "to carry out and continue
the division of world markets which had long existed between duPont
and ICI. Remington had made itself a part of the conspiracy, and the
creation of CBC was but one step in carrying it into effect in Brazil." 363
In probing the parent-subsidiary problem, the courts have some-
times placed great weight upon the identity of economic interests
between the two corporations where the subsidiary handles all of the
enterprise's foreign business and has acted in a manner which primarily
benefits the parent. In this instance the parent has much difficulty in
insisting that it is the passive beneficiary of the subsidiary's antitrust
violations designed to protect the parent's domestic market position.
368 Id. at 582.
864 Id. at 581.
866 Id. at 584.
366 Id. at 587.
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Such a case is United States v. General Elec. Co. 307 The Government
charged twelve domestic and foreign corporations with a conspiracy
to restrain, and attempt to monopolize, domestic and foreign com-
merce in incandescent electric lamps. The principal defendants in-
cluded General Electric and its wholly owned subsidiary, International
General Electric (IGE). IGE had been organized by General Electric
in 1919 for the purpose of exploiting foreign markets. It was an
"autonomous organization"" and took over and conducted all of
General Electric's foreign assets and business in all areas of the
world except the United States and Canada. The complaint alleged
that General Electric through its subsidiary, IGE, violated the Sher-
man Act by entering into and maintaining patent licenses and other
agreements with potential and actual foreign competitors.'
The magnitude of the task undertaken by the Government to
associate General Electric with the international cartel, termed the
Phoebus agreements, was clearly stated by the court:
On the face of the Phoebus agreements General Electric
and IGE are not parties, United States trade is expressly ex-
cluded and the Sherman Act has no extra-territorial operation.
There appears to be present merely an agreement between
foreign companies doing business abroad . . . No restraint
or conspiracy is present on the face of the agreements but
the Government has undertaken to demonstrate this by ex-
ploration in the nether surface." (Citations omitted.)
The Government's "explorations in the nether surface" consisted
of stressing: (1) IGE's role as the manipulator in bringing about the
Phoebus agreements; (2) the fact that a wholly owned subsidiary of
IGE was a signatory to the agreements and that both corporations
were regarded by General Electric as the same company; and (3) a
series of comprehensive reports from a top IGE official, the chief
architect of the cartel, to General Electric concerning the status of
cartel negotiations. These reports emphasized its benefits to General
Electric and recommended policies to be adopted with reference to
it. Other factors emphasized by the court were the identity of eco-
nomic interests between IGE and General Electric, and the submission
of a dispute involving IGE and one of the foreign conspirators to the
Phoebus tribunal for arbitration. But it was the manifest intent and
effect of the international agreements upon which the court principally
relied to associate General Electric with the cartel. According to the
court:
367 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J 1949).
368 Id. at 772.
369 Id. at 766.
670 Id. at 842.
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The evidence overwhelmingly supports the Government's
contentions for it is a fact that IGE was the manipulator
which brought into being the Phoebus Cartel and General
Electric activities in the United States were geared to the
Phoebus agreement and were controlled by virtue of it. The
Phoebus agreement and the 1941 agreement are complements
of the domestic monopoly and a part of the general conspir-
acy charged."'
Noting that General Electric had thus used its foreign subsidiaries
to develop a cartel system in Europe in order to protect its domestic
market, the court stated: "The gloss of separate corporate entities
employed to insulate General Electric from the consequences of these
maneuvers avails nothing in face of the plain intent to monopolize
the incandescent electric lamp industry in the United States and pro-
tect this dominant position from foreign competition:137'
Almost invariably the foreign subsidiary which seeks to protect
its parent's domestic position from foreign rivalry will document the
intent to do so in internal reports between its personnel and those execu-
tives of the parent charged with the responsibility for central policy
planning for the enterprise as a whole. This occurred in General
Electric and greatly influenced the decision. The court noted that
" [t] he authors of the documents were no minor figures but men of the
stature of 'elder statesmen' who governed, controlled and established
the policies of General Electric in their time,' and then stated:
The conduct of General Electric has been too well geared to
the teachings of these documents for their meaning to be
discounted. . . . These documents have revealed the intent
that governed the policy of General Electric and have lifted
the corporate veil of IGE to expose it as a facile tool and
active conspirator in a scheme whose primary purpose was
the maintenance of General Electric domination over the
lamp industry in the United States by preventing foreign
competition.374
General Electric thus presents a contrast to /C/ on the dangers
inherent in centralized planning in multicorporate business structures.
If /C/ shows that too much supervision by the parent over the sub-
sidiary's decision-making processes can lead the court to conclude
that the two corporations are in fact a single enterprise entity, General
Electric demonstrates that action undertaken by the subsidiary for the
371 Id. at 843.
372 Id.
873 Id. at 845.
3" Id.
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benefit of the parent can lead to the same conclusions. This interesting
and novel parent-subsidiary problem was involved in another inter-
national cartel case. In United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Infor-
mation Center, Inc.,375
 several American and Swiss manufacturers and
sellers of Swiss watches and watch parts and a Swiss trade association
were found guilty of conspiring to restrain interstate and foreign trade
and commerce in watches and watch parts."' Included among the 24
defendants were various United States watch companies and their
wholly owned Swiss subsidiaries. The principal agreement found to
be the basis of the unlawful conspiracy was the "Collective Conven-
tion" executed in Switzerland. According to the court, the purpose of
this agreement "was to protect, develop and stabilize the Swiss watch
industry and to impede the growth of competitive watch industries
outside of Switzerland."3" The court found that this agreement and the
acts done pursuant thereto were intended to and did affect United
States commerce.
The Government sought to associate American corporations, not
signatories to the Collective Convention, with the conspiracy through
the acts of their Swiss affiliates who had executed the agreement. It
was the Government's theory that the wholly owned Swiss subsidiaries
actually controlled their American parents."' This contention was
expressly rejected by the court in an earlier opinion, denying the
motion of the Swiss affiliates to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction over
them:
Although in each case the American parent has financial con-
trol of the Swiss subsidiary, the complaint alleges that it has
voluntarily subjected itself as an affiliate to the restrictive
dominance of the Swiss industry. Granted the Swiss affiliate
did not and could not compel the submission of the American
parent, the American parent has submitted itself to important
policy controls by its subsidiary by permitting the subsidiary
to bind it to the Collective Convention and by permitting the
subsidiary to participate as a member of FH [the Swiss trade
association found to have violated United States law]. The
375 1963 Trade Cas. II 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
376 Specifically, the court found that the defendants had conspired to restrain the
manufacture and sale of watches and watch parts in the United States, imports and
exports of watches and watch parts for manufacturing or repair purposes, and the
furnishing of machinery, materials or technical assistance in violation of both Section 1
of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), and Section 73 of the Wilson Act (Tariff),
15 U.S.C. § 8 ( 1 964).
377 1963 Trade Cas. at 77,426.
373 The two American companies referred to were Omen Watch Company and its
wholly owned Swiss subsidiary Gruen Watch Manufacturing Company, S.A., and Lon-
gines-Wittnauer Watch Company and its wholly owned Swiss subsidiary, Wittnauer et
Cie., S.A.
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American parent may have bought the Swiss company but the
Swiss Company through its know-how and its collective Swiss
relationship determines what watches the American parent
shall sell and at what price and terms and the American com-
pany has committed itself to acquiesce. Also, it has in a
sense pledged its subsidiary to the controlling Swiss forces as
an earnest for its own conduct in the United States. The Swiss
affiliate may be fined or penalized for action by the American
parent here. It is unrealistic to speak in terms of corporate
separation when both have agreed that acts by one corpora-
tion visit penalties upon the other and that one as a member
and in its dealings through FH sets the conditions for the ac-
tions of the other. To that extent the two affiliates do not deal
with each other as independents and it is a sufficient dissolu-
tion of the corporate barrier to make the acts of one the acts
of the other in determining "presence." ... [T] aking an over-
all look at the ... relationships, they are a corporate partner-
ship with a single program 3r6
The court also found another Swiss corporation within its juris-
diction as a result of its control over a. domestic corporation, which
had formerly been its wholly owned subsidiary. While the stock-
ownership relationship between the two corporations no longer existed,
the Swiss defendant retained option rights to compel a reconveyance
of the American corporation to it for a nominal sum 380
In rendering its decision on the merits, the court did not elaborate
on the parent-subsidiary relationships. It simply concluded that the
American parents knew and approved of the execution of the Collec-
tive Conventions by their respective Swiss subsidiaries."' The sub-
stantive decision thus suggests the court found no reason to disagree
with or modify its earlier statements."'
379 United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center, Inc., 133 F. Supp.
40, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
sso Eterna, A.G. Uhrenfabrik was a Swiss corporation having as its sole United
States distributor Eterna Watch Company of America (Eterna, N.Y.). Eterna, N.Y. was
once a wholly owned subsidiary of Eterna, A.G. but had been transferred to two other
Swiss corporations for a consideration of one dollar. As part of the transaction it was
agreed that Eterna, A.G. would appoint Eterna, N.Y. its sole distributor subject to termi-
nation by either party on six months' notice, and that upon termination Eterna, A.G.
had an option to compel a reconveyance of the capital stock of Eterna, N.Y. for a
nominal consideration. 1963 Trade Cas. at 77,418-19; 133 F. Supp. at 49.
381 1963 Trade Cas. at 77,453.
382 One caveat should perhaps be placed at this point: The issue of whether a
court has power to bring a foreign corporation before it because of the acts of its
affiliate is not the same as the issue of whether to impose liability on one corporation
for the acts of its affiliate. Cf., e.g., Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S.
333, 336-37 (1925).
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The Swiss Watchmakers case will probably stand as an anomaly
in antitrust law. It is difficult to conceive of a comparable factual and
evidentiary situation. Nevertheless, the case is important to the present
discussion for two reasons: first, because American corporations were
held responsible under our antitrust laws at least in part for the acts of
their affiliated foreign corporations abroad; and second, because for-
eign corporations were brought within the jurisdiction of United States
courts and found to have violated our antitrust laws on the basis of
their relationships to "affiliated" American companies conducting busi-
ness within the United States. Like /C/, the decision also suggests there
is no express distinction between holding the parent liable for the acts
of a subsidiary or a subsidiary for the acts of a parent. In antitrust
cases, the corporate veil apparently can be pierced from either side
whenever two affiliated companies are shown to be "managed as one
and the same enterprise"' or "a corporate partnership with a single
program" is proved.
While there is nothing in the cases to support the formulation of
any specific rules on the vicarious liability of an American corporation
for the antitrust violations of its overseas establishment, it is possible
to make some meaningful observations.
First, the decisions support the conclusion that a corporation
may be associated with a conspiracy through the acts of an affiliated—
parent or wholly or partially owned subsidiary—corporation without
application of the "instrumentality," "agency" or related rules. In
each case except Alcoa, the courts relied primarily upon the actions
of one corporation to associate another with the conspiracy. While
something more than the normal relationship between the parent and
subsidiary probably must still be shown before the corporate fiction
will be disregarded, the degree of domination required under the tra-
ditional rules need not be shown. A judicial willingness to probe the
relationship to determine whose interests are fundamentally involved
in particular actions is rapidly developing. The identity of economic
interests of parent and subsidiary has enabled the judiciary to view
conduct in its total economic perspective and ferret out the actual
consequences of actions taken by parent and subsidiary alike. A find-
ing that one of the affiliated corporations was the sole or primary
beneficiary of cartel agreements or other unlawful practices involving
the other, has frequently led to the conclusion that the former was
intended to and did act for the purpose of accomplishing the latter's
end. And a finding that both corporations were benefited as an enter-
prise entity has similarly led to the conclusion that this was the
intended result. Under these circumstances, the form of separate
corporate existence has been found impotent to insulate one of the
383 See text accompanying note 364 supra.
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corporate entities from the consequences of the other's actions. It
may be that the courts are, in effect if not in theory, beginning to
accept for antitrust purposes the enterprise entity theory advanced by
some authorities as a substitute for the instrumentality rule."'
Second, proof of violation by more than one defendant has been
greatly simplified. The evidentiary basis of the cases gives birth to
some interesting and potent consequences. In each case, affiliates were
charged with being coconspirators; sometimes they were named as
defendants. As such they became subject to the rule permitting the use
of documents and statements of one conspirator as evidence against
another when the latter's relationship to the conspiracy has been inde-
pendently established. This raises the possibility that the corporate
relationship may serve as a substitute for the burden of independent
proof. Thus if it is assumed that A and B have conspired and it is
sought to associate C with their conspiracy, independent proof con-
necting C with A and B may not be necessary. Instead, it may be
sufficient to associate C's subsidiary D with A and B as a party to the
conspiracy and then rely upon C's relationship with D to show that C
as well as A, B and D were all conspirators. The potential advantages
of this approach to the Government are indeed obvious where the par-
ent and subsidiary are horizontally related and the subsidiary has en-
tered into cartel agreements protecting its parent's markets as well as
its own. But the ramifications of the theory do not stop here. The multi-
corporate, vertically integrated enterprise can encounter similar prob-
lems. Consider, for example, a marketing firm, D, having as its sole
or principal purpose the distribution of products manufactured by C,
an affiliated firm, where D has agreed with outsiders, A and B, to
restrain trade. If the agreement substantially benefits C, the relation-
ship between C and D may result in a finding that C is also a conspira-
tor. Since one member of a multicorporate family seldom acts solely
on its own behalf without attempting to benefit the family as a unit,
this theory has potent ramifications. It could become the normal rather
than the unusual situation for the Government to allege that the
affiliates of the active conspirators are coconspirators.
Finally, in the case of partially owned subsidiaries and joint
ventures, there is the problem of the nonconspiratorial shareholder. The
case of the other investors in the partially owned subsidiary can be
easily dismissed because they are simply investors. There is no basis
for imposing liability upon them. But the joint venture raises distinct
problems where the nonparticipant owns insufficient stock either to
control or to block control and does not join in any attempt to control.
There is no reason why he should be responsible for the acts of the
joint corporation.
384 See Berle, supra note 357.
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The problem becomes more difficult where the shareholder has
sufficient shares to block intervention by any other shareholder and to
prevent the joint enterprise from engaging in illegal conduct, but does
not do so. There are, of course, no cases dealing specifically with this
problem and, consequently, no judicially recognized answer to the ques-
tion exists. For this reason, any attempt to formulate rules is fraught
with peril, particularly in light of the limitless intricacies of corporate
relationships and the ingenuity of counsel.
In a slightly different context, whenever one of the parents has
advance knowledge of the proposed plan of another to have their
joint subsidiary engage in conduct violative of the antitrust laws, he
may have an obligation to exercise whatever control he has to stop
the commission of the offensive act. If he does not, he is effectively
participating in the illegal conduct, for the very essence of a joint
venture is that it is a partnership enterprise of the parents. However,
to impose responsibility here because of partial ownership and control
and derivative benefits, would constitute a marked departure from the
general rule that corporate parents are not chargeable for the conduct
of their wholly or partially owned subsidiaries. As a general rule, it
would seem that joint venturers, just as any other corporate parents,
should not be held responsible for the unlawful acts of their joint
enterprise except to the extent that they participate in them.
Nevertheless, the very nature of the joint venture—a collaboration
of partners taking an active part in the direction and management of
the joint enterprise—may lead to the judicial imposition of responsi-
bility. Of course, if one of the partners dissents from the unlawful
acts he liberates himself from liability. In any event, the case where
one partner claims the status of a nonparticipating shareholder should
be viewed with extreme caution. No matter how small his interest, the
joint venturer is an active participant in the activities of the joint enter-
prise and he may not be permitted to claim the complete freedom of
one who has not encouraged or otherwise participated in the decision
to commit the illegal act.
V. RECAPITULATION
When the American businessman decides to expand his operations
and engage in business abroad, there are essentially four forms of
organizational structure available for choice: (1) the unincorporated
branch, division or department; (2) the wholly owned subsidiary; (3)
the partially owned subsidiary; and (4) the joint venture. While the
businessman's ultimate choice may depend on tax or other factors, a
meaningful decision must take account of the distinct antitrust conse-
quences attendant on each form of organization. These consequences
may arise in the act of establishment itself, during internal manage-
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ment operations, or as the result of independent acts of the foreign
establishment. The businessman will need to consider specifically the
likelihood of being liable under the antitrust laws for conduct which
violates Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act or Section 7 of the Clayton
Act. He will have to consider the possibility of being held vicariously
liable for the acts of his foreign establishment. Because one organiza-
tional structure may be preferable for some purposes but not for others
he will have to compare the probable consequences of each form in the
context of these areas of antitrust concern.
A. The Legality of the Establishment
At the outset it can quickly and safely be stated that the act
of establishing an overseas branch or subsidiary cannot in itself be
considered violative of the antitrust laws. It becomes illegal only when
the establishment is used to accomplish an illegal end or is the fruit
of otherwise unlawful conduct. The major antitrust problems which
might arise are connected with the market dominance or size of the
expanding firm rather than with the fact of establishment. These
situations could well lead to monopoly problems under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.
The occurrence of either contingency is unlikely, because, even for
large firms, internal expansion is generally considered normal, permis-
sible business behavior. Violations occur only in those unusual instances
where there is a specific intent to restrain or monopolize United States
trade or where the establishment has such significant market impact
that it unreasonably restricts the opportunities of competitors to ob-
tain or market their products in the relevant geographic market. In
the latter event, the major issue centers on the determination of the
appropriate market. It may be large enough to encompass all or part
of the domestic or foreign market alternatives available for American
business opportunity and thus reduce still further the possibility of
antitrust illegality.
While internal expansion is thus relatively secure from antitrust
attack, external expansion is not. Whenever the foreign extension is
achieved through the acquisition of an existing foreign business con-
cern, it must be tested under additional prohibitions. If large com-
panies merge to form the foreign establishment, a restraint of trade in
violation of the Sherman Act may develop. This arises when the merg-
ing companies constitute such major competitive factors in the relevant
market that their combination eliminates significant competition be-
tween them and also occurs when the merger forecloses competitors
from substantial supplies or outlets and hence unduly restricts their
opportunity to buy or sell. In contrast, Section 7 of the Clayton Act
can be violated by small acquisitions, permissible under the Sherman
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Act, since there may nevertheless be a reasonable probability that
they may substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly.
The significant issue in this area lies in the jurisdictional requirements
of section 7 which may prevent its application to acquisitions threaten-
ing injury only to the export commerce of the United States. For the
most part no distinction can be drawn between complete and partial
stock or asset acquisitions since both are covered by the Clayton Act.
However, section 7 does exempt from its prohibitions stock purchases
which are made "solely for investment" and not used to bring about
the substantial lessening of competition and, therefore, the true
"investor" encounters no antitrust difficulties.
Although the status of branch and subsidiary operations is clear,
the legality of collaborative ventures in foreign commerce is less cer-
tain and raises distinct problems. Their permissibility depends not only
upon the lawfulness of their conception but also upon the reasonable-
ness of the combination of the parents. Joint ventures have often
been established to cloak a division of markets by their parents and
sometimes they can be found to possess pernicious effects and to lack
redeeming social virtue. In either case, the establishment of a joint
venture which is the result of acquisition or the creation of a new
enterprise is unlawful under the Sherman Act.
Since joint ventures are also deemed to constitute "acquisitions"
even when newly created, at least when their parents are engaged
in commerce, they must also satisfy the stringent tests of section 7.
Under both the Sherman and Clayton Acts, the key issue is justifica-
tion for the collaboration. This generally requires at the minimum a
showing of absence of prior competition between the venturers in the
joint market and of the inability of one of them to go it alone. Under
the Clayton Act it is additionally necessary to determine that the ven-
turer who would not have entered the market alone but might have
remained at its edge did not constitute a substantial incentive to com-
petition in the market.
It is important to remember that there are restraints inherent
in every joint venture. While the danger to the competitive system is
perhaps more pronounced in the horizontal situation where competi-
tors combine in joint activity, this does not necessarily prohibit col-
laboration. It is only when, in light of all the circumstances, an undue
limitation on competition exists, that any joint enterprise may be pro-
scribed. To generalize, much depends upon who joins, what is joined
and especially what market is served by the joint enterprise. Joint
ventures between or among businesses, even competitors, which are
too small to have an appreciable competitive impact upon the mar-
ket will not incur antitrust displeasure. On the other hand, the joint
operations of dominant or major firms, particularly actual or potential
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competitors, are almost certain to encounter antitrust difficulties.
Between these extremes, all that can be said is that, before a joint
enterprise is undertaken, its competitive merits and its potential anti-
trust consequences should be assessed.
B. Internal Conspiracies
While no distinction is drawn between incorporated and unincor-
porated foreign business operations for purposes of determining the
validity of their establishment, their separate legal status and struc-
tures are important in assessing the import of antitrust problems
arising in their operation.
1. Unincorporated Establishments.—The chief antitrust advantage of
the branch, division or department form of business organization, not
offered by any other organizational structure, is the reduction of the
problem of internal conspiracy to a minimum. With the unincorporated
foreign structure there is, except in rare circumstances, only one
legal entity, and it takes at least two to make a conspiracy. The unity
of corporate personality allows the greatest freedom in the area of
normal business operations. The home office can set policy for its
foreign branches, divisions or departments. It can adopt policies which
will divide territories, fix prices, regulate output and otherwise tend to
avoid competition inter sese without fear of antitrust violation. Con-
spiratorial conduct can occur only when corporate personnel combine
with outside agents or in the extraordinary situation where branches,
divisions or departments of a single corporation have the status of
autonomous and independently functioning subsidiaries and combine
among themselves on a horizontal plane without direction from above.
In any event, there is nothing in the rationes decendendi of the cases
which poses any threat to foreign expansion or erects any barrier to
centralized management control within the structure of a single cor-
porate enterprise.
2. Wholly Owned Subsidiaries.—The major problem here concerns
the internal relationship of the two corporations and, specifically, the
question whether the parent's centralized management will mesh the
two in an intraenterprise conspiracy. The doctrine has seldom been
invoked by government enforcement agencies, despite the fact that
the Supreme Court promulgated it in broad and sweeping terms. More-
over, in those few instances where it has been used, the courts have
ordinarily interpreted it narrowly. The explanation most of ten given
for this governmental and judicial hesitancy to apply intraenterprise
principles broadly is that it would place thousands of companies in
constant violation of the antitrust laws. An overwhelming majority of
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the commentators who have considered the question have concluded
that there is no substantive distinction between the single business
enterprise which conducts operations on a multicorporate basis and one
which operates within the framework of a single corporate shell. The
same community of interest which exists between a corporation and
its unincorporated components exists also between parent and sub-
sidiary and should permit the latter two to be regarded as a single
unit. The use of subsidiaries instead of branches, divisions or depart-
ments is generally selected for reasons divorced from market considera-
tions and, therefore, no social objective is attained by enjoining them
from agreeing not to compete with each other. Accordingly, it is
generally conceded that it is not unlawful for a parent corporation to
determine its subsidiaries' policies—including price fixing and market
division as well as other arrangements designed to avoid competition
within the family. Though an abundance of caution might suggest the
avoidance of horizontal agreements in order to negate the impression
of competition between subsidiaries, it is clear that the parent's con-
trol will enable it to direct the affairs of its subsidiaries through normal
voting channels without the necessity for formal agreement.
3. Partially Owned Subsidiaries.—The rationale which permits cen-
tralized planning when one corporation owns all the stock of another
may also permit it when there is less than complete ownership, for a
parent-subsidiary relationship may still exist. As the percentage of
ownership decreases, however, the control of the parent is diluted and
the community of interest beween the two corporations gradually dis-
appears. If the minority interest is held by persons who are or could
be competitors of the majority stockholder, it may be impossible to
find an enterprise entity. Accordingly, the enterprise theory which
permits treating the parent and its subsidiaries as a single trader
offers no justification for formal agreements here due to the existence
of a competing interest in the partially owned corporation. The doc-
trine is equally inapplicable where the parent's controlling position
stems from a minority stock interest even though the remainder of the
stock is widely held. In these latter two instances, however, the parent's
controlling stock interest will enable it to exercise management con-
trol without antitrust "combination" through normal voting channels.
4. Joint Ventures.—The joint venture, if incorporated, has an inde-
pendent legal personality separate and distinct from its parents, which
are separate and distinct from each other. Because each parent is
actively engaged in the direction and management of the joint enter-
prise, it does not possess a community of interest with any of them.
The absence of an identity of interest between the joint venture and its
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parents, either severally or individually, makes the enterprise entity
concept inapplicable to them. Consequently, agreements between the
joint venture and its parents limiting competition inter sese are unlaw-
ful unless reasonably ancillary to a primary lawful purpose such as the
creation of the joint enterprise itself, or the licensing of valid patent,
trademark or secret process rights.
The same result follows when the joint venture is not incorporated
or established with a separate and distinct legal personality, indepen-
dent from that of its parents. Absent the creation of a separate cor-
porate personality, there is simply an agreement between the collobora-
tors by which they jointly agree upon the bases on which they will
engage in foreign commerce. The agreement is permitted only to the
extent that the joint venture itself is justified.
C. Vicarious Liability
Issues as to the vicarious liablility of the American corporation
for the antitrust violations of its overseas establishment center exclu-
sively on the subsidiary and joint venture forms of business structures.
Since the unincorporated foreign branch, division or department is but
an extension of the American corporation, its acts are the acts of the
corporation which bears full responsibility for them. While this is clear,
there is no easy answer to the question of when the American parent
will be held liable for the acts of its wholly or partially owned foreign
subsidiaries. It is often said that the parent will not be visited with
responsibilty unless it participated in them. But this statement is
deceptively simple, for the parent has frequently been charged with
the violation. The actual basis of liability is admittedly unclear, and
though the test appears to be the exercise of control over, or interven-
tion in, specific acts, the degree of parental participation required
remains clouded. About the only conclusion that can be safely drawn
is that the courts are placing antitrust responsibility upon the parent
for its subsidiary's actions without laboring expressly to fit the particu-
lar intracorporate relationship into the traditional straitjackets of
the "instrumentality," "agency" and related rules. The enterprise-
entity concept is beginning to receive judicial recognition. Nevertheless,
the apparent requirement of some kind of "participation" shows, at
least for the present, that a parent corporation is not generally respon-
sible for the antitrust violations of its overseas subsidiaries.
Since the joint venture is simply a partially owned joint subsidiary,
the same general rule of nonliability of the parent for its subsidiary's
actions obtains here also. Problems arise only where one of the parents
has advance knowledge that another intends to intervene in the affairs
of the joint enterprise in a manner that will involve it in conduct pro-
hibited by the antitrust laws. If the nonconspiratorial venturer does not
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exercise whatever control he has to block the intervention, he effectively
becomes a passive participant in the illegal conduct. There is an out-
side chance that the peculiar status of a joint venture, encompassing as
it does the collaboration of partners taking an active part in the direc-
tion and management of their joint enterprise, may permit piercing the
corporate veil and justify the imposition of responsibility upon the
passive beneficiary of its partner's illegal action. However, to impose
liability here because of partial ownership, control and derivative bene-
fits, would constitute a marked departure from the general rule that
corporate parents are not chargeable for the conduct of their subsi-
diaries.
Two final thoughts would appear appropriate. First, it has been
suggested by at least one writer that a distinction be made between
participation in foreign cartels which are limited by their terms and
effect to local foreign markets and participation in international cartels
which keep foreign companies out of the United States. 385 Under this
theory, the participation of the overseas establishment in a cartel
limited to foreign markets would not be within the ambit of concern
of the United States antitrust laws unless it operates to exclude
American exports or exporters. Second, it has also been suggested that
neither the American company nor its foreign establishment should be
deemed an antitrust violator when the overseas enterprise becomes the
unwilling participant in a so-called unlimited foreign cartel."' The
basis for this suggestion is that in foreign commerce, as opposed to
domestic commerce, "there may well be situations where the thinness
of the market or private bargaining power make acquiescence in a
restrictive agreement a sine qua non of doing any business at all."" 7
Under these circumstances, it is argued, the "thrust upon" doctrine
should excuse participation. While there is little if any judicial support
for these theories, they do merit consideration.
D. Conclusion
There is no such thing as the form of business organization which
is the "safest" to adopt from an overall antitrust viewpoint. On spe-
cific issues, a particular type of organizational structure may give rise
to fewer antitrust problems than others, but on other issues the reverse
is true. For example, the unincorporated foreign branch reduces the
problem of possible unlawful conspiracy between the home office and
the overseas establishment to a minimum, but at the same time in-
creases the antitrust exposure of the American corporation to possible
liability for the acts of its overseas personnel. On the other hand,
385 Brewster, supra note 22, at 186.
386 Id. at 88.
887 Id.
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utilization of a foreign subsidiary reduces the risk that the American
corporation will be held responsible for the unlawful acts of its foreign
subsidiaries, but increases the risk that conspiracy charges will spring
from the internal relationship among members of the multicorporate
family. Thus while one cannot say that any one form of business
organization is the "safest," one can certainly conclude_that the joint
venture is fraught with the most peril.
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